

1. THE ABANDONED ROAD

A programme whose basic thesis is, not that the system of free enterprise for profit has failed in this generation, but that it has not yet been tried.

F. D. Roosevelt.

When the course of civilisation takes an unexpected turn, when instead of the continuous progress which we have come to expect, we find ourselves threatened by evils associated by us with past ages of barbarism, we blame naturally anything but ourselves. Have we not all striven according to our best lights, and have not many of our finest minds incessantly worked to make this a better world? Have not all our efforts and hopes been directed towards greater freedom, justice, and prosperity? If the outcome is so different from our aims, if, instead of freedom and prosperity, bondage and misery stare us in the face, is it not clear that sinister forces must have foiled our intentions, that we are the victims of some evil power which must be conquered before we can resume the road to better things? However much we may differ when we name the culprit, whether it is the wicked capitalist or the vicious spirit of a particular nation, the stupidity of our elders, or a social system not yet, although we have struggled against it for half a century, fully overthrown—we all are, or at least were until recently, certain of one thing: that the leading ideas which during the last generation have become common to most people of goodwill and have determined the major changes in our social life cannot have been wrong. We are ready to accept almost any explanation of the present crisis of our civilisation except one: that the present state of the world may be the result of genuine error on our own part, and that the pursuit of some of our most cherished ideals have apparently produced results utterly different from those which we expected.

While all our energies are directed to bringing this war to a victorious conclusion, it is sometimes difficult to remember that even before the war the values for which we are now fighting were threatened here and destroyed elsewhere. Though for the time being the different ideals are represented by hostile nations fighting for their existence, we must not forget that this conflict has grown out of a struggle of ideas within what, not so long ago, was a common European civilisation; and that the tendencies which have culminated in the creation of the totalitarian systems were not confined to the countries which have succumbed to them. Though the first task must now be to win the war, to win it will only gain us another opportunity to face the basic problems and to find a way of averting the fate which has overtaken kindred civilisations.

Now, it is somewhat difficult to think of Germany and Italy, or of Russia, not as different worlds, but as products of a development of thought in which we have shared; it is, at least so far as our enemies are concerned, easier and more comforting to think that they are entirely different from us and that what happened there cannot happen here. Yet the history of these countries in the years before the rise of the totalitarian system showed few features with which we are not familiar. The external conflict is a result of a transformation of European thought in which others have moved so much faster as to bring them into irreconcilable conflict with our ideals, but which has not left us unaffected.

1. 被放弃了的道路

一个政府方略，其基本命题是，对这一代人而言，不是逐利的自由企业制度失败了，而是根本还没试。

富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福

当人类文明的进程突然掉头，不再如我们所期望的那样持续进步，我们发现与过去野蛮时代关联在一起的邪恶开始威胁我们的时候，自然而然，我们责备一切，除了自己。难道我们没有尽最大的努力吗？难道不是有很多最聪明的人在为更美好的世界夜以继日吗？难道我们所有的努力和希望不是以更自由、公平与繁荣为目标吗？如果结果与初衷天差地别，我们看到的是奴役与悲惨而不是自由与繁荣，难道还不清楚是邪恶势力阻遏了我们，我们成了某些邪恶力量的牺牲品，我们必须击败它才能继续对美好的追求吗？在指出谁是罪魁祸首时，不管我们分歧多大，无论是道德败坏的资本家还是某个民族灵魂邪恶，无论是老一辈的愚蠢还是我们与之斗争了半个世纪还没推翻的社会制度——至少直到最近，我们都肯定一点：过去一代善意人们共同接受的，决定了我们社会生活重大变革的主要思想，不可能有错。人类文明发展到今天的危机，我们几乎可以接受任何解释，除了一条：世界今天的模样或许是我们自身真正的错误造成的，我们对抱有的某些理想的追求明显地产生了与期望大相径庭的结果。

当我们所有精力都用来以取得二战的胜利，有时候很难记得，即使在战前，我们现在为之奋斗的价值已经在这里受到威胁，在他处受到摧毁。尽管当前为存亡而战的敌对国家代表不同的理想，我们不应忘记，不久之前欧洲还是统一的文明，冲突正源于其中的思想斗争；登峰造极，产生极权制度的趋势并不局限于那些已屈从的国家。尽管现在第一要务是赢得战争，但战争胜利仅将再给我们一次机会，面对基本问题，寻找避免重蹈类似文明覆辙的途径。

现在不把德国、意大利和俄国想作不同的世界，而是我们同样思想发展而成的产物，多少有点困难；就我们的敌人而言，至少把他们想成跟我们完全不同，他们那里发生的事在我们这里不会发生，更容易更舒服些。然而，这些国家在极权制度出现之前几年的历史几乎没有我们不熟悉的特征。外在冲突是欧洲思想转变的结果。思想变化在其他国家发展快很多，从而产生了与我们理想不可调和的矛盾。我们并非置身变化之外。

That a change of ideas, and the force of human will, have made the world what it is now, though men did not foresee the results, and that no spontaneous change in the facts obliged us thus to adapt our thought, is perhaps particularly difficult for the English to see, just because in this development the English have, fortunately for them, lagged behind most of the European peoples. We still think of the ideals which guide us and have guided us for the past generation, as ideals only to be realised in the future, and are not aware how far in the last twenty-five years they have already transformed, not only the world, but also this country. We still believe that until quite recently we were governed by what are vaguely called nineteenth century ideas or the principle of *laissez-faire*. Compared with some other countries, and from the point of view of those impatient to speed up the change, there may be some justification for such belief. But although till 1931 this country had followed only slowly on the path on which others had led, even by then we had moved so far that only those whose memory goes back to the years before the last war know what a liberal world has been like¹.

The crucial point of which people here are still so little aware is, however, not merely the magnitude of the changes which have taken place during the last generation, but the fact that they mean a complete change in the direction of the evolution of our ideas and social order. For at least twenty-five years before the spectre of totalitarianism became a real threat, we had progressively been moving away from the basic ideas on which European civilisation has been built. That this movement on which we have entered with such high hopes and ambitions should have brought us face to face with the totalitarian horror has come as a profound shock to this generation, which still refuses to connect the two facts. Yet this development merely confirms the warnings of the fathers of the liberal philosophy which we still profess. We have progressively abandoned that freedom in economic affairs without which personal and political freedom has never existed in the past. Although we had been warned by some of the greatest political thinkers of the nineteenth century, by *de Tocqueville* and Lord Acton, that socialism means slavery, we have steadily moved in the direction of socialism. And now that we have seen a new form of slavery arise before our eyes, we have so completely forgotten the warning, that it scarcely occurs to us that the two things may be connected².

How sharp a break not only with the recent past but with the whole evolution of Western civilisation the modern trend towards socialism means, becomes clear if we consider it not merely against the background of the nineteenth century, but in a longer historical perspective. We are rapidly abandoning not the views merely of Cobden and Bright, of Adam Smith and Hume, or even of Locke and Milton, but one of the salient characteristics of Western civilisation as it has grown from the foundations laid by Christianity and the Greeks and Romans. Not merely nineteenth- and eighteenth-century liberalism, but the basic individualism inherited by us from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero and Tacitus, Pericles and Thucydides is progressively relinquished.

观念的变化、人意志的力量造就了今天的世界，尽管人类未曾事先料想到结果，并且事实上也没有自身变化因此迫使我们迁就于自己的思想。这一点对英国人来说可能特别难理解，仅仅因为在这个发展过程中，英国人万幸地落后于大多数欧洲民族。我们仍把现在的理想、过去一代人的理想视作追求的理想，我们没有意识到过去二十五年它们已经完全改变了这个世界，改变了英国。直到最近，我们还在相信我们遵循的是含糊的所谓十九世纪思想或者自由放任主义原则。对比其他国家，从那些急不可耐想加速变革的人的观点出发，那样相信或许有些道理。直到 1931 年，英国在追随其他国家步伐很慢，但是即便如此，到 1931 年改变已如此之大，以致只有还记得一战前样子的人知道一个自由的世界是什么样的。

然而，英国人仍然很少意识到的关键一点是，过去一代发生变化不仅仅是量变，事实上意味着我们思想和社会秩序的演化方向发生了彻底的改变。极权主义幽灵成为真正威胁之前的二十五年里，我们就已经逐渐偏离了作为欧洲文明基石的基本观念。应该是我们怀着崇高希望与抱负开始的这场运动带给我们的极权主义直接威胁，这对仍然不愿意把这两者联系起来的我们这一代人来说是深深的震惊。然而，这一发展仅仅证实了我们仍宣称信仰的自由主义哲学之父们的警告。我们已经逐步放弃了经济事务中的自由，在过去，没有经济的自由就绝不存在个人自由和政治自由。尽管十九世纪托克维尔和阿克顿爵士这些伟大的政治思想家警告过我们说社会主义就意味着奴役，我们还是稳步朝社会主义方向前进。现在我们已经看到新形式的奴役在眼前出现，我们已经把警告忘得如此一干二净，以致几乎不能想到二者可能有联系。

如果不仅置之于一九世纪背景，而在更长远的历史视角来看，我们就能清楚地看到，现代社会主义趋势不仅意味着对西方文明的最近发展而且意味着对其整个演化过程的急剧决裂。我们正在快速放弃的不仅是考布登、布莱特、亚当·斯密和休谟，甚至是洛克和米尔顿的观点，而且正在放弃从基督教、希腊人、罗马人基础上发展而来的西方文明的最突出的特色之一。逐步放弃的不仅是十八世纪、十九世纪的自由主义，还有我们从伊拉斯谟、蒙田、西塞罗、塔西陀、伯里克利以及修昔底德那里继承而来的基本的个人主义。

¹ Even in that year the Macmillan Report could speak already of "the change of outlook of the government of this country in recent times, its growing pre-occupation, irrespective of party, with the management of the life of the people" and add that "Parliament finds itself increasingly engaged in legislation which has for its conscious aim the regulation of the day-to-day affairs of the community and now intervenes in matters formerly thought to be entirely outside its scope". This could be said before, later in the same year, the country finally took the headlong plunge and, in the short space of the inglorious years 1931 to 1939, transformed its economic system beyond recognition.

² Even much more recent warnings which have proved dreadfully true have been almost entirely forgotten. It is not yet thirty years since Mr. Hilaire Belloc, in a book which explains more of what has happened since in Germany than most works written after the event, explained that "the effect of Socialist doctrine on Capitalist society is to produce a third thing different from either of its two begetters-to-wit, the Servile State" (*The Servile State*, 1913, 3rd ed. 1927, p. xiv).

The Nazi leader who described the National-Socialist revolution as a counter-Renaissance spoke more truly than he probably knew. It was the decisive step in the destruction of that civilisation which modern man had built up from the age of the Renaissance and which was above all an individualist civilisation. Individualism has a bad name today and the term has come to be connected with egotism and selfishness. But the individualism of which we speak in contrast to socialism and all other forms of collectivism has no necessary connection with these. Only gradually in the course of this book shall we be able to make clear the contrast between the two opposing principles. But the essential features of that individualism which, from elements provided by Christianity and the philosophy of classical antiquity, was first fully developed during the Renaissance and has since grown and spread into what we know as Western European civilisation—the respect for the individual man *qua* man, that is the recognition of his own views and tastes as supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the belief that it is desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and bents. "Freedom" and "liberty" are now words so worn with use and abuse that one must hesitate to employ them to express the ideals for which they stood during that period. Tolerance is, perhaps, the only word which still preserves the full meaning of the principle which during the whole of this period was in the ascendant and which only in recent times has again been in decline, to disappear completely with the rise of the totalitarian state.

The gradual transformation of a rigidly organised hierarchic system into one where men could at least attempt to shape their own life, where man gained the opportunity of knowing and choosing between different forms of life, is closely associated with the growth of commerce. From the commercial cities of Northern Italy the new view of life spread with commerce to the west and north, through France and the south-west of Germany to the Low Countries and the British Isles, taking firm root wherever there was no despotic political power to stifle it. In the Low Countries and Britain it for a long time enjoyed its fullest development and for the first time had an opportunity to grow freely and to become the foundation of the social and political life of these countries. And it was from there that in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it again began to spread in a more fully developed form to the West and East, to the New World and the centre of the European continent where devastating wars and political oppression had largely submerged the earlier beginnings of a similar growth.

During the whole of this modern period of European history the general direction of social development was one of freeing the individual from the ties which had bound him to the customary or prescribed ways in the pursuit of his ordinary activities. The conscious realisation that the spontaneous and uncontrolled efforts of individuals were capable of producing a complex order of economic activities could come only after this development had made some progress. The subsequent elaboration of a consistent argument in favour of economic freedom was the outcome of a free growth of economic activity which had been the undesigned and unforeseen by-product of political freedom.

纳粹领导人说民族社会主义革命是反文艺复兴的，真是不自觉地说出了真相。从文艺复兴时期以来，现代人类所建立的文明，首先是个人主义的文明，而它是摧毁这个文明决定性的一步。个人主义这个名词今天不太好听，跟利己主义、自私联系在一起。但是我们所说的个人主义，是跟社会主义和其它一切形式的集体主义相对而言，跟利己自私这些没有必然的联系。我们只能通过本书逐步阐明这两对立原则的对照差异。个人主义的基本特征提炼自基督教及古代古典哲学的元素，在文艺复兴时期第一次得以充分发展，此后成长传播，成为我们所知的西欧文明——把个人作为人来尊重，承认个人空间无论多么狭小，其中个人观点与趣味至高无上；以信仰个人最好应该发展自身天赋与爱好。“自由”(Freedom)和“解放”(Liberty)是现在滥用、用烂了的两个词，在使用它们时必须慎重，能否准确传达它们当时所代表的思想。宽容也许是唯一还保留着该原则全部意义的词，社会上的宽容在整个这一时期从开始逐步上升，直到最近这个时代才又逐步下降，将随着极权国家的出现完全消失。

从有严格组织的等级制度逐步转变为一个人们至少可以尝试塑造自己生活的社会制度，在其中有机会了解、选择不同生活方式，这和商业的发展密切相关。从意大利北部商业城市开始，新的人生观随商业发展向西、向北，通过法国、德国西南部传入荷兰以及不列颠群岛，在没有独裁政治势力压迫它的地方扎根成长。在荷兰与英国，它在很长时期得以充分发展，第一次有机会自由地成长，并成为这些国家社会与政治生活的基础。从那里，在十七世纪后期及十八世纪，它又开始以更加成熟的形式传入西方和东方，传到新大陆，传到毁灭性战争和政治压迫曾经很大程度上湮灭了其萌芽的欧洲大陆的中心。

在整个欧洲历史的现代时期，社会发展的总方向是使个人在日常生活中从习惯和定规的约束中解脱出来。只有这个发展到一定程度，我们才能自觉地意识到，个人自发、不受管制的努力能够为经济活动带来复杂的秩序。政治自由带来未经设计、未能预料的副产品，即经济活动的自由增长，随之而来的是拥护经济自由一贯论调的长篇累牍。

Perhaps the greatest result of the unchaining of individual energies was the marvellous growth of science which followed the march of individual liberty from Italy to England and beyond. That the inventive faculty of man had been no less in earlier periods is shown by the many highly ingenious automatic toys and other mechanical contrivances constructed while industrial technique still remained stationary, and by the development in some industries which, like mining or watch-making, were not subject to restrictive controls. But the few attempts towards a more extended industrial use of mechanical inventions, some extraordinarily advanced, were promptly suppressed, and the desire for knowledge was stifled, so long as the dominant views were held to be binding for all: the beliefs of the great majority on what was right and proper were allowed to bar the way of the individual innovator. Only since industrial freedom opened the path to the free use of new knowledge, only, since everything could be tried—if somebody could be found to back it at his own risk—and, it should be added, as often as not from outside the authorities officially entrusted with the cultivation of learning, has science made the great strides which in the last hundred and fifty years have changed the face of the world.

As is so often true, the nature of our civilisation has been seen more clearly by its enemies than by most of its friends: "the perennial Western malady, the revolt of the individual against the species", as that nineteenth-century totalitarian, Auguste Comte, has described it, was indeed the force which built our civilisation. What the nineteenth century added to the individualism of the preceding period was merely to make all classes conscious of freedom, to develop systematically and continuously what had grown in a haphazard and patchy manner and to spread it from England and Holland over most of the European Continent.

The result of this growth surpassed all expectations. Wherever the barriers to the free exercise of human ingenuity were removed man became rapidly able to satisfy ever-widening ranges of desire. And while the rising standard soon led to the discovery of very dark spots in society, spots which men were no longer willing to tolerate, there was probably no class that did not substantially benefit from the general advance. We cannot do justice to this astonishing growth if we measure it by our present standards, which themselves result from this growth and now make many defects obvious. To appreciate what it meant to those who took part in it we must measure it by the hopes and wishes men held when it began: and there can be no doubt that its success surpassed man's wildest dreams, that by the beginning of the twentieth century the working man in the Western world had reached a degree of material comfort, security, and personal independence which a hundred years before had seemed scarcely possible.

What in the future will probably appear the most significant and far-reaching effect of this success is the new sense of power over their own fate, the belief in the unbounded possibilities of improving their own lot, which the success already achieved created among men. With the success grew ambition—and man had every right to be ambitious. What had been an inspiring promise seemed no longer enough, the rate of progress far too slow; and the principles which had made this progress possible in the past came to be regarded more as obstacles to speedier progress, impatiently to be brushed away, than as the conditions for the preservation and development of what had already been achieved.

个人自由从意大利传播到英格兰、到更远，个人能量得以释放，所带来最伟大的结果可能是科学奇迹般的成长。较早时期，创造力并不见得少，工业技术虽然停滞不前但有很多非常巧妙的自动玩意、机械发明，还有一些没有管制的行业如采矿、钟表制造的发展，都可以看出这点。但是只要占主导地位的观点对所有人能有约束作用，绝大多数人是非观被允许阻遏个人发明，少数机械发明大规模行业推广应用的尝试，其中有些非常先进，很快就被压制，对知识的渴求也被窒息了。只有产业自由为新知识的运用大开方便之门，只有，当什么事情都可以尝试——如果有人支持并承担风险——并且，应该指出的是，往往是授权负责学术的官方机构之外的尝试，科学才能取得长足的进步，这在过去一百五十年间改变了世界的面貌。

常常对的是，对我们文明的本质，敌人比大多数朋友看得更清楚，十九世纪极权主义者奥古斯塔·孔德说“西方世界的陈年固疾，个人对种族的反抗”，这的确是成就我们文明的动力。十九世纪对之前个人主义的贡献只是使所有阶级意识到自由的存在，使得杂乱无章野蛮生长的自由得以系统地持续地发展，从英格兰和荷兰传播到大部分欧洲大陆。

成长的结果超出所有人期望。无论哪里只要消除了人类创造力自由发挥的障碍，人类不断扩大的欲望都能快速得以满足。并且虽然标准的提高导致很快发现了社会污点，人们不再愿意忍受的污点，但可能没有哪一个社会阶级没从普遍的进步中得到实惠。如按现在的标准来衡量，我们难以正确评价这个惊人的进步；现在的标准本身就是源于这一进步，并且因此暴露出很多社会的不足。正确评价这对于置身其中的人的意义，我们应该基于初衷来衡量，其成功毫无疑问超过了人类最大胆的想象，到二十世纪初，西方世界一个工薪阶层达到了物质上舒适、有保障并且个人独立的程度，这些一百年之前看起来几乎不可能。

可能出现在将来的，这一成功最重要、最深远的影响是人类对于掌握自己命运的力量有了新的理解，相信有无限的可能来改善成功已经造就的一切。成功激发壮志——人类完全有权雄心勃勃。曾经鼓舞人心的誓言已经不够了，发展速度太慢；过去那些促成进步的原则道理不再被视为保持成果、扩大成果的前提条件，更多地被看作加速发展的绊脚石，欲除之而后快。

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There is nothing in the basic principles of liberalism to make it a stationary creed, there are no hard-and-fast rules fixed once and for all. The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of applications. There is, in particular, all the difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible, and passively accepting institutions as they are. Probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of *laissez-faire*. Yet in a sense this was necessary and unavoidable. Against the innumerable interests who could show that particular measures would confer immediate and obvious benefits on some, while the harm they caused was much more indirect and difficult to see, nothing short of some hard-and-fast rule would have been effective. And since a strong presumption in favour of industrial liberty had undoubtedly been established, the temptation to present it as a rule which knew no exceptions was too strong always to be resisted.

But with this attitude taken by many popularisers of the liberal doctrine, it was almost inevitable that, once their position was penetrated at some points, it should soon collapse as a whole. The position was further weakened by the inevitably slow progress of a policy which aimed at a gradual improvement of the institutional framework of a free society. This progress depended on the growth of our understanding of the social forces and the conditions most favourable to their working in a desirable manner. Since the task was to assist, and where necessary to supplement, their operation, the first requisite was to understand them. The attitude of the liberal towards society is like that of the gardener who tends a plant and in order to create the conditions most favourable to its growth must know as much as possible about its structure and the way it functions.

No sensible person should have doubted that the crude rules in which the principles of economic policy of the nineteenth century were expressed were only a beginning, that we had yet much to learn, and that there were still immense possibilities of advancement on the lines on which we had moved. But this advance could only come as we gained increasing intellectual mastery of the forces of which we had to make use. There were many obvious tasks, such as our handling of the monetary system, and the prevention or control of monopoly, and an even greater number of less obvious but hardly less important tasks to be undertaken in other fields, where there could be no doubt that the governments possessed enormous powers for good and evil; and there was every reason to expect that with a better understanding of the problems we should some day be able to use these powers successfully.

But while the progress towards what is commonly called "positive" action was necessarily slow, and while for the immediate improvement liberalism had to rely largely on the gradual increase of wealth which freedom brought about, it had constantly to fight proposals which threatened this progress. It came to be regarded as a "negative" creed because it could offer to particular individuals little more than a share in the common progress—a progress which came to be taken more and more for granted and was no longer recognised as the result of the policy of freedom. It might even be said that the very success of liberalism became the cause of its decline. Because of the success already achieved man became increasingly unwilling to tolerate the evils still with him which now appeared both unbearable and unnecessary.

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自由主义基本原则不是不变的教条，没有硬性的规定，不是一成不变的。其根本原则就是，在处理我们的事务时，应该尽可能多地利用社会自发力量，尽可能少地诉诸胁迫，这能够适用于千变万化的实际情况。特别是，特意建立一种尽可能有利于竞争的制度和被动接受现存制度，二者全然不同。对自由主义事业的伤害莫过于僵化地坚持某些简单粗糙的经验法则，尤其是放任自由。然而在某种意义上，这必要又必然。各人有各人具体的措施，给某些人带来直接明显的好处，对他人造成的伤害又不直接、不易见，面对无数的利害关系，一些简单硬性的规定总是行之有效。放任自由无疑已经假定有利于行业自由，其规则又表现出一视同仁，非常具吸引力，往往无法拒绝。

但是自由主义学说的很多推广者采用硬性的态度，几乎不可避免的结果就是，一旦某些观点站不住脚，整个学说全线崩溃。一些相关的政策旨在逐步提高自由社会中的制度框架，这不可避免地进展缓慢，也进一步弱化了其立场。政策的进展取决于我们提高对各社会力量及最适合其运作的环境的理解。自由主义对社会各力量的任务是协助、必要时补充，所以第一要务是了解他们。自由主义对于社会的态度，像园丁照顾植物，为了创造最适合其成长的环境，必须尽可能多地了解植物的结构与功能方式。

没一个在理的人会怀疑，表示十九世纪经济政策基本原则的那些简单粗略的规则只是一个开端，我们还有很多要学，前进道路充满巨大的可能。但只有在思想上逐步掌握了必须加以利用的社会力量，才能够取得进展。有很多显而易见的工作要做，譬如货币制度的处理，垄断的避免或控制，以及其它领域一些数量更多，不那么显而易见但同等重要的工作，在这些工作中政府无疑拥有巨大的权力，为善也罢为恶也罢；我们有充分的理由可以期待，有一天对问题有了更好的理解，应该能成功地运用这些力量。

但是，朝着普遍认为“正面”的方向前进必然缓慢；自由主义要立竿见影，必然很大程度上依赖于自由所带来的财富的逐步增长，但总有威胁到进步的种种提议，不得不不停地与之斗争。最终，因为带给某些具体人群的利益不能高于普遍水平，它被认为是“消极的”。大家越来越认为普遍的进步水平是理所当然，忘了这其实是自由政策的结果。甚至可以说，正是自由主义的成功造就了其衰落。因为已经取得的成功，人们变得越来越不愿意容忍仍存在的不足，这些不足看起来是多余的、无法忍受的。

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Because of the growing impatience with the slow advance of liberal policy, the just irritation with those who used liberal phraseology in defence of anti-social privileges, and the boundless ambition seemingly justified by the material improvements already achieved, it came to pass that toward the turn of the century the belief in the basic tenets of liberalism was more and more relinquished. What had been achieved came to be regarded as a secure and imperishable possession, acquired once and for all. The eyes of the people became fixed on the new demands, the rapid satisfaction of which seemed to be barred by the adherence to the old principles. It became more and more widely accepted that further advance could not be expected along the old lines within the general framework which had made past progress possible, but only by a complete remodelling of society. It was no longer a question of adding to or improving the existing machinery, but of completely scrapping and replacing it. And as the hope of the new generation came to be centred on something completely new, interest in, and understanding of, the functioning of the existing society rapidly declined; and with the decline of the understanding of the way in which the free system worked our awareness of what depended on its existence also decreased.

This is not the place to discuss how this change in outlook was fostered by the uncritical transfer to the problems of society of habits of thought engendered by the preoccupation with technological problems, the habits of thought of the natural scientist and the engineer, how these at the same time tended to discredit the results of the past study of society which did not conform to their prejudices, and to impose ideals of organisation on a sphere to which they are not appropriate. All we are here concerned to show is how completely, though gradually and by almost imperceptible steps, our attitude towards society has changed. What at every stage of this process of change had appeared a difference of degree only, has in its cumulative effect already brought about a fundamental difference between the older liberal attitude towards society and the present approach to social problems. The change amounts to a complete reversal of the trend we have sketched, an entire abandonment of the individualist tradition which has created Western civilisation.

According to the views now dominant the question is no longer how we can make the best use of the spontaneous forces found in a free society. We have in effect undertaken to dispense with the forces which produced unforeseen results and to replace the impersonal and anonymous mechanism of the market by collective and "conscious" direction of all social forces to deliberately chosen goals. The difference cannot be better illustrated than by the extreme position taken in a widely acclaimed book on whose programme of so-called "planning for freedom" we shall have to comment yet more than once.

We have never had to set up and direct [writes Dr. Karl Mannheim] the entire system of nature as we are forced to do today with society... Mankind is tending more and more to regulate the whole of its social life, although it has never attempted to create a second nature¹.

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自由主义政策进展缓慢，大家越来越缺乏耐心；有些人损人利己后，用自由主义一套措辞为自己辩护，大家心生不满；物质上已经取得了进步，步子迈大点看起来似乎也不无道理，结果发生了，接近上个世纪之交时，大家逐步放弃了对自由主义基本宗旨的信仰。已经取得的进步开始被认为是一劳永逸、永保不朽的。大家眼睛只盯着新的需要，好像坚持旧的原则就会阻碍新需要的迅速满足。越来越被广泛接受的一个观点是，在取得过去进步的框架下，沿着老路走，不可能再取得更进一步的发展，只有完全重塑这个社会才有可能进步。这不再是一个补充或者改进现有机制的问题，而是完全撕碎它、取代它。随着新一代的希望集中在全新的社会上，对现存社会如果起作用的兴趣和理解迅速衰退；随着对自由主义社会制度运作方式的了解的减少，我们也逐渐意识不到很多东西其实是建立在自由主义之上的。

专门研究技术问题产生一种思维习惯，所谓科学家工程师的思维习惯，将这些思维习惯不加批判地应用于社会问题，促使了这个形式的变化；我们这里不讨论这个变化是怎么促使而成的，也不讨论这些思维习惯是如何地抹杀不符合其观点的已有社会学研究成果，把条理组织的概念强加于其并不适用的社会领域的。我们这里所要表明的是，我们对社会的态度是如何毫无察觉、一步一步、到最终完全被改变。这个过程每一阶段的量变已经累积而成对社会问题较早的自由主义态度与现在态度二者的不同。这个改变最终完全扭转了我们勾勒的社会大略方向，完全抛弃了缔造西方文明的个人主义传统。

据现在主流观点，问题已经不再是如何能最优地利用自由社会中出现的自发力量的问题。我们实际上着手摒弃那些产生未知结果的力量，用集体、“自觉”地指挥一切社会力量服务选择性目标，取代非人为干预的、不记名的市场机制。对这二者区别最好的阐述莫过于一本广受好评的书在其所谓“为自由而计划”的纲领中所采取的极端立场，对此我们后续还会提及。

【卡尔·海姆曼博士写到】今天我们迫不得已对社会做这做那，而我们从来就不必像这样去创造和指挥整个自然界……人类从来不曾试图去另造一个自然，却越来越想管控整个社会生活。

¹ Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, 1940, p.175

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It is significant that this change in the trend of ideas has coincided with a reversal of the direction in which ideas have travelled in space. For over two hundred years English ideas had been spreading eastwards. The rule of freedom which had been achieved in England seemed destined to spread throughout the world. By about 1870 the reign of these ideas had probably reached its easternmost expansion. From then onwards it began to retreat and a different set of ideas, not really new but very old, began to advance from the East. England lost her intellectual leadership in the political and social sphere and became an importer of ideas. For the next sixty years Germany became the centre from which the ideas destined to govern the world in the twentieth century spread east and west. Whether it was Hegel or Marx, List or Schmoller, Sombart or Mannheim, whether it was socialism in its more radical form or merely "organisation" or "planning" of a less radical kind, German ideas were everywhere readily imported and German institutions imitated. Although most of the new ideas, and particularly socialism, did not originate in Germany, it was in Germany that they were perfected and during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century they reached their fullest development. It is now often forgotten how very considerable was the lead which Germany had during this period in the development of the theory and practice of socialism, that a generation before socialism became a serious issue in this country, Germany had a large socialist party in her parliament, and that till not very long ago the doctrinal development of socialism was almost entirely carried on in Germany and Austria, so that even today Russian discussion largely carries on where the Germans left off; most English socialists are still unaware that the majority of the problems they begin to discover were thoroughly discussed by German socialists long ago.

The intellectual influence which German thinkers were able to exercise during this period on the whole world was supported not merely by the great material progress of Germany but even more by the extraordinary reputation which German thinkers and scientists had earned during the preceding hundred years when Germany had once more become an integral and even leading member of the common European civilisation. But it soon served to assist the spreading from Germany of ideas directed against the foundations of that civilisation. The Germans themselves—or at least those among them who spread these ideas—were fully aware of the conflict: what had been the common heritage of European civilisation became to them, long before the Nazis, "Western" civilisation—where "Western" was no longer used in the old sense of Occident but had come to mean west of the Rhine. "Western" in this sense was Liberalism and Democracy, Capitalism and Individualism, Free Trade and any form of Internationalism or love of peace.

But in spite of the ill-concealed contempt of an ever-increasing number of Germans for those "shallow" Western ideals, or perhaps because of it, the people of the West continued to import German ideas and were even induced to believe that their own former convictions had merely been rationalisations of selfish interests, that Free Trade was a doctrine invented to further British interests, and that the political ideals England had given to the world were hopelessly outmoded and a thing to be ashamed of.

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这个思潮的转变与思想当初传播在空间方向上正巧相反，很有意思。两百多年来，英国的思想东传。英国产生的自由原则似乎注定要传遍全世界。到 1870 年前后，这些思想的主导范围很可能已经扩展到最东面。从那时候开始，它开始后撤，一套不同的思想，并非真正新的而是非常老的思想，开始从东西进。英国在政治、社会领域丧失了思想上的领导地位，成为了思想的输入国。此后的六十年，德国成了中心，注定在二十世纪统治世界的思想从那开始传向东方和西方。无论是黑格尔还是马克思，李斯特还是施莫勒，桑巴特还是曼海姆，无论是极端形式的社会主义还是温和的“组织”或者“计划”，到处都是德国思想等待吸收，德国制度等待模仿。尽管大多数新的思想，特别是社会主义，并非起源于德国，但，是在德国，这些思想得以完善，在十九世纪后二十五年和二十世纪初前二十五年至臻成熟。现在常常忘记德国这段时期在社会主义理论与实践道路上领先多大距离，在社会主义成为英国的严重问题之前的一代，德国在议会中就有一个很大的社会主义政党，直到不久前整个社会主义学说的发展基本上完全在德国和奥地利进行，以至于今天俄国关于社会主义的讨论只是从德国人中止的地方继续，大多数英国社会主义者仍然没有意识到他们开始发现的大多数问题很久之前德国社会主义者就彻底讨论过了。

这段时期德国思想家给全世界所带来的思想上的影响，不仅得益于德国在物质上的巨大进步，更得益于之前一百年，德国再度成为统一的欧洲文明不可缺少的、甚至占领导地位的成员时，其思想家和科学家赢得的非凡声望。但是它很快就转而帮助那些与该文明根本对立的思想从德国向外传播。德国人他们自己，至少那些在德国人中传播思想的人，完全清楚这种冲突：欧洲文明的共同传统，远在纳粹出现之前，对他们来说就是“西方”文明——这里“西方”不是跟古老东方意义上相对的西方，而是指莱茵河以西。这个意义上的“西方”是自由与民主，资本主义与个人主义，自由贸易与任何形式的国际主义，或者对和平的热爱。

但是尽管越来越多的德国人对那些“浅薄”的西方思想不加掩饰的轻蔑，可能正因如此，西方人民不断地输入德国思想，甚至被诱导以致相信，他们自己之前的信仰不过是自私自利的合理解释，自由贸易是为促进英国利益而发明的学说，英国人带给世界的政治思想已经过时，无可救药，令人羞愧。