

10. WHY THE WORSE GET ON TOP

All power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Lord Acton.

We must now examine a belief from which many who regard the advent of totalitarianism as inevitable derive consolation and which seriously weakens the resistance of many others who would oppose it with all their might if they fully apprehended its nature. It is the belief that the most repellent features of the totalitarian regimes are due to the historical accident that they were established by groups of blackguards and thugs. Surely, it is argued, if in Germany the creation of a totalitarian regime brought the Streichers and Killingers, the Leys and Heines, the Himmlers and Heydrichs to power, this may prove the viciousness of the German character, but not that the rise of such people is the necessary consequence of a totalitarian system. Why should it not be possible that the same sort of system, if it be necessary to achieve important ends, be run by decent people for the good of the community as a whole?

We must not deceive ourselves into believing that all good people must be democrats or will necessarily wish to have a share in the government. Many, no doubt, would rather entrust it to somebody whom they think more competent. Although this might be unwise, there is nothing bad or dishonourable in approving a dictatorship of the good. Totalitarianism, we can already hear it argued, is a powerful system alike for good and evil, and the purpose for which it will be used depends entirely on the dictators. And those who think that it is not the system which we need fear, but the danger that it might be run by bad men, might even be tempted to forestall this danger by seeing that it is established in time by good men.

No doubt an English "fascist" system would greatly differ from the Italian or German models; no doubt if the transition were effected without violence, we might expect to get a better type of leader. And if I had to live under a fascist system I have no doubt that I would rather live under one run by Englishmen than under one run by anybody else. Yet all this does not mean that, judged on our present standards, a British fascist system would in the end prove so very different or much less intolerable than its prototypes. There are strong reasons for believing that what to us appear the worst features of the existing totalitarian systems are not accidental by-products, but phenomena which totalitarianism is certain sooner or later to produce. Just as the democratic statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the totalitarian dictator would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals and failure. It is for this reason that the unscrupulous and uninhibited are likely to be more successful in a society tending towards totalitarianism. Who does not see this has not yet grasped the full width of the gulf which separates totalitarianism from a liberal regime, the utter difference between the whole moral atmosphere under collectivism and the essentially individualist Western civilisation.

10. 为什么坏人当政

所有权力都产生腐败，绝对的权力产生绝对的腐败。

阿克顿爵士

很多人有一种看法认为极权主义是必然的，进而心安理得；这一看法同时严重弱化了其他人对极权主义反抗，这些人如果充分理解了极权主义的本质必然会全力反对，我们现在必须检视这一看法。这种看法认为极权政体最令人反感的特征是历史的偶然，因为他们碰巧是由流氓、暴徒的集团建立的。当然，有人说，如果在德国极权主义的诞生让施特赖歇尔和基林格、莱伊和海因斯、希姆莱和海德里希之流得势，这可以证明德国人性格上的邪恶，但是这些人的得势并非极权制度的必然后果。如果极权主义是取得重要的目标所必要的，为什么同样的制度不能为正直的人运用，为整个社会谋福利呢？

我们不能自欺欺人地认为所有好人必须是民主主义者，或者必然愿意在政府谋职。很多人无疑更愿意把政府托付给他们认为更能胜任的人。尽管这可能不太明智，但赞同好人专政不是什么坏事或者不光荣。我们已听到有人说，极权主义是一种强大的制度，为善为恶都一样，用于何种目的完全取决于独裁者个人。并且，有人认为我们应该害怕的不是制度而是由坏人掌权带来的危险，持这种观点的人甚至可能试图确保由好人及时建立极权制度来预防这种危险。

无疑，一个英国的“法西斯”制度跟意大利或者德国的模式会大不相同；无疑，如果这一转变能够和平实现，我们也许可有类更好的领导人。并且，如果我必须生活在法西斯制度下，无疑我宁可生活在英国人而不是其他人领导之下。然而所有这些并不意味着，按我们现在的标准判断，一个英国的法西斯制度归根到底会与其原型大有不同，更可以容忍。有强有力的理由相信，现有极权制度表现出的最糟糕的特征并非偶然的副产品，而是极权主义迟早肯定产生的现象。正如民主制度下着手经济计划的政治家很快就面临若或独裁或若放弃的选择局面，极权制度的独裁者很快面临若或置道德于不顾或失败的局面。正是这个原因，在走向极权主义的社会里，无视道德、不按规矩的人更容易成功。没有看到这点的人没有领会极权主义和自由政体鸿沟之宽，集体主义和本质上是个人主义的西方文明整个道德氛围之截然不同。

The "moral basis of collectivism" has, of course, been much debated in the past; but what concerns us here is not its moral basis but its moral results. The usual discussions of the ethical aspects of collectivism refer to the question whether collectivism is demanded by existing moral convictions; or what moral convictions would be required if collectivism is to produce the hoped-for results. Our question, however, is what moral views will be produced by a collectivist organisation of society, or what views are likely to rule it. The interaction between morals and institutions may well have the effect that the ethics produced by collectivism will be altogether different from the moral ideals that lead to the demand for collectivism. While we are apt to think that, since the desire for a collectivist system springs from high moral motives, such a system must be the breeding ground for the highest virtues, there is, in fact, no reason why any system should necessarily enhance those attitudes which serve the purpose for which it was designed. The ruling moral views will depend partly on the qualities that will lead individuals to success in a collectivist or totalitarian system, and partly on the requirements of the totalitarian machinery.

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We must here return for a moment to the position which precedes the suppression of democratic institutions and the creation of a totalitarian regime. In this stage it is the general demand for quick and determined government action that is the dominating element in the situation, dissatisfaction with the slow and cumbersome course of democratic procedure which makes action for action's sake the goal. It is then the man or the party who seems strong and resolute enough "to get things done" who exercises the greatest appeal. "Strong" in this sense means not merely a numerical majority—it is the ineffectiveness of parliamentary majorities with which people are dissatisfied. What they will seek is somebody with such solid support as to inspire confidence that he can carry out whatever he wants. It is here that the new type of party, organised on military lines, comes in.

In the Central European countries the socialist parties had familiarised the masses with political organisations of a semi-military character designed to absorb as much as possible of the private life of the members. All that was wanted to give one group overwhelming power was to carry the same principle somewhat further, to seek strength not in the assured votes of huge numbers at occasional elections, but in the absolute and unreserved support of a smaller but more thoroughly organised body. The chance of imposing a totalitarian regime on a whole people depends on the leader first collecting round him a group which is prepared voluntarily to submit to that totalitarian discipline which they are to impose by force upon the rest.

Although the socialist parties had the strength to get anything if they had cared to use force, they were reluctant to do so. They had, without knowing it, set themselves a task which only the ruthless, ready to disregard the barriers of accepted morals, can execute.

当然，“集体主义的道德基础”在过去被讨论过很多；但我们这里关心的不是它的道德基础而是道德结果。对于集体主义道德方面的讨论通常指的是现有道德信仰是否需要集体主义的问题；或者如果要集体主义产生预期的结果需要什么样的道德信仰的问题。然而，我们的问题是，采取集体主义组织社会会产生什么样的道德观，或者什么样的道德观会是集体主义主流道德观。道德和制度的相互作用很可能导致集体主义所产生的道德与集体主义所向往的道德理想完全不同。我们倾向于想，如果对集体主义制度的意愿出自高尚的道德动机，那一制度必然会孵化出最美道德，事实上，毫无理由一个制度必然会端正态度，服务初心。主流的道德观部分取决于在集体主义或者极权主义制度下带来个人成功的那些品质，部分取决于极权主义运作的需要。

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现在，我们必须先暂时回到民主机制承压、极权政体产生之前的情况。在这个阶段，主导因素是大众不满民主程序缓慢冗长、为行动而行动的情况，普遍要求政府行动快速、坚决。一个看起来强有力性、有决心足以“把问题解决”的人或者政党，因此具有最大的号召力。这个意义上，“强大”不仅意味着多数——人民不满意的正是议会多数表决无效率。他们需要的是一个群众基础扎实，鼓舞大众相信他能贯彻思路的人。正是这样，按军队方式组织的新型政党应运而生。

在中欧国家，群众早已熟悉各社会主义政党半军事化的组织特征，这些组织旨在尽可能吞噬成员的私生活。给予一帮人压倒性的权力，所要做的就是推广同样的原则：不是通过偶尔举行的选举中确保得到大量选票，而是通过一个规模更小但组织更完善的小团体对这帮人绝对的、毫无保留的支持。对全体人民实施独裁统治，成功的几率取决于领袖人物首先在其周围聚集一批准备自愿服从独裁纪律的人，这些人随后把纪律强加于其余人。

尽管社会主义政党只要想用武力就能得到一切，他们不想那么做。他们不自觉地给自己设定了一个只有残酷无情、无视公德堤防才能得以成功的任务。

That socialism can be put into practice only by methods which most socialists disapprove is, of course, a lesson learnt by many social reformers in the past. The old socialist parties were inhibited by their democratic ideals, they did not possess the ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task. It is characteristic that both in Germany and Italy the success of Fascism was preceded by the refusal of the socialist parties to take over the responsibilities of government. They were unwilling wholeheartedly to employ the methods to which they had pointed the way. They still hoped for the miracle of a majority agreeing on a particular plan for the organisation of the whole of society; others had already learnt the lesson that in a planned society the question can no longer be on what a majority of the people agree, but what is the largest single group whose members agree sufficiently to make unified direction of all affairs possible; or, if no such group large enough to enforce its views exists, how it can be created and who will succeed in creating it.

There are three main reasons why such a numerous and strong group with fairly homogeneous views is not likely to be formed by the best but rather by the worst elements of any society. By our standards the principles on which such a group would be selected will be almost entirely negative.

In the first instance, it is probably true that in general the higher the education and intelligence of individuals becomes, the more their views and tastes are differentiated and the less likely they are to agree on a particular hierarchy of values. It is a corollary of this that if we wish to find a high degree of uniformity and similarity of outlook, we have to descend to the regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the more primitive and "common" instincts and tastes prevail. This does not mean that the majority of people have low moral standards; it merely means that the largest group of people whose values are very similar are the people with low standards. It is, as it were, the lowest common denominator which unites the largest number of people. If a numerous group is needed, strong enough to impose their views on the values of life on all the rest, it will never be those with highly differentiated and developed tastes — it will be those who form the "mass" in the derogatory sense of the term, the least original and independent, who will be able to put the weight of their numbers behind their particular ideals.

If, however, a potential dictator had to rely entirely on those whose uncomplicated and primitive instincts happen to be very similar, their number would scarcely give sufficient weight to their endeavours. He will have to increase their numbers by converting more to the same simple creed.

Here comes in the second negative principle of selection: he will be able to obtain the support of all the docile and gullible, who have no strong convictions of their own but are prepared to accept a ready-made system of values if it is only drummed into their ears sufficiently loudly and frequently. It will be those whose vague and imperfectly formed ideas are easily swayed and whose passions and emotions are readily aroused who will thus swell the ranks of the totalitarian party.

社会主义只有通过大多数社会主义者都不赞同的方法才能付诸实施，当然是很多社会改革派在过去得到的一个教训。旧的社会主义政党被他们自己的民主思想束缚，他们没有完成任务所需要的冷酷无情。有这么个特点，在德国和意大利，法西斯的成功都是发生在社会主义政党拒绝承担组建政府的责任之后。他们不愿意全心全意地采纳他们自己提议的方法。他们仍然希望奇迹会出现，大多数人会赞同某项组织全社会的具体计划；其他人已经吸取了教训，在一个计划社会里，问题不再是大多数同意什么，而是谁是足够团结下一条心的最大一派；如果没有哪派足够大以强制推行其观点，那么问题就是怎么能、谁能创建这样一派。

有三个主要原因，为什么那样一个人数众多、力量强大、观念相当一致的派系在任何社会不可能由最好的人、却最可能由社会最坏分子组成。按我们的标准，形成那样的一派的选择原则几乎完全消极。

首先，一般说来，很可能正确的是，个人教育和才智程度越高，观点和趣味相差越大，越不可能就某种特定价值体系达成一致。依此类推，如果我们希望找到境界高度一致、相近，我们必须降到较低道德、知识水平层次，那里普遍是更原始、“共同”的本能与趣味。这并不意味着大多数人道德标准低；仅仅意味着价值观相近的最大一群人往往是低端人群。现在是，过去也是，最小公分母统一最大多数。如果需要一个人数众多的集团，强大到足以将生活的价值观强加于其他所有人身上，那么它绝不可能是那些具有高度差异化、高度发达趣味的人组成——它将是那些贬义上的芸芸众生，最没创造性、独立性，只能用人数多来支撑他们具体的理想。

然而，如果一个潜在的独裁者不得不完全靠这些简单、原始的本能恰好十分相近的人，他们人数优势作用有限。他不得不把更多人的转变过来信奉同样简单的信条，增加人数。

接着，第二个消极选择原则：他能够得到所有温驯、易于上当受骗的人的支持，那些人没有自己强大的信念，只要声音够大、次数够多地向他们耳朵里灌输，他们就能接受现成的价值体系。正是那些思想模糊、不健全、容易动摇的人，那些热情和情感容易冲动的人，壮大了极权主义政党的队伍。

It is in connection with the deliberate effort of the skilful demagogue to weld together a closely coherent and homogeneous body of supporters that the third and perhaps most important negative element of selection enters. It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easier for people to agree on a negative programme, on the hatred of an enemy, on the envy of those better off, than on any positive task. The contrast between the "we" and the "they", the common fight against those outside the group, seems to be an essential ingredient in any creed which will solidly knit together a group for common action. It is consequently always employed by those who seek, not merely support of a policy, but the unreserved allegiance of huge masses. From their point of view it has the great advantage of leaving them greater freedom of action than almost any positive programme. The enemy, whether he be internal like the "Jew" or the "Kulak", or external, seems to be an indispensable requisite in the armoury of a totalitarian leader.

That in Germany it was the Jew who became the enemy till his place was taken by the "plutocracies" was no less a result of the anti-capitalist resentment on which the whole movement was based than the selection of the Kulak in Russia. In Germany and Austria the Jew had come to be regarded as the representative of capitalism because a traditional dislike of large classes of the population for commercial pursuits had left these more readily accessible to a group that was practically excluded from the more highly esteemed occupations. It is the old story of the alien race being admitted only to the less respected trades and then being hated still more for practising them. The fact that German antisemitism and anti-capitalism spring from the same root is of great importance for the understanding of what has happened there, but this is rarely grasped by foreign observers.

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To treat the universal tendency of collectivist policy to become nationalistic as due entirely to the necessity for securing unhesitating support would be to neglect another and no less important factor. It may indeed be questioned whether anybody can realistically conceive of a collectivist programme other than in the service of a limited group, whether collectivism can exist in any other form than that of some kind of particularism, be it nationalism, racialism, or classism. The belief in the community of aims and interests with fellowmen seems to presuppose a greater degree of similarity of outlook and thought than exists between men merely as human beings. If the other members of one's group cannot all be personally known, they must at least be of the same kind as those around us, think and talk in the same way and about the same kind of things, in order that we may identify ourselves with them. Collectivism on a world scale seems to be unthinkable—except in the service of a small ruling elite. It would certainly raise not only technical but above all moral problems which none of our socialists are willing to face. If the English proletarian is entitled to an equal share of the income now derived from England's capital resources, and of the control of their use, because they are the result of exploitation, so on the same principle all the Indians would be entitled not only to the income from but also to the use of a proportional share of the British capital. But what socialists seriously contemplate the equal division of existing capital resources among the people of the world? They all regard the capital as belonging not to humanity but to the nation—though even within the nation few would dare to advocate that the richer regions should be deprived of some of "their" capital equipment in order to help the poorer regions. What socialists proclaim as a duty towards the fellow members of the existing states, they are not prepared to grant to the foreigner.

选择的第三个消极因素，或许是最重要的一个，与训练有素的煽动者特意把密切联系、性质相同的支持者紧紧整合在一起有关。这看上去几乎是人性的规律，对比积极的任务，人们就消极的安排、对敌人的仇恨、对富人的嫉妒更容易达成一致。任何信条要团结群众共同行动，基本的一点就是区分“我们”与“他们”、一致对外。那些不仅寻求政策支持、而且寻求广大群众毫无保留衷心拥护的人因此总是利用这个。从他们的角度来看，反对几乎比任何赞同的都带来更多行动腾挪的空间。无论是内部的敌人象“犹太人”或“富农”，还是外部的敌人都是极权领袖弹药库中不可或缺的必备。

在德国，敌人开始是犹太人，后来是“富豪阶级”，这是源于整个社会运动的基础就是对资本主义的憎恨，跟俄国选了富农做敌人一样。在德国和奥地利，犹太人曾被视作资本主义的代表，这是因为大部分群众传统上轻商，使得一群实际上被排斥在更高级职业之外的犹太人更易从商。自古就是，外族人只能被接纳从事不受尊敬的行业，并仍因此更受歧视。德国人反犹太、反资本主义出自同一原因的事实，对了解那里发生的一切十分重要，但这一点极少为他国观察家所领会。

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集体主义的政策普遍倾向于发展成民族主义，把它完全归因于要确保支持不动摇的需要，会忽略另一个同样重要的因素。也许的确可以发问，设想一个不服务于小撮人的集体主义，集体主义以民族主义、种族主义、或者阶级主义等特殊主义之外的某种形式存在是不是现实。相信同伙之间有共同的目标与利益预设了成员之间在境界和思想上的相似程度高于一般的人与人之间。如果不可能认识同一团体内其他所有成员，那么他们至少应该跟我们周围的人是同一类，关心同样的话题、有同样思维、表达方式，这样我们才能在身份上认同他们。世界范围的集体主义不可想象——除非服务于一小撮统治精英。它肯定会导致很多问题，不仅仅是技术性的问题更重要的是很多社会主义者不愿意面对的道德问题。如果源于资本的收入是剥削的结果，英国无产阶级有权均分、平等管理来自英国的资本收入，那么同样的原则，所有印度人也有权按比例使用英国的资本、分享资本收入。但是什么样的社会主义者会认真地考虑把现有资本均分给全世界人民呢？他们全都认为资本不属于人类而属于国家——即使在一个国家内部，也没几个敢说应该从一些富裕地区剥夺一些“他们”的资本来资助贫困地区。社会主义者声称有责任给予现存各州同胞的那些，他们是没准备给外国人的。

From a consistent collectivist point of view the claims of the "Have-Not" nations for a new division of the world are entirely justified—though, if consistently applied, those who demand it most loudly would lose by it almost as much as the richest nations. They are, therefore, careful not to base their claims on any equalitarian principles but on their pretended superior capacity to organise other peoples.

One of the inherent contradictions of the collectivist philosophy is, that while basing itself on the humanistic morals which individualism has developed, it is practicable only within a relatively small group. That socialism so long as it remains theoretical, is internationalist, while as soon as it is put into practice, whether in Russia or in Germany, it becomes violently nationalist, is one of the reasons why "liberal socialism" as most people in the Western world imagine it is purely theoretical, while the practice of socialism is everywhere totalitarian¹. Collectivism has no room for the wide humanitarianism of liberalism but only for the narrow particularism of the totalitarian.

If the "community" or the state are prior to the individual, if they have ends of their own independent of and superior to those of the individuals, only those individuals who work for the same ends can be regarded as members of the community. It is a necessary consequence of this view that a person is respected only as a member of the group, that is, only if and in so far as he works for the recognised common ends, and that he derives his whole dignity only from this membership and not merely from being man. Indeed, the very concepts of humanity and therefore of any form of internationalism are entirely products of the individualist view of man, and there can be no place for them in a collectivist system of thought².

Apart from the basic fact that the community of collectivism can extend only as far as the unity of purpose of the individuals exists or can be created, several contributory factors strengthen the tendency of collectivism to become particularist and exclusive. Of these one of the most important is that the desire of the individual to identify himself with a group is very frequently the result of a feeling of inferiority, and that therefore his want will only be satisfied if membership of the group confers some superiority over outsiders. Sometimes, it seems, the very fact that these violent instincts which the individual knows he must curb within the group can be given a free range in the collective action towards the outsider, becomes a further inducement for merging personality in that of the group. There is a profound truth expressed in the title of R. Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*—however little we can follow him in the conclusions he draws from his thesis. There is indeed, as he says elsewhere, "an increasing tendency among modern men to imagine themselves ethical because they have delegated their vices to larger and larger groups."³ To act on behalf of a group seems to free people of many of the moral restraints which control their behaviour as individuals within the group.

The definitely antagonistic attitude which most planners take towards internationalism is further explained by the fact that in the existing world all outside contacts of a group are obstacles to their effectively planning the sphere in which they can attempt it. It is therefore no accident that, as the editor of one of the most comprehensive collective studies on planning has discovered to his chagrin, "most 'planners' are militant nationalists".⁴

从一贯的集体主义观点来看，“没有”的国家要求重新瓜分世界的要求是完全合理的——只是，如果彻底实行的话，最大声要求分的国家损失几乎会跟最富裕国家一样多。因此，他们小心翼翼、不把平均主义作为根据，而是假装本民族更有能力组织管理其他民族。

集体主义哲学的固有矛盾之一就是，它建立在基于个人主义发展而来的人文道德基础上，只在相对较小的人群内可行。社会主义，如果只停留在理论层面那它是国际主义，一旦付诸实践，无论在德国还是俄国，就成为了极端民族主义，这就是为什么西方世界想象的“自由社会主义”是纯粹理论上的，而任何地方的社会主义实践都是极权主义。集体主义不能容纳自由主义广泛的人道主义，只能是极权主义者狭隘的特殊主义。

如果“社会”或者国家优先于个人，如果他们有独立于并高于个人的目标，那么只有那些为共同目标奋斗的人才能被视作社会的一员。这一观点的必然后果是，一个人只作为社会成员才会获得尊重，也就是说，只有并仅限于他为公认的共同目标工作才获得尊重，他的整个尊严仅来自其作为社会成员的身份，而不是只作为人本身。其实，人道主义的每一个概念，推而广之任何形式的国际主义，整个都是人类个人主义观点的产物，集体主义思想体系中并没有它们的位置。

集体主义社会只能存在于个体之间存在或者能够产生一致目标的地方，除了这个基本的事实，还有几个因素促使集体主义成为特殊主义、排他主义的趋势。其中最重要的一个就是，个人存在的自卑感常使其想要认同集体；如果作为成员被给予超乎外人的优越性，他的心理将得以满足。个体知道在集体内必须抑制强烈的本能能在针对外人的集体行动中得到自由发挥的空间，有时候，看起来正是这个情况进一步诱使个性融入集体。雷因霍尔德·尼布尔的《道德的人与不道德的社会》这个标题就表述了一个深刻的真理——无论我们有多么不赞同他论文所做的结论。他在其它地方也有说，其实有一个“不断增长的势头，现代人把罪恶归咎于越来越大的集体，而幻想自己很道德。”个人行为在集体内受到很多道德约束，而以集体的名义行动，好像能使人免于这种约束。

现存世界中，对外的所有接触都会妨碍计划者对其内部领域进行有效计划的尝试，这进一步解释大多数计划者对于国际主义采取的绝对敌对态度。因此，绝非偶然，一位对计划进行最全面总体研究的编辑，懊恼地发现，“所有的‘计划者’都是好战的民族主义分子。”

¹ Cf. now the instructive discussion in F. Borkenau, *Socialism, National or International?*, 1942.

² It is entirely in the spirit of collectivism when Nietzsche makes his Zarathustra say:

"A thousand goals have existed hitherto, for a thousand people existed. But the fetter for the thousand necks is still lacking, the one goal is still lacking. Humanity has no goal yet."

"But tell me, I pray, my brethren: if the goal be lacking to humanity, is not humanity itself lacking?"

³ Quoted from an article of Dr. Niebuhr's by E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, 1941, p. 203.

⁴ Findlay MacKenzie (ed.), *Planned Society, Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow: A Symposium*, 1937, p. xx.

The nationalist and imperialist propensities of socialist planners, much more common than is generally recognised, are not always as flagrant as, for example, in the case of the Webbs and some of the other early Fabians, with whom enthusiasm for planning was characteristically combined with the veneration for the large and powerful political units and a contempt for the small state. The historian Elie Halevy, speaking of the Webbs when he first knew them forty years ago, records that

their socialism was profoundly anti-liberal. They did not hate the Tories, indeed they were extraordinarily lenient to them, but they had no mercy for Gladstonian Liberalism. It was the time of the Boer War and both the advanced liberals and the men who were beginning to form the Labour Party had generously sided with the Boers against British Imperialism, in the name of freedom and humanity. But the two Webbs and their friend, Bernard Shaw, stood apart. They were ostentatiously imperialistic. The independence of small nations might mean something to the liberal individualist. It meant nothing to collectivists like themselves. I can still hear Sidney Webb explaining to me that the future belonged to the great administrative nations, where the officials govern and the police keep order.

And elsewhere Halevy quotes Bernard Shaw arguing, about the same time, that "the world is to the big and powerful states by necessity; and the little ones must come within their border or be crushed out of existence"⁵. I have quoted a length these pages, which would not surprise one in a description of the German ancestors of national socialism, because they provide so characteristic an example of that glorification of power which easily leads from socialism to nationalism and which profoundly affects the ethical views of all collectivists. So far as the rights of small nations are concerned, Marx and Engels were little better than most other consistent collectivists, and the views they occasionally expressed about Czechs or Poles resemble those of contemporary National Socialists⁶.

* * * * *

While to the great individualist social philosophers of the nineteenth century, to a Lord Acton or Jacob Burckhardt, down to contemporary socialists, like Bertrand Russell, who have inherited the liberal tradition, power itself has always appeared the arch-evil, to the strict collectivist it is a goal in itself. It is not only, as Russell has so well described, that the desire to organise social life according to a unitary plan itself springs largely from a desire for power⁷. It is even more the outcome of the fact that in order to achieve their end collectivists must create power—power over men wielded by other men—of a magnitude never before known, and that their success will depend on the extent to which they achieve such power.

社会主义计划者共同的民族主义、帝国主义的倾向，远比一般认识到的更普遍，但并不总是如韦伯夫妇和其他一些早期费边主义者那样明目张胆，他们对计划的狂热和对大国的崇拜、小国的蔑视结合在一起，颇具特色。历史学家埃利·阿列维谈及四十年前刚开始认识韦伯夫妇时，写道：

他们的社会主义极度反自由。他们不恨保守党，对他们真地超乎寻常的宽容，但是他们对格莱斯顿自由主义毫无怜悯。那是在布尔战争期间，进步的自由主义分子和筹划劳工党的人慷慨地以自由和人道为名站在布尔人一边。但韦伯夫妇和他们的朋友萧伯纳袖手旁观。他们是招摇明显的帝国主义。小国独立对自由主义个人主义也许有些意义，但对他们这样的集体主义确实不值一提。我仍然清楚记得悉尼·韦伯向我解释，未来属于官员治理和警察维稳的行政大国。

大约相同时期，在其他地方，阿列维引述萧伯纳称，“世界必然走向大国强国，小国若或并入大国，若或灭亡”。在这些页，我们已经引用很多，这些对于德国民族社会主义先驱的描述对大家来说应该不会觉陌生，他们提供了赞美强权的典型例子，这种赞美轻易把社会主义领向民族主义，深刻地影响所有集体主义的道德观。就小国权利而言，马克思和恩格斯不见得比大多数彻底的集体主义者好多少，他们偶尔发表的对于捷克、波兰的看法跟同时代的纳粹类似。

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对于十九世纪伟大的个人主义社会哲学家，譬如阿克顿爵士、雅各·布克哈特到当代继承了自由传统的社会主义者，象伯兰特·罗素来说，权力本身一直视为大恶，而对严格的集体主义者来说，权力是他们的追求。罗素说得好，想要基于统一计划组织社会生活，很大程度上源于权力的欲望。更重要的原因是，为了达到目标，集体主义者必须建立前所未有的强大权力——一个人支配另一个人的权力，他们的成功取决于在多大程度上取得了那样的权力。

⁵ E. Halevy, *L'Ere des Tyrannies*, Paris, 1938, p. 217, and *History of the English People*, Epilogue, vol. I, pp. 105-6.

⁶ Cf. K. Marx, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, and Engels' letter to Marx, May 23, 1851.
⁷ Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, 193 1, p. 211.

This remains true even though many liberal socialists are guided in their endeavours by the tragic illusion that by depriving private individuals of the power they possess in an individualist system, and by transferring this power to society, they can thereby extinguish power. What all those who argue in this manner overlook is that by concentrating power so that it can be used in the service of a single plan, it is not merely transferred but infinitely heightened; that by uniting in the hands of some single body power formerly exercised independently by many, an amount of power is created infinitely greater than any that existed before, so much more far-reaching as almost to be different in kind. It is entirely fallacious when it is sometimes argued that the great power exercised by a Central Planning Board would be "no greater than the power collectively exercised by private boards of directors"⁸. There is, in a competitive society, nobody who can exercise even a fraction of the power which a socialist planning board would possess, and if nobody can consciously use the power, it is just an abuse of words to assert that it rests with all the capitalists put together⁹. It is merely a play upon words to speak of the "power collectively exercised by private boards of directors" so long as they do not combine to concerted action—which would, of course, mean the end of competition and the creation of a planned economy. To split or decentralise power is necessarily to reduce the absolute amount of power and the competitive system is the only system designed to minimise by decentralisation the power exercised by man over man.

We have seen before how the separation of economic and political aims is an essential guarantee of individual freedom and how it is consequently attacked by all collectivists. To this we must now add that the "substitution of political for economic power" now so often demanded means necessarily the substitution of power from which there is no escape for a power which is always limited. What is called economic power, while it can be an instrument of coercion, is in the hands of private individuals never exclusive or complete power, never power over the whole life of a person. But centralised as an instrument of political power it creates a degree of dependence scarcely distinguishable from slavery.

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From the two central features of every collectivist system, the need for a commonly accepted system of ends of the group, and the all-overriding desire to give to the group the maximum of power to achieve these ends, grows a definite system of morals, which on some points coincides and on others violently contrasts with ours—but differs from it in one point which makes it doubtful whether we can call it morals: that it does not leave the individual conscience free to apply its own rules and does not even know any general rules which the individual is required or allowed to observe in all circumstances. This makes collectivist morals so different from what we have known as morals that we find it difficult to discover any principle in them, which they nevertheless possess.

尽管很多自由主义的社会主义者在奋斗中被悲剧式的幻想所误导，认为通过剥夺个人主义制度下个人所拥有的私有权力，将之转移给社会，那么他们就能消灭权力，上文中的观点仍然站得住脚。所有这样认为的人都忽视了的是，通过集中权力，统一服务于一个计划，权力不仅仅被转移，更被无限抬高；通过将之前多人独立行使的权力统一在单一团体少数人手中，产生的权力之巨大前所未有的，影响之深远已非寻常。有时有人称，中央计划委员会的权力大，但“大不过各公司董事会权力之和”，这完全是错的。在竞争性社会，没有人能够行使社会主义计划委员会所拥有权力的哪怕一小部分。假如坚称，如果没有人能自觉行使这一权力，该权利就会为所有资本家共同所有，那只是胡说八道。只要他们没有联合起来协调一致地行动——这当然意味着竞争结束、计划经济诞生，说“各私人公司董事会权力之和”，那纯属文字游戏。分开或者分散权力必然减少绝对权力的大小，而竞争制度是唯一旨在通过分散权力来最大限度减少人支配人权力的制度。

我们之前谈过，区分经济目标与政治目标是怎样成为个人自由的基本保证，它又是如何因此遭到集体主义者攻击的。我们现在必须加上一条，现在经常要求的“用政治权力取代经济权力”必然意味着一种无所不在的权力取代无不无限的权力。被称为经济权力的权力，虽然也可能成为胁迫的工具，但在私人手中永远不可能排他独享、完整无缺，永远不可能支配一个人的一生。但一旦集中为政治权力工具，它所造成的对人的依附，程度几乎无异于奴隶制度。

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每一种集体主义制度有两大中心特征，需要一个整个集团共同接受的目标体系，为达到目标有压倒性的意愿给予这个集团最大的权力，这两个特征导致了明确的道德体系。这一道德体系与我们的道德体系有些地方吻合有些地方严重相左，其中有一不同之处让我们怀疑它是不是能称之为道德：它不由着个人良心来使用规则，甚至没有任何一般性的规则在所有情况下被要求或者可以被遵守。这使得集体主义的道德与我们所知道的道德如此不同，以至于我们很难到其中找到任何原则，虽说还是有些原则。

⁸ B. E. Lippincott, in his Introduction to O. Lange and F. M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, Minneapolis, 1938, p. 33.

⁹ We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the fact that the word power, apart from the sense in which it is used with respect to human beings, is also used in an impersonal (or rather anthropomorphic) sense for

any determining cause. Of course, there will always be something that determines everything that happens, and in this sense the amount of power existing must always be the same. But this is not true of the power consciously wielded by human beings.

The difference of principle is very much the same as that which we have already considered in connection with the Rule of Law. Like formal law the rules of individualist ethics, however unprecise they may be in many respects, are general and absolute; they prescribe or prohibit a general type of action irrespective of whether in the particular instance the ultimate purpose is good or bad. To cheat or steal, to torture or betray a confidence, is held to be bad, irrespective of whether or not in the particular instance any harm follows from it. Neither the fact that in a given instance nobody may be the worse for it, nor any high purpose for which such an act may have been committed, can alter the fact that it is bad. Though we may sometimes be forced to choose between different evils they remain evils. The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule; there is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must not be prepared to do if it serves "the good of the whole", because the "good of the whole" is to him the only criterion of what ought to be done. The *raison d'etat*, in which collectivist ethics has found its most explicit formulation, knows no other limit than that set by expediency—the suitability of the particular act for the end in view. And what the *raison d'etat* affirms with respect to the relations between different countries applies equally to the relations between different individuals within the collectivist state. There can be no limit to what its citizen must not be prepared to do, no act which his conscience must prevent him from committing, if it is necessary for an end which the community has set itself or which his superiors order him to achieve.

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The absence of absolute formal rules in collectivist ethics does not, of course, mean that there are not some useful habits of the individuals which a collectivist community will encourage, and others which it will discourage. Quite the reverse; it will take a much greater interest in the individual's habits of life than an individualist community. To be a useful member of a collectivist society requires very definite qualities which must be strengthened by constant practice. The reason why we designate these qualities as "useful habits" and can hardly describe them as moral virtues is that the individual could never be allowed to put these rules above any definite orders, or to let them become an obstacle to the achievement of any of the particular aims of his community. They only serve, as it were, to fill any gaps which direct orders or the designation of particular aims may leave, but they can never justify a conflict with the will of the authority.

原则上的区别与我们已经讨论过的法治相关的区别几乎一样。象形式法一样，个人主义伦理的规则，尽管在很多方面不很精确，但都是一般性的、绝对的；它规定或者禁止总的一类行为，无论在具体实例中其最终目的是好是坏。欺骗或偷窃、酷刑或弃信，无论实际上是否造成伤害，都是坏。在某些情况下也许没人因此受到伤害，某些情况下为了更崇高目的不得不为之，无论怎样都不能改变坏的事实。尽管有时我们可能被迫，不得不在恶之间作出选择，它们仍是恶。据目的来判断手段是否正当的原则，以个人主义伦理看来，是对所有道德的否定。在集体主义伦理看来，它则必然成为至高无上的原则；理论上彻底的集体主义者没有什么事情绝对不能干，只要服务于“集体的利益”，因为“集体的利益”对他来说就是判断事情是否该做的唯一标准。国家利益，集体主义伦理最明确的典范，一切只看是否权宜可行，没有限制——看具体行动是否适于目的。国与国之间，国家利益所肯定的，在集体主义国内的人与人之间同样适用。集体主义国家里，只要是目的所必须的，社会追求的目的也罢，上级命令他达到的目的也罢，没有什么限制公民绝对不能做，没有良心不允许他做的事。

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集体主义伦理缺少绝对的形式规则当然并不意味着集体主义社会没有一些有用的个人习惯得以提倡，其他一些得以劝阻。恰恰相反，集体主义社会比个人主义社会更关心个人习惯。要成为集体主义社会有用的一员，需要非常明确的个人品质，这些品质必须反复实践提高。我们将这些品质称作“有用的习惯”，几乎不能称作美德的原因，是因为个人绝不被允许将这些原则置于任何确切的命令之上，绝不被允许它们成为达到特定社会目标的障碍。如以往一样，它们仅在填补直接命令或者针对特定目标的指令可能留下的疏漏，绝不能成为与政府意志相抵触的理由。

The differences between the virtues which will continue to be esteemed under a collectivist system and those which will disappear is well illustrated by a comparison of the virtues which even their worst enemies admit the Germans, or rather the "typical Prussian", to possess, and those of which they are commonly thought lacking and in which the English people, with some justification, used to pride themselves as excelling. Few people will deny that the Germans on the whole are industrious and disciplined, thorough and energetic to the degree of ruthlessness, conscientious and single-minded in any tasks they undertake, that they possess a strong sense of order, duty, and strict obedience to authority, and that they often show great readiness to make personal sacrifices and great courage in physical danger. All these make the German an efficient instrument in carrying out an assigned task, and they have accordingly been carefully nurtured in the old Prussian state and the new Prussian-dominated Reich. What the "typical German" is often thought to lack are the individualist virtues of tolerance and respect for other individuals and their opinions, of independence of mind and that uprightness of character and readiness to defend one's own convictions against a superior which the Germans themselves, usually conscious that they lack it, call Zivilcourage, of consideration for the weak and infirm, and of that healthy contempt and dislike of power which only an old tradition of personal liberty creates. Deficient they seem also in most of those little yet so important qualities which facilitate the intercourse between men in a free society: kindness and a sense of humour, personal modesty, and respect for the privacy and belief in the good intentions of one's neighbour.

After what we have already said it will not cause surprise that these individualist virtues are at the same time eminently social virtues, virtues which smooth social contacts and which make control from above less necessary and at the same time more difficult. They are virtues which flourish wherever the individualist or commercial type of society has prevailed and which are missing according as the collectivist or military type of society predominates—a difference which is, or was, as noticeable between the various regions of Germany as it has now become of the views which rule in Germany and those characteristic of the West. Till recently, at least, in those parts of Germany which have been longest exposed to the civilising forces of commerce, the old commercial towns of the south and west and the Hanse towns, the general moral concepts were probably much more akin to those of the Western people than to those which have now become dominant all over Germany.

在集体主义制度下那些将继续受到尊重的美德和将消失的美德之间的差别可以通过对比以下两种美德予以很好说明，即使是最恶劣的敌人也承认德国人或者“典型的普鲁士人”所拥有的美德，和认为他们普遍缺乏但英国人有一定正当理由引以为豪的美德。没人会否认德国人整体上勤劳、守纪律、细致而干劲十足到残酷的程度、做事认真一丝不苟一心一意；没人否认他们有强烈的责任感、守秩序、严格服从上级；没人否认他们遇到物理上的危险时随时准备作出个人牺牲和无畏的勇气。所有这些使德国人成为执行指派任务最有效的工具，在过去普鲁士国家和现在普鲁士人统治的第三帝国，这些品质也相应被精心培育。“典型德国人”常被认为所缺乏的则是一些个人主义的美德，对他人和他人观点的容忍、尊重，独立的思想，正直的性格，以及德国人自己也知道缺乏的在上级面前为自己信念辩护的意愿即所谓的“道德勇气”，对老弱病残的体恤，只在过去个人自由传统下才有的对权力的正常蔑视和厌恶。他们看起来在大多数细微但重要的、那些在自由社会促进人与人交流的品质上也不足：善良、幽默、谦逊、尊重个人隐私以及对邻居善意的信任。

随我们以上所说，大家就不会觉得奇怪，这些个人美德同时也显然是社会美德，它能润滑社会关系，使得从上到下的控制少有必要，但同时也更困难。这些美德在个人主义、重商社会中繁荣，在集体主义或者军事化为主体的社会则缺失——这一区别在或者说过去在德国的不同区域之间可以觉察到，现在在德国主流观点和西欧特色观点之间也可以觉察到。直到最近，至少在那些长期受商业文明力量影响的德国部分地区，西部、南部的商业城镇以及汉萨诸镇，总的道德观很可能更接近西欧而不是现在在德国各地主流道德观。

It would, however, be highly unjust to regard the masses of the totalitarian people as devoid of moral fervour because they give unstinted support to a system which to us seems a denial of most moral values. For the great majority of them the opposite is probably true: the intensity of the moral emotions behind a movement like that of National-Socialism or communism can probably be compared only to those of the great religious movements of history. Once you admit that the individual is merely a means to serve the ends of the higher entity called society or the nation, most of those features of totalitarian regimes which horrify us follow of necessity. From the collectivist standpoint intolerance and brutal suppression of dissent, the complete disregard of the life and happiness of the individual, are essential and unavoidable consequences of this basic premise, and the collectivist can admit this and at the same time claim that his system is superior to one in which the "selfish" interests of the individual are allowed to obstruct the full realisation of the ends the community pursues. When German philosophers again and again represent the striving for personal happiness as itself immoral and only the fulfilment of an imposed duty as praiseworthy, they are perfectly sincere, however difficult this may be to understand for those who have been brought up in a different tradition.

Where there is one common all-overriding end there is no room for any general morals or rules. To a limited extent we ourselves experience this in wartime. But even war and the greatest peril had led in this country only to a very moderate approach to totalitarianism, very little setting aside of all other values in the service of a single purpose. But where a few specific ends dominate the whole of society, it is inevitable that occasionally cruelty may become a duty, that acts which revolt all our feeling, such as the shooting of hostages or the killing of the old or sick, should be treated as mere matters of expediency, that the compulsory uprooting and transportation of hundreds of thousands should become an instrument of policy approved by almost everybody except the victims, or that suggestions like that of a "conscription of woman for breeding purposes" can be seriously contemplated. There is always in the eyes of the collectivist a greater goal which these acts serve and which to him justifies them because the pursuit of the common end of society can know no limits in any rights or values of any individual.

然而，极权主义国家的人民群众因为毫无保留的支持一个在我们看起来违背大多数道德价值的制度，就认为他们缺乏道德热情，那会是高度不公正。对他们绝大多数来说，正好相反：象纳粹、共产主义这样群众运动背后道德情感的强烈堪比历史上最伟大的宗教运动。一旦你承认个人仅仅是服务于所谓社会或者国家等更高实体目标的工具，独裁政体那些大多数恐怖的特征必然随之而来。从集体主义的立场来看，难容异见和残酷镇压，完全无视个人的生命与幸福，都是这基本前提必然的、无可避免的后果，集体主义者能够承认这一点，同时声称他们的制度比那些允许个人“自私”自利妨碍全面实现社会目标的制度优越。当德国哲学家一而再再而三的将追求个人幸福本身视作不道德，只有履行义务值得颂扬，不管这对那些在不同传统下长大的那些人来说多难以理解，他们自己说这话完全是由衷的。

在有一个共同的压倒一切的目标的地方，没有任何一般的道德或者规则可言。在有限程度上，我们自己在战时有过体会。但在英国即使战争和最紧要时刻带来的极权主义程度也很适度，很少为了一个目的放弃其他所有价值。但是，当少数特定的目标支配我们整个社会，有时候残忍不可避免地可能成为一种责任，象射杀人质或者杀害老弱这些与我们情感相左的行为被视作仅是权宜之计，强迫数十万人口连根拔起全部迁移成为除了受害者以外其他人都赞同的政策手段，或者象“为繁衍征召妇女”的这类建议也被认真考虑。在集体主义者眼里，总有一个更大的目标，这些行为为之服务，因此合情合理，因为追求社会共同目标可以无视任何个人的权力和价值。

But while for the mass of the citizens of the totalitarian state it is often unselfish devotion to an ideal, although one that is repellent to us, which makes them approve and even perform such deeds, this cannot be pleaded for those who guide its policy. To be a useful assistant in the running of a totalitarian state it is not enough that a man should be prepared to accept specious justification of vile deeds, he must himself be prepared actively to break every moral rule he has ever known if this seems necessary to achieve the end set for him. Since it is the supreme leader who alone determines the ends, his instruments must have no moral convictions of their own. They must, above all, be unreservedly committed to the person of the leader; but next to this the most important thing is that they should be completely unprincipled and literally capable of everything. They must have no ideals of their own which they want to realise, no ideas about right or wrong which might interfere with the intentions of the leader. There is thus in the positions of power little to attract those who hold moral beliefs of the kind which in the past have guided the European peoples, little which could compensate for the distastefulness of many of the particular tasks, and little opportunity to gratify any more idealistic desires, to recompense for the undeniable risk, the sacrifice of most of the pleasures of private life and of personal independence which the posts of great responsibility involve. The only tastes which are satisfied are the taste for power as such, the pleasure of being obeyed and of being part of a well-functioning and immensely powerful machine to which everything else must give way.

Yet while there is little that is likely to induce men who are good by our standards to aspire to leading positions in the totalitarian machine, and much to deter them, there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous. There will be jobs to be done about the badness of which taken by themselves nobody has any doubt, but which have to be done in the service of some higher end, and which have to be executed with the same expertness and efficiency as any others. And as there will be need for actions which are bad in themselves, and which all those still influenced by traditional morals will be reluctant to perform, the readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power. The positions in a totalitarian society in which it is necessary to practice cruelty and intimidation, deliberate deception and spying, are numerous. Neither the Gestapo nor the administration of a concentration camp, neither the Ministry of Propaganda nor the SA or SS (or their Italian or Russian counterparts) are suitable places for the exercise of humanitarian feelings. Yet it is through positions like these that the road to the highest positions in the totalitarian state leads. It is only too true when a distinguished American economist concludes from a similar brief enumeration of the duties of the authorities of a collectivist state that

they would have to do these things whether they wanted to or not: and the probability of the people in power being individuals who would dislike the possession and exercise of power is on a level with the probability that an extremely tender-hearted person would get the job of whipping-master in a slave plantation.¹⁰

We cannot, however, exhaust this subject here. The problem of the selection of the leaders is closely bound up with the wide problem of selection according to the opinions held, or rather according to the readiness with which a person conforms to an ever-changing set of doctrines. And this leads us to one of the most characteristic moral features of totalitarianism, its relation to, and its effect on, all the virtues falling under the general heading of truthfulness. This is so big a subject that it requires a separate chapter.

但对于极权国家人民大众来说，常常是对理想，尽管是我们厌恶的理想，的无私奉献让他们赞同甚至实施那样的行为，对政策有影响的人并非如此。要成为运作极权主义国家有用的帮手，一个人仅仅准备接受那些邪恶行径似是而非的道理是不够的，为了达到给他设定的目标，如有必要，他自己必须准备主动打破已知的所有道德规则。因为是最初领袖独自确定了这些目标，他的幕僚们因此不能有自己的道德信仰。最重要地，他们必须无保留服从于领袖个人；其次重要地是他们应该完全无原则并且理论上来说无所不能为。他们不可以有自己已实现的想法，不可以对可能妨碍领袖意图的一切有是非之分。在这种权力的位置，因此很少有东西能吸引到有传统道德信仰的人，这些传统道德信仰曾经指引过欧洲人民；也很少能够补偿很多具体任务带来的不愉快；以及很少有机会满足更加理想主义的愿望，无法补偿无可逃避的风险、以及重大责任岗位所带来的对个人生活娱乐和个性独立的牺牲。唯一能得到满足的滋味就是权力的滋味，就是有人服从的快乐，成为一个运行良好、无比强大、攻无不克的机器的零件的快乐。

尚且，独裁政府的领导岗位，能用来吸引按我们的标准有才能的人的东西很少，而能改变他们的东西却很多，冷酷无情、肆意妄为大有机会。有些坏事要做，做事的人也毫不怀疑是坏事，但是为了更崇高目的不得不做，不得不做得和其它事情一样专业、高效。有些行为本身就是坏的，但有需要，那些仍然受传统道德影响的人就不愿意执行，因而愿意做坏事成为升迁、得势的途径。专制社会需要使用残忍、恐吓、蓄意欺骗和监视手段的岗位很多。无论是盖世太保还是集中营，无论是宣传部还是冲锋队、党卫军（或者意大利、俄国类似组织）都不是适宜发挥人道主义情感的地方。然而在极权主义国家正是通过这样的岗位升迁之路走上最高职务。一位杰出的美国经济学家，同样地简单罗列了集体主义国家政府职能，然后作出如下结论，简直大正确了，

不管他们愿意与否，他们都必须做：不喜欢掌握和使用权力的人当权的可能性，跟一个极度心善的人成为农奴种植园监工的可能性一样小。

然而，就这个问题，在此我们不能尽述。领导人选拔的问题和根据候选人所持观点，还是根据候选人服从与时俱进教条的意愿进行选拔这个大问题密切相关。这同时把我们引到了极权主义最独特的道德特征之一，即它跟真理性这个大标题下所有美德的关系、对所有美德的影响的问题。这个问题很大，需要另立一章。

¹⁰ Professor F. H. Knight in The Journal of Political Economy, December 1938, p. 869.