

11. THE END OF TRUTH

It is significant that the nationalisation of thought has proceeded everywhere pari passu with the nationalisation of industry.

E. H. Carr.

The most effective way of making everybody serve the single system of ends towards which the social plan is directed is to make everybody believe in those ends. To make a totalitarian system function efficiently it is not enough that everybody should be forced to work for the same ends. It is essential that the people should come to regard them as their own ends. Although the beliefs must be chosen for the people and imposed upon them, they must become their beliefs, a generally accepted creed which makes the individuals as far as possible act spontaneously in the way the planner wants. If the feeling of oppression in totalitarian countries is in general much less acute than most people in liberal countries imagine, this is because the totalitarian governments succeed to a high degree in making people think as they want them to.

This is, of course, brought about by the various forms of propaganda. Its technique is now so familiar that we need say little about it. The only point that needs to be stressed is that neither propaganda in itself, nor the techniques employed, are peculiar to totalitarianism, and that what so completely changes its nature and effect in a totalitarian state is that all propaganda serves the same goal, that all the instruments of propaganda are co-ordinated to influence the individuals in the same direction and to produce the characteristic Gleichschaltung of all minds. As a result, the effect of propaganda in totalitarian countries is different not only in magnitude but in kind from that of the propaganda made for different ends by independent and competing agencies. If all the sources of current information are effectively under one single control, it is no longer a question of merely persuading the people of this or that. The skilful propagandist then has power to mould their minds in any direction he chooses and even the most intelligent and independent people cannot entirely escape that influence if they are long isolated from all other sources of information.

While in the totalitarian states this status of propaganda gives it a unique power over the minds of the people, the peculiar moral effects arise not from the technique but from the object and scope of totalitarian propaganda. If it could be confined to indoctrinating the people with the whole system of values towards which the social effort is directed, propaganda would represent merely a particular manifestation of the characteristic features of collectivist morals which we have already considered. If its object were merely to teach the people a definite and comprehensive moral code, the problem would be solely whether this moral code is good or bad. We have seen that the moral code of a totalitarian society is not likely to appeal to us, that even the striving for equality by means of a directed economy can only result in an officially enforced inequality—an authoritarian determination of the status of each individual in the new hierarchical order; that most of the humanitarian elements of our morals, the respect for human life, for the weak and for the individual generally, will disappear. However repellent this may be to most people, and though it involves a change in moral standards, it is not necessarily entirely anti-moral. Some features of such a system may even appeal to the sternest moralists of a conservative tint and seem to them preferable to the softer standards of a liberal society.

11. 真理的终结

哪里工业国有化，哪里思想就接着国有化，耐人寻味啊。

爱德华·霍列特·卡尔

让每个人为社会计划所指向的单一目标服务，最有效的办法就是让每个人都相信那些目标。为了使整个极权主义制度高效运作，强迫每个人为相同目标服务还不够。最根本的是，人们必须把该目标视作自己的目标。尽管信仰必须为人民选择，并强加于他们头上，但信仰必须成为他们的信仰，一个普遍接受的、使所有人尽可能地按计划者所希冀的那样自发行动的信条。如果在极权主义国家受压迫的感觉一般来说远不如自由主义国家大多数人想象的那么厉害，那是因为极权主义政府在很大程度上成功地让人民按政府所希望的那样思考。

这当然是通过各种形式的宣传取得的。其手段现在已经如此熟悉，无须多说。这里要强调只有一点，宣传本身及采取的手段都并非极权主义所特有，但在极权主义国家如此完全改变宣传本质及作用的是，所有宣传服务于相同目的，所有宣传工具协调一致朝同一个方向影响个人、所有思想被标准化。其结果就是，极权主义国家的宣传跟相互独立、相互竞争的单位为了不同目的进行的宣传相比，其效果不仅在量上在质上也不同。如果现在所有信息的来源被有效地、统一地控制，那就不再是一个仅仅说服群众这样或者那样的问题。熟练的宣传工作者因此有能力按照他选择的任何方向模塑群众的思想，即使最聪明、能独立思考的人，如果他长期与其它所有信息源隔绝的话，那也就不能完全逃脱其影响。

在极权主义国家，宣传的地位给了它独一无二的控制群众思想的力量，不是方法而是极权主义的目标、覆盖范围制造了特有的道德效果。如果只允许向群众灌输社会努力所指向的价值体系，那么宣传所代表的不过是我们已经讨论过的集体主义道德特征的具体表现。如果宣传的目标仅仅是教育群众一个确定的、完备的道德标准，那么问题仅仅是这个道德标准是好是坏的问题。我们已经看到极权主义社会道德标准不可能对我们有吸引力，甚至通过计划经济手段来争取平等也只会带来正式的强加的不平等——独裁决定新等级制度中每个人的地位；我们道德中大部分的人性要素，对生命、弱者、总的来说对个人的尊重都将消失。对大多数人来说，不管这多么厌恶，并且尽管它涉及道德标准的改变，但它并不一定完全反道德。这样一个道德体系的某些特征甚至可能对带保守主义色彩的最严肃的道德家有吸引力，对他们来说，比自由主义社会更温和的道德标准更可取。

The moral consequences of totalitarian propaganda which we must now consider are, however, of an even more profound kind. They are destructive of all morals because they undermine one of the foundations of all morals, the sense of and the respect for truth. From the nature of its task, totalitarian propaganda cannot confine itself to values, to questions of opinion and moral convictions in which the individual always will conform more or less to the views ruling his community, but must extend to questions of fact where human intelligence is involved in a different way. This is so, firstly, because in order to induce people to accept the official values, these must be justified, or shown to be connected with the values already held by the people, which usually will involve assertions about causal connections between means and ends; and, secondly, because the distinction between ends and means, between the goal aimed at and the measures taken to achieve it, is in fact never so clear-cut and definite as any general discussion of these problems is apt to suggest; and because, therefore, people must be brought to agree not only with the ultimate aims but also with the views about the facts and possibilities on which the particular measures are based.

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We have seen that agreement on that complete ethical code, that all-comprehensive system of values which is implicit in an economic plan, does not exist in a free society but would have to be created. But we must not assume that the planner will approach his task aware of that need, or that, even if he were aware of it, it would be possible to create such a comprehensive code in advance. He only finds out about the conflicts between different needs as he goes along, and has to make his decisions as the necessity arises. The code of values guiding his decisions does not exist in abstracto before the decisions have to be made, it has to be created with the particular decisions. We have also seen how this inability to separate the general problem of values from the particular decisions makes it impossible that a democratic body, while unable to decide the technical details of a plan, should yet determine the values guiding it.

然而，我们现在要讨论的是，极权主义宣传更深远的道德后果。它对所有道德都具有破坏性，因为它颠覆了所有道德的基础之一，即对真理的认识和尊重。从其任务的本质出发，极权主义宣传不可能局限于价值观，不可能局限于个人总是或多或少顺应的社会主义观点与道德信仰问题，其范围必须扩展到人类以不同思维方式涉及的客观事实问题上去。其所以如此，首先，为了诱导群众接受官方价值观，价值观必须加以合理化，或者说，显示出与群众已有价值标准相联系，这就常常涉及明确方法和结果之间的因果关系；其次，关于目的与方法，针对的目标和达到目标采取的手段之间的区别，一般性讨论都倾向于说，事实上无法清楚地定义并区分；再次因为，这样必然使人们不仅就最终目标而且对于具体手段所根据的事实及各种可能性的看法也要达成一致。

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我们已经看到，对完备道德标准即对经济计划所暗含的无所不包的全面价值体系的赞同，在自由社会中并不存在，因此必须创建。但我们不能假定执行任务的计划者会意识到这个需要，或者即使他意识到了这个需要，也不能认为他有可能事先创立那样一个完备的价值标准。只有随着工作的进展，他才会发现不同需求之间的冲突，并在有必要时作出他的决定。在他做决定之前，并不存在指导其决定的抽象的价值标准，标准必然跟具体决定同时产生。我们也已经看到过，不能将普遍的价值问题与个别的具体决定区分开来，使得一个民主机构无法决定计划技术性细节的同时，也无法确定遵循的价值标准。

And while the planning authority will constantly have to decide issues on merits about which there exist no definite moral rules, it will have to justify its decisions to the people—or, at least, have somehow to make the people believe that they are the right decisions. Although those responsible for a decision may have been guided by no more than prejudice, some guiding principle will have to be stated publicly if the community is not merely passively to submit but actively to support the measure. The need to rationalise the likes and dislikes which, for lack of anything else, must guide the planner in many of his decisions, and the necessity of stating his reasons in a form in which they will appeal to as many people as possible, will force him to construct theories, i.e. assertions about the connections between facts, which then become an integral part of the governing doctrine. This process of creating a "myth" to justify his action need not be conscious. The totalitarian leader may be guided merely by an instinctive dislike of the state of things he has found and a desire to create a new hierarchical order which conforms better to his conception of merit, he may merely know that he dislikes the Jews who seemed to be so successful in an order which did not provide a satisfactory place for him, and that he loves and admires the tall blond man, the "aristocratic" figure of the novels of his youth. So he will readily embrace theories which seem to provide a rational justification for the prejudices which he shares with many of his fellows. Thus a pseudo-scientific theory becomes part of the official creed which to a greater or lesser degree directs everybody's action. Or the widespread dislike of the industrial civilisation and a romantic yearning for country life, together with a (probably erroneous) idea about the special value of country people as soldiers, provides the basis for another myth: But und Boden (blood and soil), expresses not merely ultimate values but a whole host of beliefs about cause and effect which once they have become ideals directing the activity of the whole community must not be questioned.

The need for such official doctrines as an instrument of directing and rallying the efforts of the people has been clearly foreseen by the various theoreticians of the totalitarian system. Plato's "noble lies" and Sorel's "myths" serve the same purpose as the racial doctrine of the Nazis or the theory of the corporative state of Mussolini. They are all necessarily based on particular views about facts which are then elaborated into scientific theories in order to justify a preconceived opinion.

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The most effective way of making people accept the validity of the values they are to serve is to persuade them that they are really the same as those which they, or at least the best among them, have always held, but which were not properly understood or recognised before. The people are made to transfer their allegiance from the old gods to the new under the pretence that the new gods really are what their sound instinct had always told them but what before they had only dimly seen. And the most efficient technique to this end is to use the old words but change their meaning. Few traits of totalitarian regimes are at the same time so confusing to the superficial observer and yet so characteristic of the whole intellectual climate as the complete perversion of language, the change of meaning of the words by which the ideals of the new regimes are expressed.

当计划部门必须不断地就并无定则的诸事权衡轻重时，他们不得不要向人证明他们的决定是合理的——或者，至少某种程度上必须让人相信是正确的决定。尽管那些负责人可能不过是按自己的成见来决策，但如果要社会不仅仅是被动服从而是主动支持其措施，则必须公开明示一些指导性原则。由于没有其它依据，计划者必然按喜恶来决策，因此需要合理化其喜恶，并以一种能为最广大群众接受的方式予以表达，这必然迫使他创造理论，也就是宣称事实之间的联系，这些随即成为国家治理学说的组成部分。制造“神话”来合理化其行动不一定是自觉的。极权主义领导作决定所遵循的也许只是他本能地不喜欢他所看到的某些现象，也许只是想建立一套更符合他价值观的等级制度，譬如他只知道他不喜欢犹太人，这些犹太人看起来竟然在一个他自己没找到满意岗位的社会里如此成功；他喜欢、羡慕那些身材魁梧金发碧眼的、他年轻时小说中“贵族”式的人物。这样，他很容易接受那些貌似为他和他的很多同事们所持成见提出理性合理解释的理论。这样一套伪科学理论就成为了官方信仰的一部分多多少少地指导每一个人的行为。又或者，对工业文明的普遍厌恶和对乡村生活的浪漫渴求，混合上一种（很可能是错的）农民从军特别崇高的想法就产生了另一个神话：血与土，它不仅表达终极价值而且包括一整套因果的信仰，这些一旦成为指导整个社会活动的意识形态，就变得不容置疑。

极权主义制度理论家早就清楚预见到需要那样的官方学说作为指导、团结群众的手段。柏拉图的“高尚的谎言”和索雷尔“神话”和纳粹的种族学说、墨索里尼的社团国家理论，服务于同样目的。他们都必然以对事实的某些具体观点为基础，精心描述为科学理论，以证明早已形成的意见的合理性。

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使群众接受他们所服务价值的合理性最有效的方法就是说服他们相信，这些价值跟他们、至少他们中最优秀的人、一直持有的但以前未能被正确理解或认识到的那些价值标准是一样的。人类习惯于通过这样的假装，直觉一直在给他新神的启示而他过去只看得模模糊糊，来把虔诚从旧神转移到新神。并且，达到这个目的，最有效的手段就是使用旧词、偷换概念。独裁主义制度特征中，很少有象完全曲解语言、偷换词汇概念来表达新制度的理想这样，让粗浅的观察者迷惑不解，同时又体现出了整个思想氛围的特色。

The worst sufferer in this respect is, of course, the word liberty. It is a word used as freely in totalitarian states as elsewhere. Indeed it could almost be said — and it should serve as a warning to us to be on our guard against all the tempters who promise us New Liberties for Old¹ — that wherever liberty as we understand it has been destroyed, this has almost always been done in the name of some new freedom promised to the people. Even among us we have "planners for freedom" who promise us a "collective freedom for the group", the nature of which may be gathered from the fact that its advocate finds it necessary to assure us that "naturally the advent of planned freedom does not mean that all [sic] earlier forms of freedom must be abolished". Dr. Karl Mannheim, from whose work² these sentences are taken, at least warns us that "a conception of freedom modelled on the preceding age is an obstacle to any real understanding of the problem". But his use of the word freedom is as misleading as it is in the mouth of totalitarian politicians. Like their freedom the "collective freedom" he offers us is not the freedom of the members of society but the unlimited freedom of the planner to do with society what he pleases³. It is the confusion of freedom with power carried to the extreme.

In this particular case the perversion of the meaning of the word has, of course, been well prepared by a long line of German philosophers, and not least by many of the theoreticians of socialism. But freedom or liberty are by no means the only words whose meaning has been changed into their opposites to make them serve as instruments of totalitarian propaganda. We have already seen how the same happens to justice and law, right and equality. The list could be extended till it includes almost all moral and political terms in general use.

If one has not oneself experienced this process, it is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this change of the meaning of words, the confusion which it causes, and the barriers to any rational discussion which it creates. It has to be seen to be understood how, if one of two brothers embraces the new faith, after a short while he appears to speak a different language which makes any real communication between them impossible. And the confusion becomes worse because this change of meaning of the words describing political ideals is not a single event but a continuous process, a technique employed consciously or unconsciously to direct the people. Gradually, as this process continues, the whole language becomes despoiled, words become empty shells deprived of any definite meaning, as capable of denoting one thing as its opposite and used solely for the emotional associations which still adhere to them.

这个方面最大的受害者当然是自由这个词。这个词在极权主义国家跟其它地方一样被随意使用。真地，几乎可以这么说，任何就我们的理解来说自由被破坏的地方，都是通过以许诺人民新自由的名义实现的——这应该被视作一个警示信号，防止那些用新自由取代旧自由的承诺来诱惑我们的人。甚至在我们当中有“为自由而计划的人”，许诺我们“团体的集体自由”，其实质可以通过如下事实推断，其拥护者认为必须向大家保证，“有计划的自由的到来，当然并不意味着必须废除所有【原文如此】早期形式的自由”。这些词句摘自卡尔·曼海姆博士的著作，他至少提醒我们“以过去时代为模型的自由概念对这个问题的真正理解来说是一个障碍。”但他对自由这个词的使用跟极权主义政客口里的自由一样误导人。象他们的自由一样，他给我们提议的“集体自由”不是社会每一个成员的自由，而是计划者对社会为所欲为的无限自由。自由和权力混淆到了极致。

当然，在这一具体的例子中，词义的曲解早有一系列的德国哲学家事先做了铺垫，尤其是很多社会主义理论家。偷换意义以服务于极权主义宣传工具的词绝不止自由这个词。我们已看到相同遭遇的有正义与法律、权利与平等。这个清单可以罗列到包括几乎所有通用道德、政治词汇。

没有亲身经历，难以正确理解篡改词义的范围之广，引起的误解之深，以及对任何理性讨论的阻碍之大。如非亲眼所见不能理解，如果两兄弟其中一个接受了新信仰，不久之后，他就像说着另一种兄弟之间都无法用以真正交流的语言。并且，篡改描述政治理想词汇的词义不是孤立事件，而是一个持续的过程，一种有意或者无意用来指挥群众的技巧，因此混淆变得越来越严重。久而久之，语言被洗劫破坏，词汇变得空洞，失去了意义，既可以表示一件事的正面也可以表示反面，用这个词也仅仅是因为情感上习惯了。

¹ This is the title of a recent work by the American historian C. L. Becker.

² *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, p. 377.

³ Mr. Peter Drucker (*The End of Economic Man*, p. 74) correctly observes that "the less freedom there is, the more there is talk of the 'new freedom'. Yet this new freedom is a mere word which covers the exact contradiction of all

that Europe ever understood by freedom.... The new freedom which is preached in Europe is, however, the right of the majority against the individual."

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It is not difficult to deprive the great majority of independent thought. But the minority who will retain an inclination to criticise must also be silenced. We have already seen why coercion cannot be confined to the acceptance of the ethical code underlying the plan according to which all social activity is directed. Since many parts of this code will never be explicitly stated, since many parts of the guiding scale of values will exist only implicitly in the plan, the plan itself in every detail, in fact every act of the government, must become sacrosanct and exempt from criticism. If the people are to support the common effort without hesitation, they must be convinced that not only the end aimed at but also the means chosen are the right ones. The official creed, to which adherence must be enforced, will therefore comprise all the views about facts on which the plan is based. Public criticism or even expressions of doubt must be suppressed because they tend to weaken public support. As the Webbs report of the position in every Russian enterprise: "Whilst the work is in progress, any public expression of doubt, or even fear that the plan will not be successful, is an act of disloyalty and even of treachery because of its possible effects on the will and on the efforts of the rest of the staff."⁴ When the doubt or fear expressed concerns not the success of a particular enterprise but of the whole social plan, it must even more be treated as sabotage.

Facts and theories must thus become no less the object of an official doctrine than views about values. And the whole apparatus for spreading knowledge, the schools and the press, wireless and cinema, will be used exclusively to spread those views which, whether true or false, will strengthen the belief in the rightness of the decisions taken by the authority; and all information that might cause doubt or hesitation will be withheld. The probable effect on the people's loyalty to the system becomes the only criterion for deciding whether a particular piece of information is to be published or suppressed. The situation in a totalitarian state is permanently and in all fields the same that it is elsewhere in some fields in wartime. Everything which might cause doubt about the wisdom of the government or create discontent will be kept from the people. The basis of unfavourable comparisons with conditions elsewhere, the knowledge of possible alternatives to the course actually taken, information which might suggest failure on the part of the government to live up to its promises or to take advantage of opportunities to improve conditions, will all be suppressed. There is consequently no field where the systematic control of information will not be practised and uniformity of views not enforced.

This applies even to fields apparently most remote from any political interests, and particularly to all the sciences, even the most abstract. That in the disciplines dealing directly with human affairs and therefore most immediately affecting political views, such as history, law, or economics, the disinterested search for truth cannot be allowed in a totalitarian system, and the vindication of the official views becomes the sole object, is easily seen and has been amply confirmed by experience. These disciplines have indeed in all totalitarian countries become the most fertile factories of the official myths which the rulers use to guide the minds and wills of their subjects. It is not surprising that in these spheres even the pretence that they search for truth is abandoned and that the authorities decide what doctrines ought to be taught and published.

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使大多数人失去独立思考的能力并不难。但是，也必须让少数持批判意向的人保持沉默。计划以道德标准为基础，指挥一切社会活动，我们已经看到为什么仅仅强迫群众接受这些道德标准是远远不够的。因为道德标准的许多部分从来没有明确表述，价值衡量尺度的很多内容只会隐舍于计划中，因此计划本身每一个细节，事实上就是政府的每一项行为，必须做到不可侵犯、无可挑剔的。如果群众要毫不犹豫的支持共同事业，他们必须信服，不仅仅所针对的目的而且选择的方法都是正确的。必须强制遵守的官方学说，因此将包括对计划所依据事实的全部观点。必须禁止公开批评或者甚至质疑，因为这样会弱化群众的支持。韦伯夫妇关于俄国企业状况的报告写道“当工作进行中，任何公开质疑，或者甚至对计划不能完成的担忧，都是不忠诚、甚至背叛的行为，因为这对他人决心和努力有潜在影响。”如果所表达的怀疑或担心不是关于某个企业的成功而是关乎整个社会的计划时，那一定更会作为蓄意破坏来处理。

事实和理论因此必然和价值观一样成为官方学说的内容。并且，传播知识的整个官僚机构，学校和出版社，电台和电影院，都被只用来传播这些观念，对也罢，错也罢，都将强化群众对政府决定正确的信心；所有可能引起群众怀疑或迟疑的信息都隐瞒起来。是否影响群众对制度的忠诚成为决定一条具体信息是公开还是不公开的唯一标准。极权主义国家这一状况出现在所有领域，永远都在，而其它国家仅出现在战时某些领域。任何可能引起群众质疑政府智商或者可能引起群众不满的信息都不让群众知情。对比起来不如其它国家的基本事实，替代实际做法可选方案的相关知识，可能暗示政府方面未能信守诺言或者未能抓住时机改善条件的信息，都将被压制。后果就是，对信息进行系统性管控、强制推行统一观点，无处不在。

甚至显然跟任何政治利益最遥不相关的领域也是如此，特别是所有科学领域，甚至是最抽象的学科。很容易看到并为经验充分证实的是，那些直接涉及人类行为，因此最直接影响政治观点的学科，譬如历史、法律、或者经济，在极权主义制度下，对真理的公正的探索被予以禁止，为官方观点辩护成为唯一课题。的确，在所有极权主义国家，这些学科成为生产官方神话最多产的工厂，这些神话被统治者用来指导其人民的思想 and 意志。毫不奇怪，在这些领域，甚至追求真理的假装都没有了，由政府来决定应该教授、出版什么样的学说。

⁴ S. and B. Webb, *Soviet Communism*, p. 1038.

Totalitarian control of opinion extends, however, also to subjects which at first seem to have no political significance. Sometimes it is difficult to explain why particular doctrines should be officially proscribed or why others should be encouraged, and it is curious that these likes and dislikes are apparently somewhat similar in the different totalitarian systems. In particular, they all seem to have in common an intense dislike of the more abstract forms of thought—a dislike characteristically also shown by many of the collectivists among our scientists. Whether the theory of relativity is represented as a "semitic attack on the foundation of Christian and Nordic physics" or opposed because it is "in conflict with dialectical materialism and Marxist dogma" comes very much to the same thing. Nor does it make much difference whether certain theorems of mathematical statistics are attacked because they "form part of the class struggle on the ideological frontier and are a product of the historical role of mathematics as the servant of the bourgeoisie", or whether the whole subject is condemned because "it provides no guarantee that it will serve the interest of the people". It seems that pure mathematics is no less a victim and that even the holding of particular views about the nature of continuity can be ascribed to "bourgeois prejudices". According to the Webbs the Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Sciences has the following slogans: "We stand for Party in Mathematics. We stand for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery." The situation seems to be very similar in Germany. The Journal of the National-Socialist Association of Mathematicians is full of "party in mathematics", and one of the best known German physicists, the Nobel prizeman Lennard, has summed up his life work under the title German Physics in Four Volumes!

It is entirely in keeping with the whole spirit of totalitarianism that it condemns any human activity done for its own sake and without ulterior purpose. Science for science's sake, art for art's sake, are equally abhorrent to the Nazis, our socialist intellectuals, and the communists. Every activity must derive its justification from a conscious social purpose. There must be no spontaneous, unguided activity, because it might produce results which cannot be foreseen and for which the plan does not provide. It might produce something new, undreamt of in the philosophy of the planner. The principle extends even to games and amusements. I leave it to the reader to guess whether it was in Germany or in Russia where chess players were officially exhorted that "we must finish once and for all with the neutrality of chess. We must condemn once and for all the formula 'chess for the sake of chess' like the formula 'art for art's sake'".

Incredible as some of these aberrations may appear, we must yet be on our guard not to dismiss them as mere accidental by-products which have nothing to do with the essential character of a planned or totalitarian system. They are not. They are a direct result of that same desire to see everything directed by a "unitary conception of the whole", of the need to uphold at all costs the views in the service of which people are asked to make constant sacrifices, and of the general idea that the knowledge and beliefs of the people are an instrument to be used for a single purpose. Once science has to serve, not truth, but the interests of a class, a community, or a state, the sole task of argument and discussion is to vindicate and to spread still further the beliefs by which the whole life of the community is directed. As the Nazi Minister of Justice has explained, the question which every new scientific theory must ask itself is: "Do I serve National-Socialism for the greatest benefit of all?"

然而，极权主义舆论控制也延及到初看起来毫无政治意义的学科。有时候很难解释为什么必须禁止某些学说而提倡另外一些，让人好奇的是，不同的极权主义制度的爱憎显然有几分相似。特别是，他们看起来好像都同样强烈厌恶更为抽象的思想形式——我们科学工作者中很多集体主义者也颇具典型性地表现出这种厌恶。无论把相对论说成是“犹太人对基督教和北欧人物理学的攻击”还是因为“违反辩证唯物主义和马克思主义学说”所以反对它也好，结果都一样。某些统计数学的定理因为“构成意识形态战线阶级斗争的一部分，是数学作为小资产阶级奴仆的历史产物”而受到攻击，某些学科因为“无法保证为人民服务”整个遭受指责，没多大区别。纯数学也遭受同样命运，对于连续性的本质持某种观点也能被归结为“资产阶级偏见”。据韦伯夫妇说，《马列主义自然科学杂志》有以下口号：“在数学中，我们拥护党。在外科学中，我们拥护马列主义的纯洁性。”德国的情况看起来很类似。《国家社会主义数学家学会会刊》充斥着“党在数学中”这类标题，最著名的德国物理学家之一，诺贝尔奖获得者，菲利普·莱纳德总结他一生的工作用了《德国物理学四卷》为题。

谴责任何为个人原因、无远大目标的行为完全符合极权主义的整体精神。为科学而科学、为艺术而艺术的行为同样为纳粹分子、我们的社会主义知识分子、共产主义者所厌恶。每一项活动的合理性都必须源自于自觉的社会目的。不能有任何自发的、无监督的活动，因为那可能产生无法预料、未曾计划的结果。它可能产生新的、计划者哲学中未曾料想到的东西。这些原则甚至延及到了运动和娱乐中。我留给读者来猜猜，是在德国还是俄国，国际象棋棋手被正式叮嘱，“我们必须彻底结束国际象棋的中立性。我们必须彻底谴责象‘艺术就是艺术’类似的‘下棋就是下棋’的方式方法”。

很多这样的不正常现象难以置信，我们必须警惕，不要把他们当作与计划体制或者极权制度本质无关、仅是偶尔产生的副产品而置之不顾。它们不是副产品。它们是那些想要看到一切处于“整体的统一概念”指挥下的直接结果，它们要求群众不断牺牲为之服务、不惜一切代价捍卫这些观念的直接结果，它们是为了唯一目的把人民的知识、信仰当作工具这个总的思想的直接结果。一旦科学不是为了真理而是为一个阶级、一个社会、一个国家的利益服务时，辨和论的唯一任务就是为指挥全部社会生活的那个信仰辩护，并更进一步传播。正如纳粹司法部长所解释那样，每一个科学理论必须问自己一个问题：“我是在为国家社会主义全体人民最大利益服务吗？”

The word truth itself ceases to have its old meaning. It describes no longer something to be found, with the individual conscience as the sole arbiter of whether in any particular instance the evidence (or the standing of those proclaiming it) warrants a belief; it becomes something to be laid down by authority, something which has to be believed in the interest of the unity of the organised effort, and which may have to be altered as the exigencies of this organised effort require it.

The general intellectual climate which this produces, the spirit of complete cynicism as regards truth which it engenders, the loss of the sense of even the meaning of truth, the disappearance of the spirit of independent inquiry and of the belief in the power of rational conviction, the way in which differences of opinion in every branch of knowledge become political issues to be decided by authority, are all things which one must personally experience—no short description can convey their extent. Perhaps the most alarming fact is that contempt for intellectual liberty is not a thing which arises only once the totalitarian system is established, but one which can be found everywhere among intellectuals who have embraced a collectivist faith and who are acclaimed as intellectual leaders even in countries still under a liberal regime. Not only is even the worst oppression condoned if it is committed in the name of socialism, and the creation of a totalitarian system openly advocated by people who pretend to speak for the scientists of liberal countries; intolerance too is openly extolled. Have we not recently seen a British scientific writer defend even Inquisition because in his opinion it "is beneficial to science when it protects a rising class"?⁵ This view is, of course, practically indistinguishable from the views which led the Nazis to the persecution of men of science, the burning of scientific books, and the systematic eradication of the intelligentsia of the subjected people.

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The desire to force upon the people a creed which is regarded as salutary for them is, of course, not a thing that is new or peculiar to our time. New, however, is the argument by which many of our intellectuals try to justify such attempts. There is no real freedom of thought in our society, so it is said, because the opinions and tastes of the masses are shaped by propaganda, by advertising, by the example of the upper classes, and by other environmental factors which inevitably force the thinking of the people into well-worn grooves. From this it is concluded that if the ideals and tastes of the great majority are always fashioned by circumstances which we can control, we ought to use this power deliberately to turn the thoughts of the people in what we think is a desirable direction.

真理这个词已经失去了它最初的含义。它不再表述某种被追寻的东西，这其中只有个人良心是唯一裁判，在任何具体情况下，证据（或者出具证据人的声望）是否支持信仰；它成为政府制订，为了组织起来的工作统一的利益必须相信，在紧急情况需要时可能不得不随之而更改的东西。

由此产生的总的知识分子的大环境、对真理的全面嘲讽、真理的意义甚至该词含义的丧失、独立探索精神和对理性思考信仰的消失、每一个知识领域的意见分歧都成为由政府决定的政治问题的处理方式，所有这些非亲身经历不能体会，范围之广无法一一罗列。也许最令人担忧的事是，对思想自由的蔑视不是只发生在极权主义制度建立之后，甚至在仍是自由主义制度的国家，在那些接受集体主义信仰的知识分子，那些被视作知识分子领袖的人当中都能见到。以社会主义之名进行的最粗暴的压制，假装代表自由主义国家科学工作者发声的人公开主张建立极权主义制度，不仅仅这些得到纵容，甚至不容异见也得到公开赞扬。我们最近不是看到一个英国科学作家甚至为“迫害异端”辩护，因为按他的观点“保护新兴阶级有助于科学”。这个观点，当然，与导致纳粹迫害科学工作者、焚烧科学书籍、系统性地消灭被征服民族知识分子阶层的观点，实际上没有区别。

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想要强迫民众接受一种被认为对其有益的信条，当然不是我们这个时代新的或者特有的东西。然而，新的是我们很多知识分子尽力为其合理性背书。可以说，我们这个社会没有真正的思想自由，大众舆论和兴趣爱好都被宣传、被广告、被上层阶级的榜样、以及被不可避免迫使大家思想循规蹈矩的其它环境因素所塑造。由此，我们可以得出结论，如果绝大多数人的意识形态和兴趣爱好总是由可以控制的环境塑造，那我们应该有意地使用这个力量把群众的思想转到我们认可的方向上去。

⁵ G. Crowther, *The Social Relation of Science*, 1941, p. 333.

Probably it is true enough that the great majority are rarely capable of thinking independently, that on most questions they accept views which they find ready-made, and that they will be equally content if born or coaxed into one set of beliefs or another. In any society freedom of thought will probably be of direct significance only for a small minority. But this does not mean that anyone is competent, or ought to have power, to select those to whom this freedom is to be reserved. It certainly does not justify the presumption of any group of people to claim the right to determine what people ought to think or believe. It shows a complete confusion of thought to suggest that, because under any sort of system the majority of people follow the lead of somebody, it makes no difference if everybody has to follow the same lead. To deprecate the value of intellectual freedom because it will never mean for everybody the same possibility of independent thought is completely to miss the reasons which give intellectual freedom its value. What is essential to make it serve its function as the prime mover of intellectual progress is not that everybody may be able to think or write anything, but that any cause or idea may be argued by somebody. So long as dissent is not suppressed, there will always be some who will query the ideas ruling their contemporaries and put new ideas to the test of argument and propaganda.

This interaction of individuals, possessing different knowledge and different views, is what constitutes the life of thought. The growth of reason is a social process based on the existence of such differences. It is of its essence that its results cannot be predicted, that we cannot know which views will assist this growth and which will not—in short, that this growth cannot be governed by any views which we now possess without at the same time limiting it. To "plan" or "organise" the growth of mind, or, for that matter, progress in general, is a contradiction in terms. The idea that the human mind ought "consciously" to control its own development confuses individual reason, which alone can "consciously control" anything, with the interpersonal process to which its growth is due. By attempting to control it we are merely setting bounds to its development and must sooner or later produce a stagnation of thought and a decline of reason.

The tragedy of collectivist thought is that while it starts out to make reason supreme, it ends by destroying reason because it misconceives the process on which the growth of reason depends. It may indeed be said that it is the paradox of all collectivist doctrine and its demand for the "conscious" control or "conscious" planning that they necessarily lead to the demand that the mind of some individual should rule supreme—while only the individualist approach to social phenomena makes us recognise the super-individual forces which guide the growth of reason. Individualism is thus an attitude of humility before this social process and of tolerance to other opinions, and is the exact opposite of that intellectual hubris which is at the root of the demand for comprehensive direction of the social process.

很可能这些都是真的：绝大多数人很少能独立思考，在大多数问题上他们接受现成的观点，同样满足于与生俱来还是受人哄骗得以接受了这样或那样的信仰。在任何社会，思想自由很可能仅对极少数人有直接的意义。但这并不意味着有人能够、或者应该有权选择谁可以拥有自由。假定某群人有权决定大家应该想什么、信什么肯定不合理。无论哪种制度下大多数人总是要服从某人的领导，这跟所有人必须服从同一个领导没什么区别，这种说法完全是混淆概念。思想自由并不意味着对所有人来说都能同样的独立思考，因此贬低其价值，完全没有把握思想自由的价值所在。思想自由之所以是推进思想进步的根本原因，不是因为每个人就任何事都有能力思考或者写作，而是对任何原因、想法有人可以争论。只要异见不被压制，总会有人质疑当时的主流意见，提出新想法，接受辩论、宣传的考验。

拥有不同知识和持有不同观点的人与人之间的交流构成思想的生命。有这些差别才有理性的成长这样一个社会过程。本质的一点就是，结果是不可预料的，我们无法知道哪个观点会有助于理性成长，哪个不会——简而言之，现有观点只要管它就必然限制它。对思想的成长，或者总的来说思想的进步，进行“计划”或者“组织”连叙述都是自相矛盾的。人类思想必须“自觉地”控制其自身发展的想法，混淆了能够单独“自觉控制”一切的个体理性和带来思想成长的人与人之间的交流。试图控制思想只会限制其发展，迟早会带来思想的停滞和理性的倒退。

集体主义思想的悲剧在于，它以置理性于至高无上开始，最终以毁灭理性结束，究其原因就在于它误解了理性赖以产生成长的过程。也许真地可以这么说，集体主义学说的自相矛盾和它对“自觉”控制和“自觉”计划的要求必然导致需要某个人的想法高于至高无上——只有当我们用个人主义方法研究社会现象才使我们意识到这个指导理性成长的超级个人力量。个人主义对社会过程态度是谦虚的、对他人意见是容忍的，跟思想狂妄截然相反，想要对社会过程进行全面指挥的根本原因就是思想狂妄。