

13. THE TOTALITARIANS IN OUR MIDST

When authority presents itself in the guise of organisation it develops charms fascinating enough to convert communities of free people into totalitarian States.

The Times.

Probably it is true that the very magnitude of the outrages committed by the totalitarian governments, instead of increasing the fear that such a system might one day arise in this country, has rather strengthened the assurance that it cannot happen here. When we look to Nazi Germany the gulf which separates us seems so immense that nothing that happens there can possess relevance for any possible development in this country. And the fact that the difference has steadily become greater seems to refute any suggestion that we may be moving in a similar direction. But let us not forget that fifteen years ago the possibility of such a thing happening in Germany would have appeared just as fantastic, not only to nine-tenths of the Germans themselves, but also to the most hostile foreign observers (however wise they may now pretend to have been).

As suggested earlier in these pages, however, it is not the present Germany but the Germany of twenty or thirty years ago to which conditions in this country show an ever-increasing resemblance. There are many features which were then regarded as "typically German" and which are now equally familiar in this country, and many symptoms that point to a further development in the same direction. We have already mentioned the most significant, the increasing similarity between the economic views of the Right and Left and their common opposition to the Liberalism that used to be the common basis of most English politics. We have the authority of Mr. Harold Nicolson for the statement that during the last Conservative government, among the back-benchers of the Conservative party "the most gifted ... were all socialists at heart"¹ and there can be little question that, as in the days of the Fabians, many socialists have more sympathy with the Conservatives than with the Liberals. There are many other features closely related to this. The increasing veneration for the state, the admiration of power, and of bigness for bigness' sake, the enthusiasm for "organisation" of everything (we now call it planning), and that "inability to leave anything to the simple power of organic growth", which even H. v. Treitschke deplored in the Germans sixty years ago, are all scarcely less marked in this country now than they were in Germany.

13. 我们中间的极权主义者

当政府打着组织的幌子时，它产生的吸引力，足以迷惑自由的群众，把他们的社会变成极权主义的国家。

泰晤士报

很可能真的是，极权主义政府所犯下的滔天暴行，不是让人更加害怕英国有一天也可能会有这样一个制度，而是让人更加确信它不会发生在英国。当我们看到纳粹德国与我们之间的鸿沟看起来如此之大，以至于好像他们德国那里发生的事情跟我们英国可能发生的事情毫不相干。并且，差异逐步增大这个事实也似乎否认英德会朝类似方向发展。但我们不要忘记，十五年前，德国现在发生的这些在当时看来就象梦幻一样，不仅仅对九成德国人来说如此，就是对最不怀好意的国外观察家（无论他们现在装得多明智）也是如此。

然而，正如本书前面所提到，英国的情况表现出越来越像的不是现在的德国，而是二十、三十年前的德国。有很多当时被认为是“典型的德国”特征现在在英国同样常见，有很多征兆显示两者在朝相同方向进一步发展。我们已经提到过，最重要的，左右两派经济观点趋同、一致反对曾是大多数英国政治共同基础的自由主义。我们以哈罗德·尼科尔森的话为信，他说上届保守党政府后排议员“最有才华的……内心深处都是社会主义者”，而且少有疑问，就如费边主义时代，很多社会主义者对保守党比自由党更同情。还有很多其它特征跟这密切相关。日益崇拜国家、羡慕权力、好大喜功、热衷一切“组织”化（现在我们称之为计划）、“不能听任任何事物自生自长”，海因里希·冯·特赖奇克六十年前就在德国为这些痛惜，现在这些在英国跟过去在德国一样明显。

¹ *The Spectator*, April 12, 1940, p. 523.

How far in the last twenty years England has travelled on the German path is brought home to one with extraordinary vividness if one now reads some of the more serious discussions of the differences between British and German views on political and moral issues which appeared in this country during the last war. It is probably true to say that then the British public had in general a truer appreciation of these differences than it has now; but while the people of this country were then proud of their distinctive tradition, there are few of the political views then regarded as characteristically English of which the majority of people in this country do not now seem half ashamed, if they do not positively repudiate them. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the more typically English a writer on political or social problems then appeared to the world, the more is he today forgotten in his own country. Men like Lord Morley or Henry Sidgwick, Lord Acton or A. V. Dicey, who were then admired in the world at large as outstanding examples of the political wisdom of liberal England, are to the present generation largely obsolete Victorians. Perhaps nothing shows this change more clearly than that, while there is no lack of sympathetic treatment of Bismarck in contemporary English literature, the name of Gladstone is rarely mentioned by the younger generation without a sneer over his Victorian morality and naive utopianism.

I wish I could in a few paragraphs adequately convey the alarming impression gained from the perusal of a few of the English works on the ideas dominating the Germany of the last war, where almost every word could be applied to the views most conspicuous in current English literature. I shall merely quote one brief passage by Lord Keynes, describing in 1915 the "nightmare" which he found expounded in a typical German work of that period: he describes how according to a German author

even in peace industrial life must remain mobilised. This is what he means by speaking of the "militarisation of our industrial life" [the title of the work reviewed]. Individualism must come to an end absolutely. A system of regulations must be set up, the object of which is not the greater happiness of the individual (Professor Jaffe is not ashamed to say this in so many words), but the strengthening of the organised unity of the state for the object of attaining the maximum degree of efficiency (*Leistungsfähigkeit*), the influence of which on individual advantage is only indirect. This hideous doctrine is enshrined in a sort of idealism. The nation will grow into a "closed unity" and will become, in fact, what Plato declared it should be "Der Mensch im Grossen". In particular, the coming peace will bring with it a strengthening of the idea of State action in industry.... Foreign investment, emigration, the industrial policy which in recent years had regarded the whole world as a market, are too dangerous. The old order of industry, which is dying today, is based on Profit; and the new Germany of the twentieth-century Power without consideration of Profit is to make an end of that system of Capitalism, which came over from England one hundred years ago².

Except that no English author has yet to my knowledge dared openly to disparage individual happiness, is there a passage in this which is not mirrored in much of contemporary English literature?

如果现在读一下一战时期英国对于英德之间政治、道德观点分歧的一些较严肃的讨论，就会分外鲜明地看到过去二十年英国沿德国的道路上走了多远。真的可以说，英国公众当时对于这些分歧认识总的来说比现在更正确；但是，尽管当时英国人对他们独特的传统颇为自豪，现在大多数英国人对那些被认为典型的英国政治观点，如果不直接否认，也多少感到羞愧。毫不夸张的说，一个政治、社会问题的英国作家，在全世界看来越具典型英国特征，那今天在英国就越被人遗忘。象莫利爵士、亨利·西季威克、或者阿克顿爵士、艾博·文·戴雪这样的人，在当时世界范围内普遍作为英国自由主义政治智慧的杰出代表被崇拜，对现在英国这代人来说很大程度上就是过时的维多利亚时代人物。也许最能清楚说明这个变化的就是，在当代英国文学中，对俾斯麦不乏同情，而年轻一代在提及威廉·格莱斯顿的名字时，很少不对他维多利亚时代的道德观和天真的乌托邦思想加以嘲笑的。

我细读过几本关于一战时期德国主流思想的英文著作，这些著作每个词基本上都适应于现在英国文学中最明显的观点，给我留下了令人担忧的印象，我希望通过几个段落充分传达这些。我仅引用凯恩斯的一小段，他在 1915 年写到，他在那个时期典型德国著作论述中看到的“噩梦”：他叙述按照某个德国作家的说法该如何做

即使在和平时期，工业生产也必须保持在动员起来的状态。这就是他说的“工业生产军事化”【这就是那本书名】的意思。个人主义必须绝对消灭。必须建立规章制度，其目的不是使个人更幸福（加菲教授不知羞耻长篇累牍），而是加强国家的组织统一以期达到对个人利益仅有间接影响的最高效率。这个可怕的理论以某种理想主义的形式被奉上神坛。国家将“内敛归一”，实际上，将变成柏拉图声称的那样——整体上就像一个人。特别是，随将来的和平而来的将是进一步强化工业国家化的观念……外国投资、移民、近年来视整个世界为一个大大市场的产业政策，太危险了。现在垂死的旧工业秩序是逐利的，二十世纪强大的崭新德国，不计利润，要终结一百年前来自英国的资本主义制度。

据我所知还没有哪个英国作家敢公开蔑视个人幸福，除此以外，其中有哪句没反映在诸多的当代英国文学中呢？

² *Economic Journal*, 1915, p. 450.

And, undoubtedly, not merely the ideas which in Germany and elsewhere prepared totalitarianism, but also many of the principles of totalitarianism itself are what exercises an increasing fascination in many other countries. Although few people, if anybody, in this country would probably be ready to swallow totalitarianism whole, there are few single features which we have not yet been advised by somebody or other to imitate. Indeed, there is scarcely a leaf out of Hitler's book which somebody or other in this country has not recommended us to take and use for our own purposes. This applies particularly to many people who are undoubtedly Hitler's mortal enemies because of one special feature in his system. We should never forget that the anti-semitism of Hitler has driven from his country, or turned into his enemies, many people who in every respect are confirmed totalitarians of the German type.³

No description in general terms can give an adequate idea of the similarity of much of current English political literature to the works which destroyed the belief in Western civilisation in Germany and created the state of mind in which Nazism could become successful. The similarity is even more one of the temper with which the problems are approached than of the specific arguments used—a similar readiness to break all cultural ties with the past and to stake everything on the success of a particular experiment. As was also true in Germany, most of the works which are preparing the way for a totalitarian course in this country are the product of sincere idealists and often of men of considerable intellectual distinction. So, although it is invidious to single out particular persons as illustrations where similar views are advocated by hundreds of others, I see no other way of demonstrating effectively how far this development has actually advanced in this country. I shall deliberately choose as illustrations authors whose sincerity and disinterestedness are above suspicion. But though I hope in this way to show how the views from which totalitarianism springs are now rapidly spreading here, I stand little chance of conveying successfully the equally important similarity in the emotional atmosphere. An extensive investigation into all the subtle changes in thought and language would be necessary to make explicit what one readily enough recognises as symptoms of a familiar development. Through meeting the kind of people who talk about the necessity of opposing "big" ideas to "small" ones and of replacing the old "static" or "partial" thinking by the new "dynamic" or "global" way one learns to recognise that what at first appears sheer nonsense is a sign of the same intellectual attitude with whose manifestations we can alone concern ourselves here.

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My first examples are two works by a gifted scholar, which in the last few years have attracted much attention. There are, perhaps, few other instances in contemporary English literature where the influence of the specific German ideas with which we are concerned is so marked as in Professor E. H. Carr's books on the *Twenty Years' Crisis* and the *Conditions of Peace*.

并且,无疑,不仅仅是在德国等地为极权主义做铺垫的思想观点,而且极权主义本身的很多原则在其他不少国家也逐渐散发出吸引力。尽管在英国如果有的话应该还不多的几个人很可能愿意全盘照抄极权主义,但很少有特征不曾分别被这个或那个建议仿效。真的,希特勒的书没有哪一页没有被这个国家的某些人推荐采纳来服务我们的需要。特别是,这也适用于很多无疑因希特勒制度的某个特征而极力反对希特勒的人。我们不应该忘记,希特勒的反犹太主义,把很多各个方面都确信无疑是德国式极权主义分子的人,赶出了德国,赶到了他的敌人阵营里。

无法通过笼统描述充分地说明现在英国政治著作和摧毁德国的西方文化信仰、制造纳粹能够成功心态的著作之间的相似性。这种相似性更多的表现在探讨问题的态度上,而不是具体的论据——类似地,准备断绝与过去的所有文化联系,把一切寄诸某个实验的成功。跟德国当年一样,在英国,大多数为极权主义铺路的工作都是出自真诚的理想主义者、常常是一些颇负才智盛名的人。尽管从成百上千执类似观点的人中挑出某几个人来说明问题令人反感,但我想不出别的好办法更有效地说明在英国极权主义思想实际上已经发展到了什么程度。我会特意选择那些其诚实客观不容怀疑的作家为例说明。但是,尽管我希望通过这种方式展示作为极权主义源泉的思想如何在英国快速扩散,但我不能把同等重要的情感氛围的相似性也成功传达出来。要使人一望便知哪些是熟知发展的征兆,必须对思想和语言的细微变化做一番广泛研究。通过和那些把有必要提倡“大”的思想反对“小”的思想、用新的“发展的”、“全局的”思考取代旧的“静止的”、“局部的”思考挂在嘴边的人接触,我们逐步意识到,那些初看起来纯属胡说八道的东西是相同思想态度的标志,其表现值得我们在此单独注意。

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我的第一个例子是一个天才学者所写、过去几年广受关注的两部著作,爱德华·霍利特·卡尔的《危机二十年》和《和平的条件》。它们受我们这里担心的德国思想的影响十分显著,可能在当代英国文学中,几乎没有其他例子可比。

³ Especially when we consider the proportion of former socialists who have become Nazis it is important to remember that the true significance of this ratio is seen only if we compare it, not with the total number of former socialists, but with the number of those whose conversion would not in any case have been prevented by their ancestry. In fact, one of the surprising features of the political emigration from Germany is the comparatively small number of refugees from the Left who are not "Jews" in the German sense of the term.

How often do we not hear eulogies of the German system prefaced by some statement such as the following with which at a recent conference an enumeration of the "features of the totalitarian technique of economic mobilisation which are worth thinking about" was introduced: "Herr Hitler is not my ideal-far from it. There are very pressing personal reasons why Herr Hitler should not be my ideal, but ..."

In the first of these two books Professor Carr frankly confessed himself an adherent of "the 'historical school' of realists [which] had its home in Germany and [whose] development can be traced through the great names of Hegel and Marx". A realist, he explains, is one "who makes morality a function of politics" and who "cannot logically accept any standard of value save that of fact". This "realism" is contrasted, in truly German fashion, with the "utopian" thought dating from the eighteenth century "which was essentially individualist in that it made the human conscience the final court of appeal". But the old morals with their "abstract general principles" must disappear because "the empiricist treats the concrete case on its individual merits". In other words, nothing but expediency matters, and we are even assured that "the rule *pacta sunt servanda* is not a moral principle". That without abstract general principles merit becomes solely a matter of arbitrary opinion, and that international treaties, if they are not morally binding, have no meaning whatever, does not seem to worry Professor Carr.

According to Professor Carr, indeed, although he does not explicitly say so, it appears that England fought the last war on the wrong side. Anyone who re-reads now the statements of British war aims of twenty-five years ago and compares them with Professor Carr's present views will readily see that what were then believed to be the German views are now those of Professor Carr who would presumably argue that the different views then professed in this country were merely a product of British hypocrisy. How little difference he is able to see between the ideals held in this country and those practised by present-day Germany is best illustrated by his assertion that

it is true that when a prominent National-Socialist asserts that "anything that benefits the German people is right, anything that harms them is wrong" he is merely propounding the same identification of national interest with universal right which has already been established for English-speaking countries by [President] Wilson, Professor Toynbee, Lord Cecil, and many others.

Since Professor Carr's books are devoted to international problems it is mainly in that field that their characteristic tendency becomes apparent. But from the glimpses one gets of the character of the future society which he contemplates, it appears also to be quite on the totalitarian model. Sometimes one even wonders whether the resemblance is accidental or deliberate. Does Professor Carr, for example, realise, when he asserts that "we can no longer find much meaning in the distinction familiar to nineteenth-century thought between 'society' and 'state'", that this is precisely the doctrine of Professor Carl Schmitt, the leading Nazi theoretician of totalitarianism, and, in fact, the essence of the definition of totalitarianism which that author has given to that term which he himself had introduced? Or that the view that "the mass production of opinion is the corollary of the mass-production of goods" and that, therefore, "the prejudice which the word propaganda still exerts in many minds today is closely parallel to the prejudice against control of industry and trade" is really an apology for a regimentation of opinion of the kind practised by the Nazis?

In his more recent *Conditions of Peace* Professor Carr answers with an emphatic affirmative the question with which we concluded the last chapter:

The victors lost the peace, and Soviet Russia and Germany won it, because the former continued to preach, and in part to apply, the once valid, but now disruptive ideals of the rights of nations and *laissez-faire* capitalism, whereas the latter, consciously or unconsciously borne forward on the tide of the twentieth century, were striving to build up the world in larger units under centralised planning and control.

在前一书中，卡尔教授坦率地承认自己是“产生于德国，发展可追溯到大名鼎鼎黑格尔、马克思的现实主义‘历史学派’”的追随者。他解释道，现实主义者是“视道德为政治的一部分”和“不能罔顾事实而逻辑上接受任何价值标准”的人。按照真正的德国方式，这个“现实主义”跟十八世纪以来基本上就是“诉诸良心的个人主义”的乌托邦截然不同。但是带着“抽象的一般性原则”的旧道德必须不复存在，因为“经验主义者具体问题具体分析”。换句话说，权宜之计最重要，甚至向我们保证“信守诺言不是一个道德准则”。没有抽象的一般性原则的美德就仅是个随意的意见，没有道德约束，无论什么国际条约也就没有意义，这些好像卡尔教授并不在意。

虽然卡尔教授没有明说，按照他的意思，看起来英国在一战中站错了边。现在重读二十五年前英国战争声明，对照卡尔教授现在观点，很容易看到，当年认为是德国的观点就是现在卡尔教授的观点，卡尔教授想必会辩称英国当年宣称的观点不过是虚伪。他如下断言，从中可以看出，他其实看不到英国理想抱负和德国现在理想实践之间的任何差别

的确，当一位著名的国家社会主义者声称“任何有利于德国人民的都是正确的，任何伤害他们的都是错误的”时，他只不过主张将国家利益与威尔逊（总统）、汤因比教授、塞西尔爵士等人为英语国家建立的普世权利当作一回事。

卡尔教授的著作致力于国际问题，所以主要在国际问题上其特征性倾向明显。但，初看之下能隐约了解他构思的未来社会特征，也很像极权主义的模式。有时，甚至会疑惑这个相似是偶然出现还是有意为之。譬如，卡尔教授是否意识到，当他宣称“十九世纪思想观念上常见的‘社会’和‘国家’的区别，我们发现不再有什么意义”时，这正是纳粹最重要的极权主义理论家卡尔·施密特的学说，并且，事实上，正是他自己引入极权主义这个术语时所下定义的本质？或者，“大规模的商品生产导致规模化的意见”的观点，以及因此“宣传这个词在人心目中产生的偏见和工商业中对管理的偏见一样一样”实际上是对纳粹实施那种舆论管制的辩解？

对于上一章结尾处我们提的那个问题，卡尔教授在他最近的《和平的条件》一书给出了明确肯定的回答：

胜利者失掉了和平，苏维埃俄国和德国得到了和平，因为前者仍在继续宣扬并且部分实施那些曾经是合理的现在却是有害的思想，如民族权力、自由放任的资本主义等；而后者俄德正有意、无意地引领二十世纪进步的潮流，正努力建立集中计划管理下由大单位组成的世界。

Professor Carr completely makes his own the German battle-cry of the socialist revolution of the East against the liberal West in which Germany was the leader:

the revolution which began in the last war, which has been the driving force of every significant political movement in the last twenty years . . . a revolution against the predominant ideas of the nineteenth century: liberal democracy, national self-determination and *laissez-faire* economics.

As he himself rightly says "it was almost inevitable that this challenge to nineteenth-century beliefs which she had never really shared should find in Germany one of its strongest protagonists". With all the fatalistic belief of every pseudo-historian since Hegel and Marx this development is represented as inevitable: "we know the direction in which the world is moving, and we must bow to it or perish."

The conviction that this trend is inevitable is characteristically based on familiar economic fallacies—the presumed necessity of the general growth of monopolies in consequence of technological developments, the alleged "potential plenty", and all the other popular catchwords which appear in works of this kind. Professor Carr is not an economist and his economic argument generally will not bear serious examination. But neither this, nor his belief characteristically held at the same time, that the importance of the economic factor in social life is rapidly decreasing, prevent him from basing on economic arguments all his predictions about the inevitable developments or from presenting as his main demands for the future "the reinterpretation in predominantly economic terms of the democratic ideals of 'equality' and 'liberty'!"

Professor Carr's contempt for all the ideas of liberal economists (which he insists on calling nineteenth-century ideas, though he knows that Germany "had never really shared" them and had already in the nineteenth century practised most of the principles he now advocates), is as profound as that of any of the German writers quoted in the last chapter. He even takes over the German thesis, originated by Friedrich List, that Free Trade was a policy dictated solely by, and appropriate only to, the special interests of England in the nineteenth century. Now, however, "the artificial production of some degree of autarky is a necessary condition of orderly social existence". To bring about a "return to a more dispersed and generalised world trade ... by a 'removal of trade barriers' or by a resuscitation of the *laissez-faire* principles of the nineteenth century" is "unthinkable". The future belongs to *Grossraumwirtschaft* of the German kind: "the result which we desire can be won only by a deliberate reorganisation of European life such as Hitler has undertaken!"

After all this one is hardly surprised to find a characteristic section headed "The Moral Functions of War", in which Professor Carr condescendingly pities "the well-meaning people (especially in English-speaking countries) who, steeped in the nineteenth-century tradition, persist in regarding war as senseless and devoid of purpose", and rejoices in the "sense of meaning and purpose" which war, "the most powerful instrument of social solidarity", creates. This is all very familiar—but it was not in the works of English scholars that one expected to find these views.

卡尔教授完全把，以德国为首的反西方自由主义的东方社会主义革命德国式的战斗口号，当成他自己的口号：

始于一战的革命，是过去二十年所有重大政治运动的推动力……是反对十九世纪主流思想如自由民主主义、民族自决和自由放任经济的革命。

正如他自己恰如其分地指出“十九世纪的信仰，德国从来没有真正拥有过，几乎不可避免地在德国遭到最强有力的挑战”。受黑格尔、马克思以来所有伪历史学家的宿命论式信仰的影响，这种发展被说成是不可避免的：“我们知道世界前进的方向，我们必须屈从它，否则就会灭亡。”

相信这个趋势是不可避免的，典型地基于一些熟知的经济学谬论——技术发展的后果导致普遍产生垄断这种假定的必然性，所谓“潜在的丰富”，以及所有其它一些出现在这类著作中的口号等等。卡尔教授不是一个经济学家，他的经济学论证通常经不起推敲。但并不是因为这个，也不是同时期他那个相信社会生活中经济因素越来越不重要的独特想法，妨碍他基于经济学基础做出预测，妨碍他“以经济学主要术语重新诠释‘平等’和‘自由’这些民主思想”来作为他对未来的主要要求。

卡尔教授对于所有自由主义经济学家思想的蔑视（尽管他知道德国“从来没有真正接受过”这些自由思想，并且早在十九世纪就开始实践他现在主张的大多数原则，他坚称这些为十九世纪的思想）跟上章我们引用过的德国作家一样强烈。他甚至接过弗里德里希·李斯特创立的德国理论，即自由贸易是一个由十九世纪英国特殊利益所决定、并仅适合于英国的政策。不管如何，现在“人为制造某种程度的自给自足是社会有秩序的的必要条件”。“通过‘消除贸易壁垒’或者恢复十九世纪自由放任的原则等方法回归更广泛的世界贸易”“不可想象”。未来属于德国式的国家经济，“只有按希特勒所做那样，精心重组欧洲，才能获得我们想要的结果。”

经过以上讨论，我们对卡尔教授以“战争的道德作用”为题的一章所说不再奇怪，其中他居高临下地可怜那些“深陷十九世纪传统，坚持认为战争无意义、无目的的好心人（特别是英语国家的）”，并为战争这个“促使社会团结最有力的工具”所产生的“意义感和目的感”感到高兴。这些观点都很熟悉——但过去在英国学者著作中并不常见。

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Possibly we have not yet given enough attention to one feature of the intellectual development in Germany during the last hundred years which is now in an almost identical form making its appearance in this country: the scientists agitating for a "scientific" organisation of society. The ideal of a society organised "through and through" from the top has in Germany been considerably furthered by the quite unique influence which her scientific and technological specialists were allowed to exercise on the formation of social and political opinions. Few people remember that in the modern history of Germany the political professors have played a role comparable to that of the political lawyers in France⁴. The influence of these scientist-politicians was of late years not often on the side of liberty: the "intolerance of reason" so frequently conspicuous in the scientific specialist, the impatience with the ways of the ordinary man so characteristic of the expert, and the contempt for anything which was not consciously organised by superior minds according to a scientific blueprint, were phenomena familiar in German public life for generations before they became of significance in this country. And perhaps no other country provides a better illustration of the effects on a nation of a general and thorough shift of the greater part of its educational system from the "humanities" to the "realities" than Germany between 1840 and 1940⁵. The way in which, in the end, with few exceptions, her scholars and scientists put themselves readily at the service of the new rulers is one of the most depressing and shameful spectacles in the whole history of the rise of National-Socialism⁶. It is well known that particularly the scientists and engineers, who had so loudly claimed to be the leaders on the march to a new and better world, submitted more readily than almost any other class to the new tyranny⁷.

The role which the intellectuals played in the totalitarian transformation of society was prophetically foreseen in another country by Julien Benda, whose *Trahison des Cleres* assumes new significance when one now re-reads it, fifteen years after it has been written. There is particularly one passage in that work which deserves to be well pondered and kept in mind when we come to consider certain examples of the excursions of British scientists into politics. It is the passage in which M. Benda speaks of the

superstition of science held to be competent in all domains, including that of morality; a superstition which, I repeat, is an acquisition of the nineteenth century. It remains to discover whether those who brandish this doctrine believe in it or whether they simply want to give the prestige of a scientific appearance to passions of their hearts, which they perfectly know are nothing but passions. It is to be noted that the dogma that history is obedient to scientific laws is preached especially by partisans of arbitrary authority. This is quite natural, since it eliminates the two realities they most hate, i.e. human liberty and the historical action of the individual.

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过去一百年来德国思想发展还有一个特征，可能我们还没引起足够的注意，现在在英国表现形式几乎一样：科学工作者鼓吹“科学地”组织社会。德国科技专家被允许在社会、政治观点形成中施加十分独特的影响，使得德国从上到下“彻头彻尾”对社会进行组织的理想大大推进。不大有人还记得，在德国现代历史上，政治学教授扮演过跟法国政治法律工作者类似的角色。这些身具科学家、政治家双重身份人士的影响近年来很少站在自由主义这边：科学家常常明显地对“理性的不宽容”、专家对普通民众做事方式典型地缺乏耐心、以及蔑视一切不是由天才大脑根据科学蓝图有意组织起来的的东西，这些在英国引起注意之前，在德国社会都是好几代熟知的普遍现象。并且，从 1840 年到 1940 年，德国教育制度的大部分普遍而且彻底地从“人文”转向“现实”，其转向对整个国家的影响，恐怕没有哪个国家比德国更说明问题。最终，通过这样的方式，德国学者、科学家都心甘情愿委身于新的统治者，少有例外，这是国家社会主义兴起的整个历史中，最让人郁闷和羞耻的一幕。众所周知，尤其是那些大声叫嚷要做奔向新世界排头兵的科学家、工程师，比几乎其他所有阶级更心甘情愿向新的暴政俯首称臣。

另一个国家的朱利安·班达先知般地预见知识分子在极权主义社会变革中所扮演的角色，现在重读他十五年前写的《知识分子的背叛》一书颇有新意。当我们来研究英国科学家业余涉足政治的某些例子时，他书中有一段话特别值得仔细思考、牢记在心。在这段中，班达写到，

迷信科学可以适应于包括道德在内的一切领域；我重申，是十九世纪产生的迷信。尚待弄清，那些鼓吹这个理论的人是真的相信它，还是只想为他们自己知道纯属一股热情的东西披上科学的外衣。值得注意的是，专制政权特别爱宣扬历史服从科学规律这个理论。这很自然，因为它消除了他们最恨的两个现实因素，即人类的自由和个人的历史作用。

⁴ cr. Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. 11, 1933, p.204.

⁵ I believe it was the author of *Leviathan* who first suggested that the teaching of the classics should be suppressed, because it instilled a dangerous spirit of liberty!

⁶ The servility of the scientists to the powers that be appeared early in Germany, hand in hand with the great development of state-organised science which to-day is the subject of so much eulogy in this country. One of the most famous of German Scientists, the physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond, was not ashamed, in an oration delivered in 1870 in his double capacity of Rector of the University of Berlin and President of the Prussian Academy of Science, to proclaim that "We, the University of Berlin, quartered opposite the King's palace, are, by the deed of our foundation, the intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohen-zollern." (*A Speech on the German War*, London 1870, p. 31.—It is remarkable that du Bois-Reymond should have thought it advisable to issue an English edition of this oration.)

⁷ It will suffice to quote one foreign witness: Mr. R. A. Brady, in his study of *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, concludes his detailed account of the development in the German academic world with the statement that "the scientist, per se, is hence, perhaps, the most easily used and 'coordinated' of all the especially trained people in modern society. The Nazis, to be true, fired a good many University professors, and dismissed a good many scientists from research laboratories. But the professors were primarily among the social sciences where there was more common awareness of and a more persistent criticism of the Nazi programmes, and not among the natural sciences where thinking is supposed to be most rigorous. Those dismissed in this latter field were primarily Jewish or exceptions to the generalisations made above, because of the equally uncritical acceptance of beliefs running contrary to Nazi views -- Consequently the Nazis were able to 'co-ordinate' scholars and scientists with relative ease, and hence to throw behind their elaborate propaganda the seeming weight of the bulk of German learned opinion and support."

We have already had occasion to mention one English product of this kind, a work in which, on a Marxist background, all the characteristic idiosyncrasies of the totalitarian intellectual, a hatred of almost everything which distinguishes European civilisation since the Renaissance, is combined with an approval of the methods of Inquisition. We do not wish to consider here such an extreme case and shall take a work which is more representative and which has achieved considerable publicity. Dr. C. H. Waddington's little book under the characteristic title *The Scientific Attitude* is as good an example as any of a class of literature which is actively sponsored by the influential weekly *Nature* and which combines claims for greater political power for the scientists with an ardent advocacy of wholesale "planning". Though not quite as outspoken in his contempt for freedom as Mr. Crowther, Dr. Waddington is hardly more reassuring. He differs from most of the writers of the same kind in that he clearly sees and even emphasises that the tendencies he describes and supports inevitably lead to a totalitarian system. Yet apparently this appears to him preferable to what he describes as "the present ferocious monkey-house civilisation".

Dr. Waddington's claim that the scientist is qualified to run a totalitarian society is based mainly on his thesis that "science can pass ethical judgment on human behaviour", a claim to the elaboration of which by Dr. Waddington *Nature* has given considerable publicity. It is, of course, a thesis which has long been familiar to the German scientist-politicians and which has justly been singled out by J. Benda. For an illustration of what this means we do not need to go outside Dr. Waddington's book. Freedom, he explains, "is a very troublesome concept for the scientist to discuss, partly because he is not convinced that, in the last analysis, there is such a thing". Nevertheless we are told that "science recognises" this and that kind of freedom, but "the freedom to be odd and unlike one's neighbour is not ... a scientific value". Apparently the "harlot humanities", about which Dr. Waddington has to say many uncomplimentary things, have gravely misled us in teaching us tolerance!

That when it comes to social and economic questions this book on the "scientific attitude" is anything but scientific is what one has learnt to expect of this kind of literature. We find again all the familiar clichés and baseless generalisations about "potential plenty" and the inevitable tendency towards monopoly, though the "best authorities" quoted in support of these contentions prove on examination to be mostly political tracts of questionable scientific standing, while the serious studies of the same problems are conspicuously neglected.

As in almost all works of this type, Dr. Waddington's convictions are largely determined by his belief in "inevitable historical tendencies" which science is presumed to have discovered and which he derives from "the profound scientific philosophy" of Marxism whose basic notions are "almost, if not quite, identical with those underlying the scientific approach to nature" and which his "competence to judge" tells Dr. Waddington are an advance on anything which has gone before. Thus Dr. Waddington, though he finds it "difficult to deny that England now is a worse country to live in than it was" in 1913, looks forward to an economic system which "will be centralised and totalitarian in the sense that all aspects of the economic development of large regions are consciously planned as an integrated whole". And for his facile optimism that in this totalitarian system freedom of thought will be preserved, his "scientific attitude" has no better counsel than the conviction that "there must be very valuable evidence about questions which one does not need to be an expert to understand", such as, for example, whether it is possible "to combine totalitarianism with freedom of thought".

我们已有场合提到过一本这类英国著作，其中，在马克思主义背景下，所有极权主义知识分子的特质，也就是憎恨欧洲文明自文艺复兴以来发展的几乎所有特色，与赞同宗教裁判所迫害异端的做法结合在了一起。我们不想在这里讨论那样极端的例子，将选择一本更具代表性，并获得相当知名度的著作。标题很有特色，康拉德·哈尔·沃丁顿博士的小书《科学的态度》是个很好的例子，跟有影响力的《自然》周刊积极推荐的、为科学家争取更大政治权力并热烈拥护全盘“计划”的其他同类文献一样好。尽管不象克劳瑟先生那样大胆直率地蔑视自由，沃丁顿博士反对自由确信无疑。他与同类大多数作家不同的是，他清楚地看到、甚至有强调他所叙述和支持的这种倾向必然导致极权主义制度。然而，显然，比起他称为“现在可怕的疯人院一样的议会文明”，他宁愿要这个。

沃丁顿博士的理论称“科学能够对人类行为作出道德评判”，基于此他认为科学家有资格运作一个极权主义社会，沃丁顿博士对这一论点的阐述，《自然》杂志给了大量宣传。当然，这个理论早为德国身具科学家、政治家双重身份人士所熟悉，被朱利安·班达公允地挑了出来。这理论到底什么含义，看沃丁顿博士的书就够了。他解释说，“自由是个科学家解释起来很麻烦的概念，部分因为，归根到底，科学家不信有那个东西”。尽管如此，他还是告诉我们，“科学承认”这种、那种自由，但是“自古古怪与众不同，不具……科学的价值。”显然，沃丁顿博士必然对其一顿贬损的“男盗女娼仁义道德”教我们宽容，已经严重误导了我们。

当开始讨论社会和经济问题时候，这本关于“科学的态度”的书完全全反科学，这一类书籍早料到如此。在其中我们再一次看到关于“潜在丰富”、必然走向垄断之类的陈词滥调和毫无根据的归纳陈述，支持论点的“最权威”引用，仔细考察起来大多都是些科学上站不住脚的政治小短文，而对于同一问题的严肃研究则显然被忽视。

在几乎所有这类著作中，沃丁顿博士的坚定信念很大程度上源于他相信他从马克思主义“高深的科学哲学”推理出来的、假定已为科学所发现的“必然的历史趋势”。马克思主义的基本概念“与自然科学研究方法的那些概念如果不是完全相同，也是基本上相同”。他的“判断力”告诉他，这个趋势比以往一切都进步。这样，沃丁顿博士发现“难以否认现在的英国是个日子比 1913 年还要糟糕的国家”，因此他期盼一个“各大区域经济发展方方面面都在整体上有意识地计划的，这个意义上集中的、极权主义的”的经济制度。对于他认为在极权主义制度下能保留思想自由这个浅薄乐观的想法，他的“科学的态度”除了坚信对“不用是专家就能理解的问题”，譬如能否有可能“把极权主义和思想自由结合起来”的问题，“一定有非常有价值的事实依据”，别无其它深入探讨。

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A fuller survey of the various tendencies towards totalitarianism in this country would have to give considerable attention to the various attempts to create some kind of middle-class socialism bearing no doubt unknown to their authors an alarming resemblance to similar developments in pre-Hitler Germany⁸. If we were concerned here with political movements proper we should have to consider such new organisations as the "Forward March" or "Common Wealth" movement of Sir Richard Acland, the author of *Unser Kampf*, or the activities of the "1941 Committee" of Mr. J. B. Priestley, at one time associated with the former. But, though it would be unwise to disregard the symptomatic significance of such phenomena as these, they can hardly yet be counted as important political forces. Apart from the intellectual influences which we have illustrated by two instances, the impetus of the movement towards totalitarianism comes mainly from the two great vested interests, organised capital and organised labour. Probably the greatest menace of all is the fact that the policies of these two most powerful groups point in the same direction.

They do this through their common, and often concerted, support of the monopolistic organisation of industry; and it is this tendency which is the great immediate danger. While there is no reason to believe that this movement is inevitable, there can be little doubt that if we continue on the path we have been treading, it will lead us to totalitarianism.

This movement is, of course, deliberately planned mainly by the capitalist organisers of monopolies, and they are thus one of the main sources of this danger. Their responsibility is not altered by the fact that their aim is not a totalitarian system but rather a sort of corporative society in which the organised industries would appear as semi-independent and self-governing "estates". But they are as short-sighted as were their German colleagues in believing that they will be allowed not only to create but also for any length of time to run such a system. The decisions which the managers of such an organised industry would constantly have to make are not decisions which any society will long leave to private individuals. A state which allows such enormous aggregations of power to grow up cannot afford to let this power rest entirely in private control. Nor is the belief any less illusory that in such conditions the entrepreneurs will be long allowed to enjoy the favoured position which in a competitive society is justified by the fact that of the many who take the risks only a few achieve the success the chances of which make the risk worth taking. It is not surprising that entrepreneurs should like to enjoy both the high income which in a competitive society the successful ones among them gain, and the security of the civil servant. So long as a large sector of private industry exists side by side with the government-run industry great industrial talent is likely to command high salaries even in fairly secure positions. But while the entrepreneurs may well see their expectations borne out during a transition stage, it will not be long before they will find, as their German colleagues did, that they are no longer masters but will in every respect have to be satisfied with whatever power and emoluments the government will concede them.

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如果对英国走向极权主义的各种趋势做全面调研，就必须对建立中产阶级的社会主义的各种尝试多加注意，其与希特勒之前德国类似的发展情况有惊人的相似性，可以肯定其创始人并不了解这些。如果这里要适当讨论政治运动的话，我们必须讨论象《我们的斗争》作者理查德·艾克兰爵士的“前进”或者“共同富裕”这样的新兴组织，或者跟艾克兰合作过的约翰·波顿·普利斯特利先生的组织“1941 委员会”的那些活动。这些现象具有征兆性的意义，最好不要忽视，但是这些都算不上重要的政治力量。除了我们已通过两个例子说明了的思想影响，这些运动走向极权主义的动力主要来自两大既得利益集团：有组织的资本与有组织的劳工。最大的威胁很可能就是这两个最大集团的政策指向同一个方向。

他们是通过行业垄断性组织共同并常常是协调一致的支持做到的这点；正是这个趋势有巨大直接的危险。没有理由相信这个运动是必然的，但如果继续沿着这个道路走下去，毫无疑问，会把我们带向极权主义。

这个运动当然主要由垄断组织的资本家精心计划的，他们因此是危险的主要来源之一。他们的责任当然不会因以下事实而改变：他们的目的不是极权主义制度而是某种法团社会，其中组织起来的行业就像半独立、自治的“领地”。但他们跟他们的德国同行一样目光短浅，相信政府不但允许他们创立这样的系统而且可以永远下去。那样高度有组织的行业内经理们需要经常做的那些决定在任何社会都不会长期留给私人来做。一个国家允许权力如此庞大地聚集成长，是无法承担让这个权力完全落在私人手中的代价。在那样的条件下，相信企业家会被允许长期保持优势地位也是幻想。在竞争社会中优势地位之所以合理存在是因为，承受风险的人多而成功的人少，成功的机会值得冒险。毫不奇怪，企业家都乐于既享受在竞争社会中成功者才能获得的高收入，又享受公务员的一切有保障。只要大量私企与国企共存，杰出的行业人才非常可能在相当安稳的位置上获得高薪。企业家很可能在过渡期看到他们的预期得以实现，但是不久他们就会发现，就像他们德国同行见到过的一样，他们不再说了算，只能是在各个方面，政府给什么权力就拿什么权力，给多少酬劳就拿多少酬劳了。

⁸ Another element which after this war is likely to strengthen the tendencies in this direction will be some of the men who during the war have tasted the powers of coercive control and will find it difficult to reconcile themselves with the humbler roles they will then have to play. Though after the last war men of this kind were not as numerous as they will probably be in the future, they exercised even then a not inconsiderable

influence on the economic policy of this country. It was in the company of some of these men that as long as ten or twelve years ago I first experienced in this country the then still unusual sensation of being suddenly transported into what I had learnt to regard as a thoroughly "German", intellectual atmosphere.

Unless the argument of this book has been completely misunderstood, the author will not be suspected of any tenderness towards the capitalists if he stresses here that it would nevertheless be a mistake to put the blame for the modern movement towards monopoly exclusively or mainly on that class. Their propensity in this direction is neither new nor would it by itself be likely to become a formidable power. The fatal development was that they have succeeded in enlisting the support of an ever-increasing number of other groups and with their help to obtain the support of the state.

In some measure the monopolists have gained this support either by letting other groups participate in their gains or, and perhaps even more frequently, by persuading them that the formation of monopolies was in the public interest. But the change in public opinion which through its influence on legislation and judicature⁹ has been the most important factor to make this development possible, is more than anything the result of the propaganda against competition by the Left. Very frequently even measures aimed against the monopolists in fact serve only to strengthen the power of monopoly. Every raid on the gains of monopoly, be it in the interest of particular groups or of the state as a whole, tends to create new vested interests which will help to bolster up monopoly. A system in which large privileged groups profit from the gains of monopoly may be politically much more dangerous, and monopoly in such a system certainly is much more powerful, than in one where the profits go to a limited few. But though it should be clear that, for example, the higher wages which the monopolist is in a position to pay are just as much the result of exploitation as his own profit, and are just as certain to make poorer not only all the consumers but still more all other wage earners, not merely those who benefit from it but the public generally nowadays accept the ability to pay higher wages as a legitimate argument in favour of monopoly¹⁰.

There is serious reason for doubt whether even in those cases where monopoly is inevitable the best way of controlling it is to put it in the hands of the state. If only a single industry were in question this might well be so. But when we have to deal with many different monopolistic industries, there is much to be said for leaving them in different private hands rather than combining them under the single control of the state. Even if railways, road and air transport, or the supply of gas and electricity, were all inevitably monopolies, the consumer is unquestionably in a much stronger position so long as they remain separate monopolies than when they are "co-ordinated" by a central control. Private monopoly is scarcely ever complete and even more rarely of long duration or able to disregard potential competition. But a state monopoly is always a state-protected monopoly—protected against both potential competition and effective criticism. It means in most instances that a temporary monopoly is given the power to secure its position for all time—a power almost certain to be used. Where the power which ought to check and control monopoly becomes interested in sheltering and defending its appointees, where for the government to remedy an abuse is to admit responsibility for it, and where criticism of the actions of monopoly means criticism of the government, there is little hope of monopoly becoming the servant of the community. A state which is entangled in all directions in the running of monopolistic enterprise, while it would possess crushing power over the individual, would yet be a weak state in so far as its freedom in formulating policy is concerned. The machinery of monopoly becomes identical with the machinery of the state, and the state itself becomes more and more identified with the interests of those who run things than with the interests of the people in general.

如果我在这里强调，无论如何，把现代运动朝垄断发展完全或者主要地归罪于资产阶级是错误的，除非本书的论调被完全误解，否则，不应该怀疑我对资本家有任何怜悯。资本家在这个方向上的癖性不是新的，他们本身也不可能发展成为强大的势力。致命的一步是他们成功地谋得了数量越来越多的团体的支持，并在此基础上得到了国家层面的支持。

寡头们能得到这个支持，某种程度上，或者让其它团体参与瓜分利益，或者，也许更常见的，是通过说服使他们相信垄断符合公共利益。但是，舆论通过对立法、司法的影响成为促成这个发展最重要的因素，舆论的转变是左翼反竞争宣传最直接的结果。经常发生的是，甚至针对寡头的措施都事实上帮助增强了垄断的势力。为了某个集团或者国家整体的利益，每一次查抄垄断所得，都会产生新的既得利益者，反过来又帮助加固了垄断。多个大的特权集团瓜分垄断所得的制度比少数几个人瓜分垄断所得的制度政治上更危险，垄断也肯定强大得多。尽管应该很清楚，譬如，寡头能够支付高工资，高工资跟他们自己的利润一样都是剥削的结果，肯定会不仅使消费者而且使其他工薪族收入减少，但是不仅仅是那些受惠的人而且普罗大众现在都普遍接受垄断更好的一个合理理由就是工资高。

甚至在垄断无可避免的情况下，也有充足的理由质疑，由政府来管是不是最好的办法。如果仅仅是一个行业，这么做也许可以。如果面对多个不同的垄断行业，就有不少理由宁可分别让不同私人来管，而不是把它们捆绑在一起由政府统一管理。即使铁路、公路、航空运输、或者供气、供电这些行业垄断不可避免，毫无疑问对消费者来说，它们分开垄断比集中“协调”管理要好得多。私人垄断很少是完全垄断，更加难以持久垄断或者忽视潜在竞争。但国家垄断则总是受国家保护的垄断——不受潜在竞争和有效批评的影响。这意味着在大多数情况下，本来是一个临时性的垄断会得以授权因此永久性保持垄断地位——这种授权几乎肯定会用。政府应该用来监督、控制垄断的权力成为热衷于包庇、捍卫他指派的垄断者，政府通过揽责任来补救权力滥用，批评垄断行为就等于批评政府，哪有什么希望垄断能够为社会服务。一个政府一旦整天纠缠于垄断性企业运作的方方面面，尽管对个人有绝对的权力，就自由制订政策而言，还是个弱政府。垄断机构与国家机构合二为一，大家会越来越认为国家代表的是国家管理者的利益而不再是人民大众的利益。

⁹ Cf. on this the recent instructive article on "Monopoly and the Law", by W Arthur Lewis, in *The Modern Law Review*, vol. VI, no. 3, April 1943.

¹⁰ Even more surprising, perhaps, is the remarkable tenderness which many socialists are apt to show towards the rentier bondholder to whom monopolist organisation of industry frequently guarantees secure incomes.

That their blind enmity to profits should lead people to represent effortless fixed income as socially or ethically more desirable than profits, and to accept even monopoly to secure such a guaranteed income to, for example, railway bondholders, is one of the most extraordinary symptoms of the perversion of values which has taken place during the last generation.

The probability is that wherever monopoly is really inevitable the plan which used to be preferred by the Americans, of a strong state control over private monopolies, if consistently pursued, offers a better chance of satisfactory results than state management. This would at least seem to be so where the state enforces a stringent price control which leaves no room for extraordinary profits in which others than the monopolists can participate. Even if this should have the effect (as it sometimes had with American public utilities) that the services of the monopolistic industries would become less satisfactory than they might be, this would be a small price to pay for an effective check on the powers of monopoly. Personally I should much prefer to have to put up with some such inefficiency than have organised monopoly control my ways of life. Such a method of dealing with monopoly, which would rapidly make the position of the monopolist the least eligible among entrepreneurial positions, would also do as much as anything to reduce monopoly to the spheres where it is inevitable and to stimulate the invention of substitutes which can be provided competitively. Only make the position of the monopolist once more that of the whipping boy of economic policy and you will be surprised how quickly most of the abler entrepreneurs will rediscover their taste for the bracing air of competition!

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The problem of monopoly would not be as difficult as it is if it were only the capitalist monopolist whom we have to fight. But, as has already been said, monopoly has become the danger that it is, not through the efforts of a few interested capitalists, but through the support they have obtained from those whom they have let share in their gains, and from the many more whom they have persuaded that in supporting monopoly they assist in the creation of a more just and orderly society. The fatal turning point in the modern development was when the great movement which can serve its original ends only by fighting all privilege, the Labour Movement, came under the influence of anti-competition doctrines and became itself entangled in the strife for privilege. The recent growth of monopoly is largely the result of a deliberate collaboration of organised capital and organised labour where the privileged groups of labour share in the monopoly profits at the expense of the community and particularly at the expense of the poorest, those employed in the less well organised industries and the unemployed.

It is one of the saddest spectacles of our time to see a great democratic movement support a policy which must lead to the destruction of democracy and which meanwhile can benefit only a minority of the masses who support it. Yet it is this support from the Left of the tendencies towards monopoly which make them so irresistible and the prospects of the future so dark. So long as Labour continues to assist in the destruction of the only order under which at least some degree of independence and freedom has been secured to every worker, there is indeed little hope for the future. The Labour leaders who now proclaim so loudly that they have "done once and for all with the mad competitive system"¹¹ are proclaiming the doom of the freedom of the individual. There is no other possibility than either the order governed by the impersonal discipline of the market or that directed by the will of a few individuals; and those who are out to destroy the first are wittingly or unwittingly helping to create the second. Even though some workmen will perhaps be better fed, and all will no doubt be more uniformly dressed in that new order, it is permissible to doubt whether the majority of English workmen will in the end thank the intellectuals among their leaders who have presented them with a socialist doctrine which endangers their personal freedom.

¹¹ Professor H. J. Laski, in his address to the 41 st Annual Labour Party Conference, London, May 26, 1942 (*Report*, p. 111). It deserves to be noted that according to Professor Laski it is "this mad competitive system

当垄断真的不可避免，美国人喜欢采用私人垄断加上严格国家监管的方法，这方法如果贯彻执行，可能比国家直接经营更有机会带来满意的效果。下面这种情况至少看起来如此，国家强制实行严格的价格控制，使得垄断以外的人即使能参与的话也没有额外的利润空间。即使这样会使垄断行业服务不能尽量的满意（这常见于美国公共事业），这是以较小的代价有效监督垄断的权力。我个人而言，宁愿这样效率低点，而不愿意有组织的寡头控制我的生活方式。这样对待垄断的方法，很快使得垄断不是企业的一种理想处境，在垄断不可避免的领域从而减少了垄断、激励发明可以通过竞争提供的替代方式。只有通过使垄断者更多地为经济政策的承负责任，你才会惊奇地发现只有才能的企业家能多快重新找到兴趣点、拥抱竞争的氛围。

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垄断的问题如果我们必须与之斗争的只是资本家，问题就不是那么难。但是，正如我们已经指出，垄断不是由于少数几个利害关系的资本家的努力变得危险，而是因为得到了与他们雨露均沾的人的支持，得到了更多被他们说服认为支持垄断就是支持更公平更有秩序的社会的人的支持。在现代发展中，最致命的一个转折点是，当只有跟各种特权做斗争才能服务初衷的伟大运动，劳工运动，受到反竞争理论的影响，开始纠缠于争夺特权。垄断最近的发展很大程度上就是有组织的资本和有组织的劳工精心合作的结果，其中劳工中的特权集团，牺牲社会利益，特别是最贫困的、组织得较差行业里或者失业的工人人们的利益，参与瓜分垄断利润。

看到伟大的民主运动支持一项必然导致民主破坏、拥护它的大众中只有少数能受益的政策是我们这个时代最痛心的一幕。然而正是左翼对垄断倾向的支持让其势不可挡，未来前途黑暗。只要劳动党继续协助破坏这每一个工人的独立和自由至少有某种程度保障的唯一的秩序，未来真的毫无希望。那些现在大声宣布他们已经“一劳永逸地消灭了疯狂的竞争制度”的劳动党领袖，实际上是在宣布个人自由的世界末日。要么是市场客观原则指导下的秩序，要么是少数人意志指导下的秩序，没有其它可能，那些去破坏前者的人有意或者无意的助长后者的产生。在那样的新秩序中，即使有些工人可能会吃得好些，毫无疑问所有人会穿得更整齐划一，但多数英国工人最终会不会感谢他们领袖中的知识分子给他们奉上了一个危害他们个人自由的社会主义理论，这值得怀疑。

which spells poverty for all peoples, and war as outcome of that poverty"- a curious reading of the history of the last hundred and fifty years.

To anyone who is familiar with the history of the major Continental countries in the last twenty-five years, the study of the recent programme of the Labour Party, now committed to the creation of a "planned society" is a most depressing experience. To "any attempt to restore traditional Britain" there is opposed a scheme which not only in general outline but also in detail and even wording is indistinguishable from the socialist dreams which dominated German discussion twenty-five years ago. Not only demands, like those of the resolution, adopted on Professor Laski's motion, which requires the retention in peace time of the "measures of Government control needed for mobilising the national resources in war", but all the characteristic catchwords, such as the "balanced economy" which Professor Laski now demands for Great Britain, or the "community consumption" towards which production is to be centrally directed, are bodily taken over from the German ideology. Twenty-five years ago there was perhaps still some excuse for holding the naive belief "that a planned society can be a far more free society than the competitive laissez-faire order it has come to replace".¹² But to find it once more held after twenty-five years of experience and the re-examination of the old beliefs to which this experience has led, and at a time when we are fighting the results of those very doctrines, is tragic beyond words. That the great party which in Parliament and public opinion has largely taken the place of the progressive parties of the past, should have ranged itself with what, in the light of all past development, must be regarded as a reactionary movement, is the decisive change which has taken place in our time and the source of the mortal danger to everything a liberal must value. That the advances of the past should be threatened by the traditionalist forces of the Right is a phenomenon of all ages which need not alarm us. But if the place of the opposition, in public discussion as well as in Parliament, should become lastingly the monopoly of a second reactionary party, there would indeed be no hope left.

对熟悉主要欧洲大陆国家过去二十五年历史的人来说，研究一下劳动党最近的纲领，它现在着力于建立“计划的社会”，令人沮丧至极。针对“任何恢复英国传统的试图”有一个反对的计划，不仅仅在大纲上，而且在细节甚至在遣词造句上都和二十五年前主导德国思想辩论的社会主义梦想毫无二致。不仅仅是要求，就像对拉斯基教授动议所采取的决议那样要求，在和平时期保留“政府在战争期间动员全国资源所需要的管控措施”，而且所有特色口号，譬如拉斯基教授现在要求英国实行的“平衡的经济”或者集中指挥生产以满足的“公众消费”，都是从德国意识形态中全盘照搬过来的。二十五年前，带着天真的信仰“一个计划的社会比它将替代的竞争的放任制度更自由”可能仍情有可原。但是有过二十五年经验以及二十五年经验导致对传统信仰的反思后，且恰恰是当我们与这些理论的结果做斗争的时候，再一次发现这个天真的信仰还被人坚持，难以言传地可悲。在议会和社会舆论中很大程度上取代了过去各进步党派的执政党，跟依照过去全部经验看怎样都属于反动的群众运动应该是已经站到了一起，这是发生在我们这个时代决定性的变化，这对自由主义必须重视的一切来说都是致命的危险。过去进步受到右翼传统势力的威胁，是所有时期都会有的现象，不必惊恐。但是，如果在舆论和议会中，在野党的位置又为第二大的反动政党的持久霸占，那就真的没什么希望了。

¹² *The Old World and the New Society*, an Interim Report of the National Executive of the British Labour Party on the Problems of Reconstruction, pp. 12 and 16.