

#### 14. MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND IDEAL ENDS

Is it just or reasonable, that most voices against the main end of government should enslave the less number that would be free? More just it is, doubtless, if it come to force, that a less number compel a greater to retain, which can be no wrong to them, their liberty, than that a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness, compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow slaves. They who seek nothing but their own just liberty, have always the right to win it, whenever they have the power, be the voices never so numerous that oppose it.

John Milton.

Our generation likes to flatter itself that it attaches less weight to economic considerations than did its parents or grandparents. The "End of Economic Man" bids fair to become one of the governing myths of our age. Before we accept this claim, or treat the change as praiseworthy, we must inquire a little further how far it is true. When we consider the claims for social reconstruction which are most strongly pressed it appears that they are almost all economic in character: we have seen already that the "reinterpretation in economic terms" of the political ideals of the past, of liberty, equality, and security, is one of the main demands of people who at the same time proclaim the end of economic man. Nor can there be much doubt that in their beliefs and aspirations men are today more than ever before governed by economic doctrines, by the carefully fostered belief in the irrationality of our economic system, by the false assertions about "potential plenty", pseudo-theories about the inevitable trend towards monopoly, and the impression created by certain much advertised occurrences such as the destruction of stocks of raw materials or the suppression of inventions, for which competition is blamed, though they are precisely the sort of thing which could not happen under competition and which are made possible only by monopoly and usually by government-aided monopoly.<sup>1</sup>

In a different sense, however, it is no doubt true that our generation is less willing to listen to economic considerations than was true of its predecessors. It is most decidedly unwilling to sacrifice any of its demands to what are called economic arguments, it is impatient and intolerant of all restraints on their immediate ambitions, and unwilling to bow to economic necessities. It is not any contempt for material welfare, or even any diminished desire for it, but, on the contrary, a refusal to recognise any obstacles, any conflict with other aims which might impede the fulfilment of their own desires, which distinguishes our generation. Economophobia would be a more correct description of this attitude than the doubly misleading "End of Economic Man", which suggests a change from a state of affairs which has never existed in a direction in which we are not moving. Man has come to hate, and to revolt against, the impersonal forces to which in the past he submitted even though they have often frustrated his individual efforts.

<sup>1</sup>The frequent use that is made of the occasional destruction of wheat, coffee, etc., as an argument against competition is a good illustration of the intellectual dishonesty of much of this argument, since a little reflection will show that in a competitive market no owner of such stocks can gain by their destruction. The case of the alleged suppression of useful patents is more complicated and cannot be adequately discussed

#### 14. 物质的条件和理想的目标

反对政府主要目标的多数应该奴役本该自由的少数，公平吗？合理吗？无疑，如果是强迫的话，少数迫使多数保留并无不妥的自由，比多数为了低级趣味伤害、迫使少数与他们同做奴隶要来得更公平。那些只追求自己正当自由的人，只要有力量，他们总有权利赢得自由，无论反对的声音有多少。

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我们这一代喜欢自我吹捧，不像父辈、祖辈那样对经济上的考虑斤斤计较。“经济人的终结”很可能成为我们这个时代主要神话之一。在我们接受这个说法，或者认为这个变化值得称道之前，我们必须稍作进一步探究，看看有几分正确。当我们考虑最迫切的社会重建问题，看起来几乎全带经济性：我们已经看到，对过去政治理想自由、平等、保障等概念“用经济术语重新解释”是声称经济人的终结的那些人主要要求之一。精心培植使人相信我们经济制度不合理，谎称“潜在充足”，提出垄断是必然趋势的伪理论，大肆宣称某些事件譬如把销毁原材料库存、压制发明归咎于竞争，事实上这类事情正是在竞争环境下不可能发生、只有在垄断情况下并经常是在政府协助的垄断情况下才可能，通过这些，毫无疑问，现在大家的信仰、抱负比过去任何时候更受到各种经济学说的影响。

然而，在另外一个意义上，无疑正确的是，我们这一代人和前一辈相比，不太愿意听从经济上的考虑。绝不愿意为了经济考量牺牲其它任何需求，对眼前目标面临的各种限制没有耐心、无法容忍，不愿意为五斗米折腰。这并非瞧不起物质享受，也不是物质上的欲望减少了，相反，是拒绝承认任何困难，拒绝承认与妨碍我们欲求满足的其它目标有冲突，这就是我们这一代的与众不同。描述这种态度，用经济恐惧症一词比令人双重误解的“经济人的终结”更合适，后者暗示着一个我们从来没有过的方向上从来没有过的状态改变。人类开始憎恨、反抗那些非人为的力量，那些力量常常让他无可奈何，却曾不得不屈服。

in a note; but the conditions in which it would be profitable to put into cold storage a patent which in the social interest ought to be used are so exceptional that it is more than doubtful whether this has happened in any important instance.

This revolt is an instance of a much more general phenomenon, a new unwillingness to submit to any rule or necessity the *rationale* of which man does not understand; it makes itself felt in many fields of life, particularly in that of morals; and it is often a commendable attitude. But there are fields where this craving for intelligibility cannot be fully satisfied and where at the same time a refusal to submit to anything we cannot understand must lead to the destruction of our civilisation. Though it is natural that, as the world around us becomes more complex, our resistance grows against the forces which, without our understanding them, constantly interfere with individual hopes and plans, it is just in these circumstances that it becomes less and less possible for anyone fully to understand these forces. A complex civilisation like ours is necessarily based on the individual adjusting himself to changes whose cause and nature he cannot understand: why he should have more or less, why he should have to move to another occupation, why some things he wants should become more difficult to get than others, will always be connected with such a multitude of circumstances that no single mind will be able to grasp them; or, even worse, those affected will put all the blame on an obvious immediate and avoidable cause, while the more complex interrelationships which determine the change remain inevitably hidden to them. Even the director of a completely planned society, if he wanted to give an adequate explanation to anyone why he has to be directed to a different job, or why his remuneration has to be changed, could not fully do so without explaining and vindicating his whole plan—which means, of course, that it could not be explained to more than a few.

It was men's submission to the impersonal forces of the market that in the past has made possible the growth of a civilisation which without this could not have developed; it is by thus submitting that we are every day helping to build something that is greater than anyone of us can fully comprehend. It does not matter whether men in the past did submit from beliefs which some now regard as superstitious: from a religious spirit of humility, or an exaggerated respect for the crude teachings of the early economists. The crucial point is that it is infinitely more difficult rationally to comprehend the necessity of submitting to forces whose operation we cannot follow in detail, than to do so out of the humble awe which religion, or even the respect for the doctrines of economics, did inspire. It may indeed be the case that infinitely more intelligence on the part of everybody would be needed than anybody now possesses, if we were even merely to maintain our present complex civilisation without anybody having to do things of which he does not comprehend the necessity. The refusal to yield to forces which we neither understand nor can recognise as the conscious decisions of an intelligent being is the product of an incomplete and therefore erroneous rationalism. It is incomplete because it fails to comprehend that the co-ordination of the multifarious individual efforts in a complex society must take account of facts no individual can completely survey. And it fails to see that, unless this complex society is to be destroyed, the only alternative to submission to the impersonal and seemingly irrational forces of the market is submission to an equally uncontrollable and therefore arbitrary power of other men. In his anxiety to escape the irksome restraints which he now feels, man does not realise that the new authoritarian restraints which will have to be deliberately imposed in their stead will be even more painful.

这个反抗只是一个例子，更普遍现象的现象是，不愿屈服于任何规则、或者不了解缘由的必需要求；在生活的诸多领域特别是道德的诸多方面我们都可以感觉得到；这常是一种值得称道的态度。但是在有些领域，求知而不得，同时又拒绝屈从于任何未知的东西，这极可能导致我们文明的毁灭。周围环境越来越复杂，我们对那些不了解却不断地干扰个人希望和计划的力量抗拒也不断增长，这很自然，然而正是在这种环境下，完全理解这些力量越来越不可能。象我们这样复杂的文明必然建立在个人调整自己以适应那些原因、本质都不了解的变化的基础上：为什么他应该多得或者少得，为什么他不得不令谋他业，为什么他想要的某些东西比别人更难得到，所有这些与许多情况相关联，单靠哪一个人的脑袋都无法完全理解它们；或者，甚至更糟，那些受影响的人都归咎于可避免的明显、直接的原因，引起变化的那些更错综复杂的关系则必将藏而不现。甚至一个全面计划的社会的领导，假使想给某人一个充分的解释为什么这个人要被改派不同岗位、或者为什么薪酬要变，除非解释、澄清整个计划，否则不能完全令人满意——这当然意味着，只能对少数人解释。

在过去，正是人们对市场非人为力量的屈服使文明成长壮大成为可能，没有这种屈服，文明不能发展；正是通过这种屈服，我们每天都在参与构建一个远超我们个人能完全理解的东西。或者出于对宗教的谦卑精神，或者出于对早期经济学家肤浅教导的过分尊重，过去的人屈从于有些现在认为是迷信的信仰，这没什么关系。重要的一点是，对运作细节难以知晓的各种力量，我们要完全理解屈从于它的必要，那比屈从于宗教或者甚至对经济学学说的尊重所激发的谦卑敬畏，理性上来说，要困难得不知多少。真可能是这样，如果不理解其必要性就不去做，仅想维持当前复杂程度的文明，现在任何人所拥有的聪明才智都还远远不够。作为聪明人的自觉决定，拒绝屈从于我们不理解不认可的力量，是不完全的因此也是错误的理性主义的产物。社会复杂，个人行为五花八门，协调个人行为需要考虑的实际情况没人能够全面了解，不了解所以我们说它是不完全的。并且，它也未能看到，除非这个复杂社会消失，如果不屈从于非人为、看起来非理性的市场力量，那么就屈从于一个同样无法控制、他人独断专横的力量。当人们急于摆脱现在深感讨厌的羁绊时，他们没有意识到，取而代之的蓄意强加于他们身上的新的极权主义限制，甚至会更加痛苦。

Those who argue that we have to an astounding degree learned to master the forces of nature but are sadly behind in making successful use of the possibilities of social collaboration are quite right so far as this statement goes. But they are mistaken when they carry the comparison further and argue that we must learn to master the forces of society in the same manner in which we have learnt to master the forces of nature. This is not only the path to totalitarianism, but the path to the destruction of our civilisation and a certain way to block future progress. Those who demand it show by their very demands that they have not yet comprehended the extent to which the mere preservation of what we have so far achieved depends on the co-ordination of individual efforts by impersonal forces.

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We must now return briefly to the crucial point, that individual freedom cannot be reconciled with the supremacy of one single purpose to which the whole society must be entirely and permanently subordinated. The only exception to the rule that a free society must not be subjected to a single purpose is war and other temporary disasters when subordination of almost everything to the immediate and pressing need is the price at which we preserve our freedom in the long run. This explains also why so many of the fashionable phrases about doing for the purposes of peace what we have learnt to do for the purposes of war are so very misleading: it is sensible temporarily to sacrifice freedom in order to make it more secure in the future; but the same cannot be said for a system proposed as a permanent arrangement.

That no single purpose must be allowed in peace to have absolute preference over all others applies even to the one aim which everybody now agrees comes in the front rank: the conquest of unemployment. There can be no doubt that this must be the goal of our greatest endeavour; even so, it does not mean that such an aim should be allowed to dominate us to the exclusion of everything else, that, as the glib phrase runs, it must be accomplished "at any price". It is, in fact, in this field that the fascination of vague but popular phrases like "full employment" may well lead to extremely short-sighted measures, and where the categorical and irresponsible "it must be done at all cost" of the single-minded idealist is likely to do the greatest harm.

It is of very great importance that we should approach with open eyes the task which in this field we shall have to face after the war, and that we should clearly realise what we may hope to achieve. One of the dominant features of the immediate post war situation will be that the special needs of war have drawn hundreds of thousands of men and women into specialised jobs where during the war they have been able to earn relatively high wages. There will, in many instances, be no possibility of employing the same numbers in these particular trades. There will be an urgent need for the transfer of large numbers to other jobs, and many of them will find that the work they can then get is less favourably remunerated than was true of their war job. Even re-training, which certainly ought to be provided on a liberal scale, cannot entirely overcome this problem. There will still be many people who, if they are to be paid according to what their services will then be worth to society, would under any system have to be content with a lowering of their material position relative to that of others.

那些认为我们以惊人的程度学会了驾驭自然力量，但在成功利用可能的社会合作上可惜远远落后的人，就此说法本身而言，很正确。但是随着进一步的比较，他们声称我们必须以驾驭自然力量的一方式去驾驭社会力量，那他们就错了。这不仅仅是一条走向极权主义的道路，更是毁灭我们文明的道路，是一条肯定阻碍未来进步的道路。那些提出这些要求的人，正是其要求本身表明他们还没有理解到，仅仅是维护我们今天的文明成果，我们已经在何种程度上依赖于非人为力量对个人努力的协调。

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我们现在必须暂时回到重要的一点，那就是个人自由与全社会必须完全地、永远地服从至高无上的单一目标二者水火不容。自由社会不能服从单一目标，该规则唯一的例外就是战争和其它临时性的灾难。其时，几乎一切让位给紧急需要，这正是为长期保有自由所付出的代价。这也解释了为什么很多我们为了战争目的学会的流行用语用于和平目的就如此误导人：为了将来自由更有保障暂时牺牲自由是明智的；但是对作为永久性安排提出来的制度而言这样说就是错的。

和平时期绝不容许单一目标绝对优先于其它所有目标，这甚至适用于现在每一个人都赞的首要任务，解决就业问题。无疑，针对充分就业我们必须付出最大努力；即使如此，也并不意味着该目标可以支配我们，置其它目标于不顾，就象俗话说的“不惜一切代价”来实现。事实上，正是在这个领域，迷恋于象“充分就业”的一些模糊但中听的词汇，很可能导致极端短视的措施，思想简单的理想主义者绝对而且又不负责任的“不惜一切代价完成”极有可能做成巨大损失。

解决在战后将不得不面对的这一领域里的这些任务，我们应该睁大眼睛，清楚地认识到能够希望取得什么样的结果，这非常重要。紧接而来的战后局势主要特征之一就是，上百万的男男女女战争期间投入到了特殊的岗位，能够赚到相对较高的薪水。在很多情况下，这些特殊行业不再可能有同样多的岗位。因此迫切需要大量工人换岗，其中很多人将会发现他们能找到的工作薪酬不如战时工作。虽然政府肯定会提供规模不限的重新就业培训，即便如此，也不能完全解决这个问题。仍有很多人，如果按他们工作对这个社会的价值支取酬劳，在任何制度下，都不得不接受相对他人物质地位降低这一处境。

If, then, the trade unions successfully resist any lowering of the wages of the particular groups in question, there will be only two alternatives open: either coercion will have to be used, i.e. certain individuals will have to be selected for compulsory transfer to other and relatively less well paid positions, or those who can no longer be employed at the relatively high wages they have earned during the war must be allowed to remain unemployed till they are willing to accept work at a relatively lower wage. This is a problem which would arise in a socialist society no less than in any other; and the great majority of workmen would probably be just as little inclined to guarantee in perpetuity their present wages to those who were drawn into specially well paid employments because of the special need of war. A socialist society would certainly use coercion in this position. The point that is relevant for us is that if we are determined not to allow unemployment at any price, and are not willing to use coercion, we shall be driven to all sorts of desperate expedients, none of which can bring any lasting relief and all of which will seriously interfere with the most productive use of our resources. It should be specially noted that monetary policy cannot provide a real cure for this difficulty except by a general and considerable inflation, sufficient to raise all other wages and prices relatively to those which cannot be lowered, and that even this would bring about the desired result only by effecting in a concealed and underhand fashion that reduction of real wages which could not be brought about directly. Yet to raise all other wages and incomes to an extent sufficient to adjust the position of the group in question would involve an inflationary expansion on such a scale that the disturbances, hardships, and injustices caused would be much greater than those to be cured.

This problem, which will arise in a particularly acute form after the war, is one which will always be with us so long as the economic system has to adapt itself to continuous changes. There will always be a possible maximum of employment in the short run which can be achieved by giving all people employment where they happen to be and which can be achieved by monetary expansion. But not only can this maximum be maintained solely by progressive inflationary expansion and with the effect of holding up those redistributions of labour between industries made necessary by the changed circumstances, and which so long as workmen are free to choose their jobs will always come about only with some delays and thereby cause some unemployment: to aim always at the maximum of employment achievable by monetary means is a policy which is certain in the end to defeat its own purposes. It tends to lower the productivity of labour and thereby constantly increases the proportion of the working population which can be kept employed at present wages only by artificial means.

而后，如果某行业工会成功地抵制了降低工资，那么只有两种非此即彼的结果：或者采取强迫手段，即是不得不挑出某些人强行转调到其它薪酬相对较差的岗位；或者无法找到与战时同样相对高薪工作的人不得不先处于失业状态，直到他们愿意接受相对较低薪水为止。这个问题在社会主义社会跟其它任何社会一样常见；绝大多数工人可能都不愿意给予那些因战争特殊需要而获得特别高薪工作的人永远保持该薪资水平的保证。在这个情况下，社会主义社会肯定会采取强迫手段。这跟我们有关的一点是，如果我们铁定要不惜一切代价确保不允许失业，同时又不愿意采取强迫手段，我们将被迫采取各种不顾一切的权宜办法，但这些都非长久之计，都将严重干扰资源的优化使用。特别值得注意的是，货币政策可以通过普遍的、规模可观的通货膨胀，相对于那些人不能降低的工资，增长所有其他人的工资、提高物价，以这种隐秘、偷偷摸摸的方式间接降低实际收入来达到想要的结果，除此以外，并不能真正解决这个困难。然而，增加其他所有人工工资收入到足以能调整所涉行业地位的程度，所造成的通货膨胀规模之大，引起的动荡、困难、不公平的问题只怕远大于所要解决的问题。

这个在战后将是特别尖锐的问题，只要经济制度还得适应不断的变化，就会一直存在。最充分就业在短期总是可能的，可以通过把所有人安置在他们当前所在的岗位，也可以通过增发货币得以实现。但，要维持这个充分就业不能只通过持续不断的通货膨胀、以及阻止行业之间因环境变化必要的劳动力再分配来实现，并且，只要工人有权自由择业，劳动力再分配就会一直发生，只是有些滞后，这样造成一些失业：想通过货币手段达到最充分就业，是一项肯定以失败告终的政策。它往往会降低劳动生产率，就业人口中，在其薪资水平上只有靠政府干预才能维持就业的那部分人的比例因此持续增加。

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There is little doubt that after the war wisdom in the management of our economic affairs will be even more important than before and that the fate of our civilisation will ultimately depend on how we solve the economic problems we shall then face. We shall at first be poor, very poor indeed—and the problem of regaining and improving our former standards may in fact prove for Great Britain more difficult than for many other countries. If we act wisely there is little question that by hard work and by devoting a considerable part of our efforts to overhauling and renewing our industrial apparatus and organisation, we shall in the course of a few years be able to return to, and even to surpass, the level we had reached. But this presupposes that we shall be satisfied to consume currently no more than is possible without impairing the task of reconstruction, that no exaggerated hopes create irresistible claims for more than this, and that we regard it as more important to use our resources in the best manner and for the purposes where they contribute most to our well-being than that we should use all our resources somehow<sup>2</sup>. Perhaps no less important is that we should not, by short-sighted attempts to cure poverty by a redistribution instead of by an increase in our income, so depress large classes as to turn them into determined enemies of the existing political order. It should never be forgotten that the one decisive factor in the rise of totalitarianism on the Continent, which is yet absent in this country, is the existence of a large recently dispossessed middle class.

Our hopes of avoiding the fate which threatens must indeed to a large extent rest on the prospect that we can resume rapid economic progress which, however low we may have to start, will continue to carry us upwards; and the main condition for such progress is that we should all be ready to adapt ourselves quickly to a very much changed world, that no considerations for the accustomed standard of particular groups must be allowed to obstruct this adaptation, and that we learn once more to turn all our resources to wherever they contribute most to make us all richer. The adjustments that will be needed if we are to recover and surpass our former standards will be greater than any similar adjustments we had to make in the past; and only if everyone of us is ready individually to obey the necessities of this readjustment shall we be able to get through a difficult period as free men who can choose their own way of life. Let a uniform minimum be secured to everybody by all means; but let us admit at the same time that with this assurance of a basic minimum all claims for a privileged security of particular classes must lapse, that all excuses disappear for allowing groups to exclude newcomers from sharing their relative prosperity in order to maintain a special standard of their own.

It may sound noble to say: damn economics, let us build up a decent world—but it is, in fact, merely irresponsible. With our world as it is, with everyone convinced that the material conditions here or there must be improved, our only chance of building a decent world is that we can continue to improve the general level of wealth. The one thing modern democracy will not bear without cracking is the necessity of a substantial lowering of the standards of living in peace time or even prolonged stationariness of its economic conditions.

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几无疑问，战后经济事务管理中的学问要比以往重要得多，我们文明的命运将最终取决于我们怎么解决即将面临的经济问题。我们开始会很穷，真的很穷——重新回到和超过以前的生活标准对英国来说可能事实上证明要比很多其他国家更难。如果我们行动明智，通过勤劳、通过投入大量的精力改造、翻新我们的工业设施、工业部门，在几年时间内，达到甚至超过曾经的水平，应该是没什么问题的。但是这是预先假定，在不影响战后重建的前提下量入为出，不要求比这多的奢望；以最佳方式、以最大限度服务于我们的福祉为目的使用资源，而不是不知所谓地使用全部资源。可能同样重要的是，我们不应该目光短浅地通过重新分配而不是增加收入来消灭贫穷，这会使大批阶级群众失去动力成为坚决反对现行政治秩序的一群。绝不能忘记的一点是，欧洲大陆极权主义兴起的一个决定性因素是，存在一大批最近被剥夺了财产的中产阶级，这个现在英国还不存在。

为了避免命运威胁，我们的希望真地很大程度上必须寄于能恢复经济的高速增长，不管起点多低，经济增长能不断带来提高；那样增长的主要条件是，我们所有人必须准备好尽快适应一个发生了巨变的世界，不允许为了照顾某些集团的历史生活水准来阻止这种适用，并且再一次地记住，哪里对我们致富贡献良多就把资源挪到哪里。我们要恢复、超越之前标准所需的调整之大超过历史上任何一次类似调整；并且只有我们每一个人准备好接受这一必要的调整，我们作为一个能够选择自己生活道路的自由人才度过困难时期。让我们尽一切办法确保每一个人享有统一的最低生活保障；但我们同时也得接受，为了确保最低基本保障，必须放弃某些阶级的特权保障，不存在某些集团为了维持自己特殊标准而将其他人排除在外的一切借口。

这样说可能听起来很堂皇：去他的经济学，让我们建设一个像样的世界吧，但，事实上，这只是不负责任。我们的现实就是如此，每个人都认为这里那里都需要提高物质条件，建设一个像样世界的唯一机会就是我们能不断提高总的财富水平。压垮现代民主的一件事是，和平时期需要大幅降低生活标准，或者甚至是经济状况长期裹足不前。

<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps the place to emphasise that, however much one may wish a speedy return to a free economy, this cannot mean the removal at one stroke of most of the wartime restrictions. Nothing would discredit the system of free enterprise more than the acute, though probably short-lived, dislocation and instability such an attempt would produce. The problem is at what kind of system we should aim in the

process of demobilisation, not whether the war-time system should be transformed into more permanent arrangements by a carefully thought-out policy of gradual relaxation of controls, which may have to extend over several years.

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People who admit that present political trends constitute a serious threat to our economic prospects, and through their economic effects endanger much higher values, are yet apt to deceive themselves that we are making material sacrifices to gain ideal ends. It is, however, more than doubtful whether a fifty years' approach towards collectivism has raised our moral standards, or whether the change has not rather been in the opposite direction. Though we are in the habit of priding ourselves on our more sensitive social conscience, it is by no means clear that this is justified by the practice of our individual conduct. On the negative side, in its indignation about the inequities of the existing social order, our generation probably surpasses most of its predecessors. But the effect of that movement on our positive standards in the proper field of morals, individual conduct, and on the seriousness with which we uphold moral principles against the expediencies and exigencies of social machinery, is a very different matter.

Issues in this field have become so confused that it is necessary to go back to fundamentals. What our generation is in danger of forgetting is not only that morals are of necessity a phenomenon of individual conduct, but also that they can exist only in the sphere in which the individual is free to decide for himself and called upon voluntarily to sacrifice personal advantage to the observance of a moral rule. Outside the sphere of individual responsibility there is neither goodness nor badness, neither opportunity for moral merit nor the chance of proving one's conviction by sacrificing one's desires to what one thinks right. Only where we ourselves are responsible for our own interests and are free to sacrifice them, has our decision moral value. We are neither entitled to be unselfish at someone else's expense, nor is there any merit in being unselfish if we have no choice. The members of a society who in all respects are made to do the good thing have no title to praise. As Milton said: "If every action which is good or evil in a man of ripe years were under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise should then be due to well-doing, what gramercy to be sober, just, or continent?"

Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily re-created in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one's conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion, the necessity to decide which of the things one values are to be sacrificed to others, and to bear the consequences of one's own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name.

That in this sphere of individual conduct the effect of collectivism has been almost entirely destructive, is both inevitable and undeniable. A movement whose main promise is the relief from responsibility<sup>3</sup> cannot but be anti-moral in its effect, however lofty the ideals to which it owes its birth. Can there be much doubt that the feeling of personal obligation to remedy inequities, where our individual power permits, has been weakened rather than strengthened, that both the willingness to bear responsibility and the consciousness that it is our own individual duty to know how to choose have been perceptibly impaired?

<sup>3</sup>This becomes more and more clearly expressed as socialism approaches totalitarianism, and in this country is most explicitly stated in the programme of that latest and most totalitarian form of English socialism, Sir Richard Acland's "Common-Wealth" movement. The main feature of the new order he promises is that in it the community will "say to the individual 'Don't you bother about the business of getting your own living.'" In consequence, of course, "it must be the community as a whole which must decide whether or not a man shall be employed upon our resources, and how and when and in what manner he shall work", and that the

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承认现在政治倾向对经济前景构成严重威胁、政治通过影响经济进一步危及更崇高价值的人，仍在倾向于自欺欺人地认为我们在牺牲物质利益换取理想目标。然而，朝集体主义方向走了五十年，我们的道德标准是不是提高了，或者是不是不是在朝着相反方向的走，很值得怀疑。尽管我们习惯为自己越来越敏感的社会良知感到自豪，我们个人行为能否印证这一点却远不清楚。负面来看，我们这一代对现存社会秩序中不平等的愤慨，很可能远超大数前辈。但这一运动对我们传统道德领域及个人行为的正面标准、对我们严肃认真捍卫道德准则抵制社会机构权宜应急措施的影响则是另外一回事。

这个领域问题如此混淆不清，我们有必要回到基本概念上去。我们这一代可能忘记，道德不仅仅必然是个人行为现象，而且只有在个人能自主行为、自愿牺牲利益遵守道德规范的世界才可能存在。在不谈个人责任的世界，没有善与恶，既没有道德荣誉也没有为信仰做出牺牲这回事。只有我们自己对自已的利益负责，能有牺牲它的自由时，我们的决定才有道德价值。我们无权慷他人之慨，被迫慷慨也不是什么美德。社会成员行善，如果从各个方面讲都是被要求的，他们没有资格受到赞扬。如弥尔顿所说“如果一个成年人做的每一件事，好事或者坏事，都是在小恩小惠、授意或者强迫下，美德岂不徒有其名？善行值什么赞美？冷静、公平、自制值什么钦佩？”

物质环境强迫我们做出选择的地方有决定自己行为的自由，对自己良心给自己安排的生活负责，是道德观念得以成长、道德价值在个人自主下每日再现的唯一氛围。对自己而不是对上级负责的良心，不是强迫而来的责任感，必需决定为他人牺牲自己的哪些利益，为自己决定产生承担后果，这些才是名副其实的道德精华。

既不可避免也不可否认，在个人行为的世界里，集体主义的影响几乎完全是破坏性的。一个以免除责任为主要承诺的群众运动，不管初衷多么高尚，最终效果只能是反道德的。能有多少人怀疑，在个人力所能及的地方，纠正不平等的个人责任感现在不是增强而是已经减弱；承担责任的意愿以及自己选择是自己责任的觉悟显然已经受到影响？

community will have "to run camps for shirkers in very tolerable conditions". Is it surprising that the author discovers that Hitler "has stumbled across (or has needed to make use of) a small part, or perhaps one should say one particular aspect of, what will ultimately be required of humanity?" (Sir Richard Acland, Bt., *The Forward March*, 1941, pp. 127, 126, 135, and 32).

There is all the difference between demanding that a desirable state of affairs should be brought about by the authorities or even being willing to submit provided everyone else is made to do the same, and the readiness to do what one thinks right oneself at the sacrifice of one's own desires and perhaps in the face of hostile public opinion. There is much to suggest that we have in fact become more tolerant towards particular abuses, and much more indifferent to inequities in individual cases, since we have fixed our eyes on an entirely different system in which the state will set everything right. It may even be, as has been suggested, that the passion for collective action is a way in which we now without compunction collectively indulge in that selfishness which as individuals we had learnt a little to restrain.

It is true that the virtues which are less esteemed and practised now—independence, self-reliance, and the willingness to bear risks, the readiness to back one's own conviction against a majority, and the willingness to voluntary co-operations with one's neighbours—are essentially those on which the working of an individualist society rests. Collectivism has nothing to put in their place, and in so far as it already has destroyed them it has left a void filled by nothing but the demand for obedience and the compulsion of the individual to do what is collectively decided to be good. The periodical election of representatives, to which the moral choice of the individual tends to be more and more reduced, is not an occasion on which his moral values are tested or where he has constantly to reassert and prove the order of his values, and to testify to the sincerity of his profession by the sacrifice of those of his values he rates lower to those he puts higher.

As the rules of conduct evolved by individuals are the source from which collective political action derives what moral standards it possesses, it would indeed be surprising if the relaxation of the standards of individual conduct were accompanied by a raising of the standards of social action. That there have been great changes is clear. Every generation, of course, puts some values higher and some lower than its predecessors. Which, however, are the aims which take a lower place now, which are the values which we are now warned may have to give way if they come into conflict with others? Which kind of values figure less prominently in the picture of the future held out to us by the popular writers and speakers than they did in the dreams and hopes of our fathers? It is certainly not material comfort, certainly not a rise in our standard of living or the assurance of a certain status in society which ranks lower. Is there a popular writer or speaker who dares to suggest to the masses that they might have to make sacrifices of their material prospects for the enhancement of an ideal end? Is it not, in fact, entirely the other way round? Are not the things which we are more and more frequently taught to regard as "nineteenth-century illusions" all moral values—liberty and independence, truth and intellectual honesty, peace and democracy, and the respect for the individual *qua* man instead of merely as the member of an organised group?

要求政府应该创造一个理想的环境或者甚至只有所有人都一样服从才愿意服从；和乐意牺牲个人要求、甚至可能不得不舆论敌意做自己认为正确事情，有天壤之别。很多情况表明，我们实际上对个别陋习已经更加宽容、对个别不平等情况更加冷漠，这是因为我们已经属意一个完全不同的制度，那里政府将把一切安排妥当。甚至可能象提到过的那样，热衷于集体行动是我们现在毫无内疚、集体纵容自私的一种形式；作为个人我们还曾学着如何稍稍约束一下自私。

真的是，现在较少得到尊重和实践的那些美德——独立、自力更生、愿意承担风险、愿意面对多数反对坚持自己的信仰、自愿和邻里合作——基本上都是个人主义社会运行的基础。集体主义没有什么可以替代这些美德，当这些美德被集体主义毁掉时，留下了空白，从而完全为要求服从、强迫个人做集体认为是好的事情这些道德标准所填补。人民代表的定期选举，个人道德成分越来越少，选举并不是一个检验候选人道德价值的场合，候选人无需一直重申和证明他对道德价值的衡量，无需通过牺牲他认为较低的价值维护较高的价值来证明他表白的真诚。

集体主义政治行动从演化的个人行为准则中衍生出它自己的道德标准，如果放松个人行为标准带来社会行为标准的提高，那的确会令人惊奇。变化很大是显然的。当然，每一代人和前一辈人相比会把某些价值看的更高些，某些看的更低些。然而，现在是哪些目的处于次要地位，哪些价值我们要注意如果与其它冲突必须放弃呢？现在很受欢迎的作家、演说家呈现给我们的未来蓝图中，哪类价值比起我们父辈梦中、希望中要来得次要些呢？肯定不是物质上的舒适，肯定不是生活水平的提高，也肯定不是确保某种较低水平的社会待遇。有没有一个很受欢迎的作家或者演说家敢于告诉大众，他们将会为了理想牺牲物质前途？难道事实不是完全相反吗？我们被反复教导是“十九世纪幻想”的那些东西——自由与独立、真理与诚信、和平与民主、把个人当作人而不仅仅是组织的一分子予以尊重，难道不全是道德价值吗？

What are the fixed poles now which are regarded as sacrosanct, which no reformer dare touch, since they are treated as the immutable boundaries which must be respected in any plan for the future? They are no longer the liberty of the individual, his freedom of movement, and scarcely that of speech. They are the protected standards of this or that group, their "right" to exclude others from providing their fellow-men with what they need. Discrimination between members and nonmembers of closed groups, not to speak of nationals of different countries, is accepted more and more as a matter of course; injustices inflicted on individuals by government action in the interest of a group are disregarded with an indifference hardly distinguishable from callousness; and the grossest violations of the most elementary rights of the individual, such as are involved in the compulsory transfer of populations, are more and more often countenanced even by supposed liberals. All this surely indicates that our moral sense has been blunted rather than sharpened. When we are reminded, as more and more frequently happens, that one cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs, the eggs which are broken are almost all of the kind which a generation or two ago were regarded as the essential bases of civilised life. And what atrocities committed by powers with whose professed principles they sympathise have not been readily condoned by many of our so-called "liberals"?

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There is one aspect of the change in moral values brought about by the advance of collectivism which at the present time provides special food for thought. It is that the virtues which are held less and less in esteem and which consequently become rarer are precisely those on which the British people justly prided themselves and in which they were generally recognised to excel. The virtues possessed by the British people possessed in a higher degree than most other people, excepting only a few of the smaller nations, like the Swiss and the Dutch, were independence and self-reliance, individual initiative and local responsibility, the successful reliance on voluntary activity, non-interference with one's neighbour and tolerance of the different and queer, respect for custom and tradition, and a healthy suspicion of power and authority. British strength, British character, and British achievements are to a great extent the result of a cultivation of the spontaneous. But almost all the traditions and institutions in which British moral genius has found its most characteristic expression, and which in turn have moulded the national character and the whole moral climate of England, are those which the progress of collectivism and its inherently centralistic tendencies are progressively destroying.

现在什么被视作神圣不可侵犯的标杆，是未来改革者不敢触碰任何计划必须予以尊重的禁区？它们不再是个人的自由，不再是行动的自由，也不大可能是言论的自由。它们是这个或那个集团受到保护的标准，把他人排除在特供之外的“权利”。封闭集团的成员和非成员之间，更不用说不同国家人民之间，歧视对待越来越视为理所当然；政府为了某一集团利益加之于个人身上的不公正被漠视，几近铁石心肠；对个人基本权利的粗暴至极的侵害，譬如发生在强制移民中的事情，连认为是自由主义的人也予以首肯。所有这些肯定表明我们的道德感不是变得敏锐而是迟钝了。我们被反复提醒，要做炒鸡蛋就必须先打鸡蛋，那些打碎的鸡蛋几乎都是那种一、两代之前视为为文明生活基础的东西。并且很多我们所谓的“自由主义者”对当权者宣称的原则表示体谅，当权者犯下的暴行还有什么不能被他们轻易宽恕的呢？

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集体主义发展带来的道德价值改变中，有个方面现在特别值得思考。那些越来越不受尊重、于是越来越罕见的美德恰恰是英国人公正地引以为豪、并被普遍认为擅长的。英国人拥有过的、除了象瑞士、荷兰少数等小国之外比其他多数国家人民程度更高的美德是独立、自力更生、个人原创、对地方负责、成功依靠志愿活动、不干涉邻居事务、宽容异见与异端、尊重习俗与传统、适度怀疑权力与政府。英国人的强项、英国人的性格、英国人的成就很大程度上是自发性培养的结果。但几乎所有体现英国人道德精华特征、进而塑造英国人民族性格和整个国家道德氛围的传统与制度，正被集体主义的发展及其固有的中央集权趋势逐步摧毁。

A foreign background is sometimes helpful in seeing more clearly to what circumstances the peculiar excellencies of the moral atmosphere of a nation are due. And if one who, whatever the law may say, must for ever remain a foreigner, may be allowed to say so, it is one of the most disheartening spectacles of our time to see to what extent some of the most precious things which England has given to the world are now held in contempt in England herself. The English hardly know to what degree they differ from most other people in that they all, irrespective of party, hold to a greater or less extent the ideas which in their most pronounced form are known as liberalism. Compared with most other peoples only twenty years ago almost all Englishmen were liberals—however much they may have differed from party Liberalism. And even today the English conservative or socialist, no less than the liberal, if he travels abroad, though he may find the ideas and writings of Carlyle or Disraeli, of the Webbs or H. G. Wells, exceedingly popular in circles with which he has little in common, among Nazis and other totalitarians, if he finds an intellectual island where the tradition of Macaulay and Gladstone, of J. S. Mill or John Morley lives, will find kindred spirits who "talk the same language" as himself—however much he himself may differ from the ideals for which these men specifically stood.

Nowhere is the loss of the belief in the specific values of British civilisation more manifest, and nowhere has it had a more paralysing effect on the pursuit of our immediate great purpose than in the fatuous ineffectiveness of most British propaganda. The first prerequisite for success in propaganda directed to other people is the proud acknowledgment of the characteristic values and distinguishing traits for which the country attempting it is known to the other peoples. The main cause of the ineffectiveness of British propaganda is that those directing it seem to have lost their own belief in the peculiar values of English civilisation or to be completely ignorant of the main points on which it differs from that of other people. The Left intelligentsia, indeed, have so long worshipped foreign gods that they seem to have become almost incapable of seeing any good in the characteristic English institutions and traditions. That the moral values on which most of them pride themselves are largely the product of the institutions they are out to destroy, these socialists cannot, of course, admit. And this attitude is unfortunately not confined to avowed socialists. Though one must hope that this is not true of the less vocal but more numerous cultivated Englishmen, if one were to judge by the ideas which find expression in current political discussion and propaganda the Englishmen who not only "the language speak that Shakespeare spoke", but also "the faith and morals hold that Milton held" seem to have almost vanished<sup>4</sup>.

外国人的背景有时候有助于更清楚地看到什么环境造就一个国家道德氛围的特别优秀。如果一个人，不管法律怎样规定，永远只能当个外国人，他也许可以这样说，我们这个时代最令人伤心的景象就是，英国人为这个世界贡献的最珍贵的东西，被英国人自己糟蹋到何等程度。英国人几乎不知道他们与其他多数国家人民有多大的不同，无论属于哪个党派，他们都或多或少程度不同地明显具有自由主义的思想。从党派自由主义的角度来看，英国人无论有多大不同，仅在二十年前，相对于其他多数国家人民而言，都是自由主义者。并且，即使在今天，英国保守派或者社会主义者，跟自由主义者一样，如果他到国外旅行，尽管他可能发现在跟他们志不同道不合的圈子里、纳粹或者极权主义当中，卡莱尔或者迪斯雷利、韦伯夫妇或者赫伯斯·乔治·韦尔斯的思想、著作超受欢迎，但是如果他遇到一个思想孤岛，麦考利、格莱斯顿、约翰·斯图尔特·密尔或者约翰·莫莱的传统犹存，他就会发现和同他讲“同一种语言的”志趣相投的人——不管他与他们所支持的理想有多么的不同。

使人对英国文明特有的价值丧失信心最明显的，对我们当前追求伟大目标起最大麻痹作用的，莫过于大多数英国舆论宣传的无能、无效。对外宣传成功的首要先决条件就是自豪地肯定他国人民知道的、本国的特色价值和突出特点。英国宣传无效主要的原因是那些指挥的人似乎自己丧失了对英国文明特有的价值的信仰或者对区别于他国人民的价值要点一无所知。左翼知识分子的确是外国神拜久了以至于对英国特色制度和传统的优点似乎无从知晓。他们大多数引以自豪的那些道德价值很大程度上就是他们准备摧毁的制度的产物，对此，当然这些社会主义者不能承认。并且，不幸的是，这样的态度并不限于公开的社会主义者。尽管希望对那些声音较小、但人数更多的有教养的英国人来说这不是真的，如果通过当前政治讨论和宣传所表达的思想来判断，不仅仅是“讲莎士比亚所讲”的，而且“信弥尔顿所信”的那些英国人看起来都消失殆尽。

<sup>4</sup> Though the subject of this chapter has already invited more than one reference to Milton, it is difficult to resist the temptation to add here one more quotation, a very familiar one, though one, it seems, which nowadays nobody but a foreigner would dare to cite: "Let not England forget her precedence of teaching

nations how to live." It is, perhaps, significant that our generation has seen a host of American and English detractors of Milton—and that the first of them, Mr. Ezra Pound, was during this war broadcasting from Italy!

To believe, however, that the kind of propaganda produced by this attitude can have the desired effect on our enemies and particularly the Germans, is a fatal blunder. The Germans know this country, not well, perhaps, yet sufficiently to know what are the characteristic traditional values of British life, and what for the past two or three generations has increasingly separated the minds of the two countries. If we wish to convince them, not only of our sincerity, but also that we have to offer a real alternative to the way they have gone, it will not be by concessions to their system of thought. We shall not delude them with a stale reproduction of the ideas of their fathers which we have borrowed from them—be it state-socialism, "Realpolitik", "scientific" planning, or corporatism. We shall not persuade them by following them half the way which leads to totalitarianism. If the English themselves abandon the supreme ideal of the freedom and happiness of the individual, if they implicitly admit that their civilisation is not worth preserving, and that they know nothing better than to follow the path along which the Germans have led, they have indeed nothing to offer. To the Germans all these are merely belated admissions that the British have been wrong all the way through, and that they themselves are leading the way to a new and better world, however appalling the period of transition may be. The Germans know that what they still regard as the British tradition and their own new ideals are fundamentally opposed and irreconcilable views of life. They might be convinced that the way they have chosen was wrong—but nothing will ever convince them that the British will be better guides on the German path.

Least of all will that type of propaganda appeal to those Germans on whose help we must ultimately count in rebuilding Europe because their values are nearest to our own. For experience has made them wiser and sadder men: they have learnt that neither good intentions nor efficiency of organisation can preserve decency in a system in which personal freedom and individual responsibility are destroyed. What the German and Italian who have learned the lesson above all want is protection against the monster state—not grandiose schemes for organisation on a colossal scale, but opportunity peacefully and in freedom to build up once more his own little world. It is not because they believe that to be ordered about by the British is preferable to being ordered about by the Prussians, but because they believe that in a world where British ideals have been victorious they will be less ordered about and left in peace to pursue their own concerns, that we can hope for support from some of the nationals of the enemy countries.

If we are to succeed in the war of ideologies and to win over the decent elements in the enemy countries, we must first of all regain the belief in the traditional values for which this country stood in the past, and must have the moral courage stoutly to defend the ideals which our enemies attack. Not by shamefaced apologies and by assurances that we are rapidly reforming, not by explaining that we are seeking some compromise between the traditional English values and the new totalitarian ideas, shall we win confidence and support. Not the latest improvements we may have effected in our social institutions, which count but little compared with the basic differences of two opposed ways of life, but our unwavering faith in those traditions which have made this country a country of free and upright, tolerant and independent people, is the thing that counts.

不管怎样，相信以这样态度做宣传能够对我们的敌人、特别是德国人达到期望的效果，那是大错特错。德国人了解英国，也许不是特别深，但足以知道英国式生活的传统特色价值是什么，过去两、三代是什么逐渐把两国人民思想分割开来的。如果我们想说服他们，不仅仅出自我们的真诚，而且我们必须为他们走过的道路提供一个真正的替代，就不能对他们的思想体系让步。我们不应该借他们父辈思想的过时翻版去愚弄他们——无论是国家社会主义、“现实政治”、“科学”计划还是社团主义也好。我们不应该通过跟着他们在朝极权主义道路上走一半的方法对他们相劝。如果英国人自己放弃个人自由与幸福的最崇高理想，如果他们默认他们的文明不值得保留只知道最好就是跟着德国屁股后面走，他们真的没什么贡献可以做了。对德国人来说，所有这些不过是迟来地承认英国一直以来都是错的，不管过渡时期多么糟糕，他们自己才是走向崭新、美好世界的领头羊。德国人知道他们所认为的英国传统和他们自己的新思想是根本对立、不可调和两种人生观。他们也许会被说服他们选择的道路是错误的——但是他们绝不会相信德国的道路上英国人会是更好的向导。

对于那些价值观跟我们最接近，我们最终必须指望他们的帮助以重建欧洲的德国人来说，这类宣传尤其没有吸引力。经验让他们更明智、更伤感：他们知道在个人自由、个人责任被摧毁了的制度下，不论是良好的愿望还是高效的组织都不能让人安身立命。已经吸取了教训的德国人和意大利人是最想要的就是保护自己对抗庞大的政府——不是庞大组织的宏伟计划，而是再一次和平地、自由地建设自己小天地的机会。我们之所以能希望得到敌对国家的一些民众支持，不是因为他们相信宁愿受英国人而不愿受普鲁士人指挥，而是因为他们相信在英国理想致胜的世界里，他们会少受些命令、有更多的空间安心从事他们自己的追求。

如果我们要在意识形态战中取得胜利、赢得敌对国家正派人士的支持，我们必须首先恢复对英国过去传统价值的信心，必须有道德勇气坚决地维护我们的理想对抗敌人的攻击。要赢得信心和支持不是通过丢人的道歉、不是通过正在尽快改革的保证、不是通过解释说我们正在寻求一种传统英国价值和新的极权主义思想的折衷。我们所依靠的也不是最近对社会制度所做的改进，比起两种对立生活方式的天差地别这样的改进虽然有效但效果甚微，我们所依靠的是对英国传统信仰的不动摇，英国传统造就了这个国家，它的人民自由、正直、宽容和独立。