

15. THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Of all checks on democracy, federation has been the most efficacious and the most congenial The federal system limits and restrains the sovereign power by dividing it and by assigning to Government only certain defined rights. It is the only method of curbing not only the majority but the power of the whole people.

Lord Acton.

In no other field has the world yet paid so dearly for the abandonment of nineteenth-century liberalism as in the field where the retreat began: in international relations. Yet only a small part of the lesson which experience ought to have taught us has been learnt. Perhaps even more than elsewhere current notions of what is desirable and practicable are here still of a kind which may well produce the opposite of what they promise.

The part of the lesson of the recent past which is slowly and gradually being appreciated is that many kinds of economic planning, conducted independently on a national scale, are bound in their aggregate effect to be harmful even from a purely economic point of view, and in addition to produce serious international friction. That there is little hope of international order or lasting peace so long as every country is free to employ whatever measures it thinks desirable in its own immediate interest, however damaging they may be to others, needs little emphasis now. Many kinds of economic planning are indeed practicable only if the planning authority can effectively shut out all extraneous influences; the result of such planning is therefore inevitably the piling up of restrictions on the movements of men and goods.

Less obvious but by no means less real are the dangers to peace arising out of the artificially fostered economic solidarity of all the inhabitants of anyone country, and from the new blocks of opposed interests created by planning on a national scale. It is neither necessary nor desirable that national boundaries should mark sharp differences in standards of living, that membership of a national group should entitle to a share in a cake altogether different from that in which members of other groups share. If the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as wholes, if international economic relations, instead of being relations between individuals, become increasingly relations between whole nations organised as trading bodies, they inevitably become the source of friction and envy between whole nations. It is one of the most fatal illusions that by substituting negotiations between states or organised groups for competition for markets or for raw materials, international friction would be reduced. This would merely put a contest of force in the place of what can only metaphorically be called the "struggle" of competition, and transfer to powerful and armed states, subject to no superior law, the rivalries which between individuals had to be decided without recourse to force. Economic transactions between national bodies who are at the same time the supreme judges of their own behaviour, who bow to no superior law, and whose representatives cannot be bound by any considerations but the immediate interest of their respective nations, must end in clashes of power.¹

If we were to make no better use of victory than to countenance existing trends in this direction, only too visible before 1939, we might indeed find that we have defeated National-Socialism merely to create a world of many national socialisms, differing in detail, but all equally totalitarian, nationalistic, and in recurrent conflict with each other. The Germans would appear as the disturbers of peace, as they already do to some people², merely because they were the first to take the path along which all the others were ultimately to follow.

¹ On all these and on the following points, which can be touched upon only very briefly, see Professor Lionel Robbins's *Economic Planning and International Order*, 1937, *passim*.

15. 国际秩序的展望

检视民主，唯有联邦制最有效、最和谐 联邦制通过分割主权力，只把某些确定的权利授予政府来限制、约束权力。这是限制多数更是限制全体民众权力唯一方法。

阿克顿爵士

抛弃十九世纪自由主义，这个世界所付出的代价，在其它所有领域都不及在国际关系领域里高，国际关系已经开始退却。现实应该给我们的经验教训，还只有一小部分被吸取。也许，与其它地方相比，在国际关系领域那些什么是可取的、什么是可行的时下观念，仍然是那种可能导致与预期相反结果的观念。

最新的经验教训有部分慢慢地、逐渐地为人们所正确认识，那就是多国独立实施的各种国家层次的经济计划，总体效果而言，甚至纯粹从经济角度来看，注定有害无益，并且还附带产生了严重的国际摩擦。现在无需强调，只要各个国家不管对他国利益的损害、只从自己眼前利益出发随意地采用它自认为可取的办法措施，那国际秩序、长久和平就没有希望。只要计划部门能够有效地屏蔽一切外来影响，多种经济计划的确可行；那样计划的结果也因此不可避免的是对人货流动越来越多的限制。

任何国家全体居民人为造就的经济上的一块板、在国家规模上因计划而产生新的利益对立集团，对和平来说都是不那么明显但绝非不真实的威胁。国界两侧生活水平天差地别，凭一国国籍就有权享有跟别国人民完全不同的利益，既不必要也不可取。如果各国的资源被视作国家独有，国际经济关系，不再是两个国家人民之间的关系，逐渐变成国家作为贸易的一方与另一方的关系，它们就不可避免地成为国家之间摩擦、猜忌的根源。国家或者有组织的团体之间用协商的办法取代围绕市场、原材料的竞争会减少国际摩擦，是最要命的错觉之一。这只不过用真正权力的比拼替代只能在引申意义称作“斗争”的竞争，把个体之间无须诉诸于武力就可以解决的较劲转变成强大的、武装的国家之间没有更高层次规则约束的对抗。主权国家，自己裁定自身的行为，不听命于任何更高层次的法律，其代表只服务于各自所代表国家的眼前利益不受其它因素约束，国家与国家之间的买卖必然以权力的冲突而告终。

如果我们支持朝现有的趋势方向继续发展，这种趋势在 1939 年之前已经过于明显，而不是更好地利用战争的胜利果实，我们可能真的会发现，打败了德国纳粹仅仅是制造了一个有很多个纳粹的世界，细节虽然不同，但同样的极权主义、民族主义，而且互相之间冲突不断。德国人看起来是和平的破坏者，就象他们已经对某些民族这么做了，仅仅因为他们是第一个走上了这条其他民族最终也要跟着走的路而已。

² See particularly the significant book by James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, 1941

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Those who at least partly realise these dangers usually draw the conclusion that economic planning must be done "internationally", i.e. by some super-national authority. But though this would avert some of the obvious dangers raised by planning on a national scale, it seems that those who advocate such ambitious schemes have little conception of the even greater difficulties and dangers which their proposals create. The problems raised by a conscious direction of economic affairs on a national scale inevitably assume even greater dimensions when the same is attempted internationally. The conflict between planning and freedom cannot but become more serious as the similarity of standards and values among those submitted to a unitary plan diminishes. There need be little difficulty in planning the economic life of a family, comparatively little in a small community. But as the scale increases, the amount of agreement on the order of ends decreases and the necessity to rely on force and compulsion grows. In a small community common views on the relative importance of the main tasks, agreed standards of value, will exist on a great many subjects. But their number will become less and less the wider we throw the net: and as there is less community of views, the necessity to rely on force and coercion increases.

The people of anyone country may easily be persuaded to make a sacrifice in order to assist what they regard as "their" iron industry or "their" agriculture, or in order that in their country nobody should sink below a certain level. So long as it is a question of helping people whose habits of life and ways of thinking are familiar to us, of correcting the distribution of incomes among, or the working conditions of, people we can well imagine and whose views on their appropriate status are fundamentally similar to ours, we are usually ready to make some sacrifices. But one has only to visualise the problems raised by economic planning of even an area such as Western Europe to see that the moral bases for such an undertaking are completely lacking. Who imagines that there exist any common ideals of distributive justice such as will make the Norwegian fisherman consent to forgo the prospect of economic improvement in order to help his Portuguese fellow, or the Dutch worker to pay more for his bicycle to help the Coventry mechanic, or the French peasant to pay more taxes to assist the industrialisation of Italy?

If most people are not willing to see the difficulty this is mainly because, consciously or unconsciously, they assume that it will be they who will settle these questions for the others, and because they are convinced of their own capacity to do this justly and equitably. English people, perhaps even more than others, begin to realise what such schemes mean only when it is presented to them that they might be a minority in the planning authority, and that the main lines of the future economic development of Great Britain might be determined by a non-British majority. How many people in this country would be prepared to submit to the decision of an international authority, however democratically constituted, which had power to decree that the development of the Spanish iron industry must have precedence over similar development in South Wales, that the optical industry had better be concentrated in Germany to the exclusion of Great Britain, or that only fully refined petrol should be imported to Great Britain and all the industries connected with refining reserved for the producer countries?

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那些至少部分认识到这个危险的人通常下结论，经济计划必须在“国际”层面上实施，也就是，通过某些超国家的政府。尽管这样能避免某些在国家层面上进行计划所引起的明显问题，但是，看起来提倡那样一个雄心勃勃计划的人对他们方案会造成更大的困难和危险没有什么概念。在国家层面自觉指挥经济事务导致问题，在国际层面试图同样做的时候，肯定想得到，会导致更大规模的问题。当那些服从统一计划的人与人之间的标准和价值的相似性逐渐减少的时候，计划和自由的冲突只能变得更严重。计划一个家庭的经济生活没什么困难，计划一个小的社区困难也相对较小。但随着规模扩大，就诸多目标优先次序达成的一致就会减少，对权力、强迫的需要就会增加。在小社区，绝大多数人在主要任务相对重要性上存在共同的想法，价值标准也能认同。但撒网范围更大，看法一致的人数就会越来越少；当共同的想法越来越少，对权力和强迫的需要就增加。

任何一个国家的人民可能很容易被说服，为了支援他们认为是“他们的”钢铁工业或者“他们的”农业，或者为了他们国家没有人应该生活在某个水平之下，而作出牺牲。只要问题是帮助生活习性、思维方式对我们来说熟悉的人，为那些我们能够想象得到、社会观念基本跟我们相似的人改进收入分配或者改善工作条件，我们通常都甘心做出某些牺牲。但是只要想象一下在一个象西欧这样的地区由经济计划导致的问题，就会看到做出那样牺牲完全缺乏道德基础了。谁能想象一下有这样公平分配的共同理想，譬如为了帮助葡萄牙的渔民让挪威的渔民放弃经济增长的机会，为了帮助考文垂的机械工人荷兰工人为自行车多付钱，为了帮助意大利工业化法国农民多缴税？

如果大多数人不愿意面对这个困难，主要原因是，因为他们有意或者无意地认为是他们在帮助别人解决问题，并且他们相信他们有能力公正、公平的解决。英国人，只有当他们面对一个方案，其计划部门中英国人占少数，大不列颠未来经济发展的主要路线可能得由占多数的外国人来决定，他们也许会比其他国家人民更多地开始意识到那样一个计划意味着什么。一个国际机构，不论构成多么民主，如果它有权命令西班牙钢铁工业发展必须优先于南威尔士，光学工业最好集中在德国而英国不要参与，或者所有炼油相关工业保留在产油国而英国只能完全进口成品油，英国会有多少人准备服从这样一个机构的决定？

To imagine that the economic life of a vast area comprising many different people can be directed or planned by democratic procedure betrays a complete lack of awareness of the problems such planning would raise. Planning on an international scale, even more than is true on a national scale, cannot be anything but a naked rule of force, an imposition by a small group on all the rest of that sort of standard and employment which the planners think suitable for the rest. If anything is certain it is that *Grossraumwirtschaft* of the kind at which the Germans have been aiming can be successfully realised only by a master race, a *Herrenvolk*, ruthlessly imposing its aims and ideas on the rest. It is a mistake to regard the brutality and the disregard of all the wishes and ideals of the smaller people shown by the Germans simply as a sign of their special wickedness; it is the nature of the task they have assumed which makes these things inevitable. To undertake the direction of the economic life of people with widely divergent ideals and values is to assume responsibilities which commit one to the use of force; it is to assume a position where the best intentions cannot prevent one from being forced to act in a way which to some of those affected must appear highly immoral.³

This is true even if we assume the dominant power to be as idealistic and unselfish as we can possibly conceive. But how small is the likelihood that it will be unselfish, and how great are the temptations! I believe the standards of decency and fairness, particularly with regard to international affairs, to be as high, if not higher, in this than in any other country. Yet even now we can hear people arguing that victory must be used to create conditions in which British industry will be able to utilise to the full the particular equipment which it has built up during the war, that the reconstruction of Europe must be so directed as to fit in with the special requirements of the industries of this country, and to secure to everybody in this country the kind of employment for which he thinks himself most fit. The alarming thing about these suggestions is not that they are made, but that they are made in all innocence and regarded as a matter of course by decent people who are completely unaware of the moral enormity which the use of force for such purposes involves.⁴

幻想可以通过民主程序来指挥或者计划一个包含多民族的广大地区的经济生活透露出他们对计划将会导致的问题完全缺乏认识。在国际层面进行计划，比国家层面，更只可能是赤裸裸的权力游戏，小撮人将计划者认为合适的所谓标准、工作强加于其他所有民族身上。如果有什么可以肯定，那就是象纳粹宣扬的那种，德国人一直以来为之奋斗的大规模经济，只能通过统治民族把自己的目标、思想无情地强加在其他民族身上才能成功实现的。德国人对其他弱小民族残忍，无视其他民族的愿望与理想，把这些视作德国人邪恶的标志是错误的；是他们所承担任务的本质使得这些不可避免。大家的理想、价值天壤之别，指挥其经济生活就是承担起责任，责任托付于权力；想得到，状况就是，愿望再良好也不得不被迫以在受害者看来高度不道德的方式做事。

即使我们假定统治权力象我们设想的那样理想、无私，结果也是一样。无私的可能性有多小？诱惑有多大！我相信英国人正派和公道的水准，特别是在国际事务中，至少和其它国家人一样高。然而，即使是现在，我们总能听到人们辩称，必须利用战争的胜利果实来创造条件，使英国工业能够充分利用起战争中建造的专门设备；必须按照符合英国工业的特殊要求来指挥欧洲的重建；必须保证每一个英国人找到他自认为最合适的工作。这些建议最让人担忧的不是提出建议本身，而是体面人物提出这些建议单纯、理所当然的态度，完全没有意识到了这些目使用权力所涉及的道德严重性。

³ The experience in the colonial sphere, of this country as much as of any other, has amply shown that even the mild forms of planning which we know as colonial development involve, whether we wish it or not, the imposition of certain values and ideals on those whom we try to assist. It is, indeed, this experience which has made even the most internationally minded of colonial experts so very sceptical of the practicability of an "international" administration of colonies.

⁴ If anyone should still fail to see the difficulties, or cherish the belief that with a little good will they can all be overcome, it will help if he tries to follow the implications of central direction of economic activity applied

on a world scale. Can there be much doubt that this would mean a more or less conscious endeavour to secure the dominance of the white man, and would rightly be so regarded by all other races? Till I find a sane person who seriously believes that the European races will voluntarily submit to their standard of life and rate of progress being determined by a World Parliament, I cannot regard such plans as anything but absurd. But this does unfortunately not preclude that particular measures, which could be justified only if the principle of world direction were a feasible ideal, are seriously advocated.

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Perhaps the most powerful agent in creating the belief in the possibility of a single central direction by democratic means of the economic life of many different peoples is the fatal delusion that if the decisions were left to the "people", the community of interest of the working classes would readily overcome the differences which exist between the ruling classes. There is every reason to expect that with world planning the clash of economic interests which arises now about the economic policy of anyone nation would in fact appear in even fiercer form as a clash of interests between whole peoples which could be decided only by force. On the questions which an international planning authority would have to decide, the interests and opinions of the working classes of the different people will inevitably be as much in conflict, and there will be even less of a commonly accepted basis for an equitable settlement, than there is with respect to different classes in anyone country. To the worker in a poor country the demand of his more fortunate colleague to be protected against his low wage competition by minimum wage legislation, supposedly in his interest, is frequently no more than a means to deprive him of his only chance to better his conditions by overcoming natural disadvantages by working at wages lower than his fellows in other countries. And to him the fact that he has to give the product of ten hours of his labour for the product of five hours of the man elsewhere who is better equipped with machinery is as much "exploitation" as that practised by any capitalist.

It is fairly certain that in a planned international system the wealthier and therefore most powerful nations would to a very much greater degree than in a free economy become the object of hatred and envy of the poorer ones: and the latter, rightly or wrongly, would all be convinced that their position could be improved much more quickly if they were only free to do what they wished. Indeed, if it comes to be regarded as the duty of the international authority to bring about distributive justice between the different peoples, it is no more than a consistent and inevitable development of socialist doctrine that class strife would become a struggle between the working classes of the different countries.

There is at present a great deal of muddle-headed talk about "planning to equalise standards of life". It is instructive to consider in a little more detail one of these proposals to see what precisely it involves. The area for which at the present moment our planners are particularly fond of drawing up such schemes is the Danube Basin and South-Eastern Europe. There can be no doubt about the urgent need for amelioration of economic conditions in this region, from humanitarian and economic considerations as well as in the interest of the future peace of Europe, nor that this can be achieved only in a political setting different from that of the past. But this is not the same thing as to wish to see economic life in this region to be directed according to a single master plan, to foster the development of the different industries according to a schedule laid down beforehand in a way which makes the success of local initiative dependent on being approved by the central authority and being incorporated in its plan. One cannot, for example, create a kind of "Tennessee Valley Authority" for the Danube Basin without thereby determining beforehand for many years to come the relative rate of progress of the different races inhabiting this area, or without subordinating all their individual aspirations and wishes to this task.

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相信通过民主的方法有可能集中统一指挥多民族的经济生活，产生这个想法最大的原因可能是一个致命的错觉，那就是如果把决定权留给“人民”，那么工人阶级的共同利益很容易克服统治阶级之间存在的分歧。每一个理由都让我们相信，世界范围的计划下，现在出现的任何国家经济政策相关的经济利益冲突事实上都会以更激烈的形式出现，因为人民作为整体之间的利益冲突只能通过武力解决。就国际计划必须解决的问题而言，各个国家工人阶级之间的利益与意见冲突一样多，比起一国之内不同阶级之间，公平解决这些冲突更缺乏能共同接受的基础。对一个穷国家的工人而言，其它富裕国家的同行要求通过最低工资立法保护来自他低工资的竞争，说是为了他好，往往只是剥夺他只有通过较低工资才能克服不利自然条件改善生存状况这唯一机会的一种手段。并且，对他而言，其他地方配备了机器的工人工作五个小时生产的产品，他不得不花费十个小时的劳力，这与所有资本家做的一样都是“剥削”。

可以相当肯定，比起自由经济来说，在有计划的国际制度下，较为富有因而最有影响力的国家更大程度上会成为较贫穷国家仇恨和嫉妒的目标：或对或错，穷者会全部相信如果他们能自主想做做的事，他们的境况能提高得快很多。确实，如果考虑把不同国家人民之间的公平分配作为国际机构的职责，社会主义学说一贯、必然的发展无非就是将阶级冲突变成不同国家工人阶级之间的斗争。

现在有大量关于“为生活标准整齐划一而计划”的糊涂讨论。了解一下其中一个方案的多点细节，看看它确切包括哪些内容，有意义。现在我们计划者特别喜欢画蓝图做方案的地区就是多瑙河谷和东南欧。毫无疑问，出自人道主义和经济考量，也为了欧洲未来的和平，改善该地区经济条件需求迫切；要达到这个目标只有通过改变政治环境，也没有疑问。但这并不等同于希望见到，统一计划该地区的经济生活，以一种当地项目的成功完全依赖于能否得到中央政府的批准、能否融入中央政府计划的方式，按事先制定的日程安排扶植各项产业发展。譬如，如果不事先决定未来几年该地区居住的各个民族相对发展速度、不为此压制民族各自的抱负与愿望，不可能在多瑙河谷创建象“田纳西河谷管理局”之类的机构。

Planning of this kind must of necessity begin by fixing an order of priorities of the different claims. To plan for the deliberate equalisation of standards of living means that the different claims must be ranked according to merit, that some must be given precedence over others, and that the latter must wait their turn—even though those whose interests are thus relegated may be convinced, not only of their better right, but also of their ability to reach their goal sooner if they were only given freedom to act on their own devices. There exists no basis which allows us to decide whether the claims of the poor Rumanian peasant are more or less urgent than those of the still poorer Albanian, or the needs of the Slovakian mountain shepherd greater than those of his Slovenian colleague. But if the raising of their standards of life is to be effected according to a unitary plan, somebody must deliberately balance the merits of all these claims and decide between them. And once such a plan is put into execution, all the resources of the planned area must serve that plan—there can be no exemption for those who feel they could do better for themselves. Once their claim has been given a lower rank, they will have to work for the prior satisfaction of the needs of those who have been given preference. In such a state of affairs everybody will rightly feel that he is worse off than he might be if some other plan had been adopted, and that it is the decision and the might of the dominant powers which have condemned him to a place less favourable than he thinks is due to him. To attempt such a thing in a region peopled by small nations, each of which believes equally fervently in its own superiority over the others, is to undertake a task which can be performed only by the use of force. What it would amount to in practice is that British decisions and British power would have to settle whether the standards of the Macedonian or the Bulgarian peasant should be raised faster, whether the Czech or the Hungarian miner should more rapidly approach Western standards. It does not need much knowledge of human nature, and certainly only a little knowledge of the people of Central Europe, to see that whatever the decision imposed, there will be many, probably a majority, to whom the particular order chosen will appear supreme injustice, and that their common hatred will soon turn against the power which, however disinterestedly, in fact decides their fate.

Though there are no doubt many people who honestly believe that if they were allowed to handle the job they would be able to settle all these problems justly and impartially, and who would be genuinely surprised to find suspicion and hatred turning against them, they would probably be the first to apply force when those whom they mean to benefit prove recalcitrant, and to show themselves quite ruthless in coercing people in what is presumed to be their own interests. What these dangerous idealists do not see is that where the assumption of a moral responsibility involves that one's moral views should by force be made to prevail over those dominant in other communities, the assumption of such responsibility may place one in a position in which it becomes impossible to act morally. To impose such an impossible moral task on the victorious nations is a certain way morally to corrupt and discredit them.

By all means let us assist the poorer people as much as we can in their own efforts to build up their lives and to raise their standards of living. An international authority can be very just and contribute enormously to economic prosperity if it merely keeps order and creates conditions in which the people can develop their own life; but it is impossible to be just or to let people live their own life if the central authority doles out raw materials and allocates markets, if every spontaneous effort has to be "approved" and nothing can be done without the sanction of the central authority.

这种计划必然从排定各种需求的优先次序开始。为了有意地统一生活标准进行计划意味着不同的要求必须按资格排序，有的优先有的靠后，靠后的必须等着轮到他们的时候；利益优先次序因此降低的人可能认为，不仅仅他们应该有更大的权利，而且只要给予他们自主的权利，以他们的能力能更快达到目标。我们没有根据来决定贫穷的罗马尼亚农民比现在更穷的阿尔巴尼亚农民的要求是否更迫切，斯洛伐克山区牧民比斯洛文尼亚牧民需要是否更基本。但是如果生活标准的提高都按统一的标准，那么必须有人来特意平衡他们所有的需求并选择决定。并且，一旦这样一个计划付诸实施，所计划区域内全部资源都必须服务于这个计划——那些感觉自己能做做得更好的也不例外。一旦他们的要求排名靠后，他们必须为优先满足那些排名靠前的人的需要而工作。在那样的事态下，每一个人都会合情合理地想，不如采取其他的计划，而正是统治者的强权和决定把他判在现在位置，比他应得的差。在一个由多个国家组成的地区试图这样做，每一个国家都同等狂热地相信他们比别的国家更有优先权，任务实施就只能通过采取强制手段。事实上，这会发展到，不得不由英国的决定和英国的权力来解决马其顿还是保加利亚平哪个的农民生活水应该提高更快，捷克还是匈牙利哪个的矿工应该更快接近西方标准的问题。无需对人性有深入的了解，只要稍微了解一些中欧人民，就会看到，无论强加的决定是什么，在很多很可能是大多数看来，选择给他们的命令是极度不公平的，很快他们会把共同的仇恨发泄在无论如何无私也是决定其命运的权力上。

无疑，很多人真诚地相信如果让他们来处理他们能够公正、公平地解决所有这些问题，很多人发现猜忌和仇恨转向他们的时候真地诧异，然而，当看到他们想帮助的人采取不合作的态度时，他们很可能就是最先使用强制手段的人，在强迫别人接受假定对其有利的决定时表现得十分无情。这些危险的理想主义者没有看到的是，承担道德责任涉及到在其它社会强行推广其道德观，承担那样的责任可能将他置于不可能道德行为的境地。将那样一个不可能的道德任务交给战胜国肯定是一条让其道德败坏、名誉受损的路。

让我们尽我们所能采取各种办法去帮助较贫困民族，让他们通过自己的努力建设他们的生活并提高他们的生活水平。一个国际机构如果仅限于维持秩序、为人民改善自己生活创造条件，他们就能保持十分公正并且对经济繁荣贡献良多；如果中央政府调拨原材料、分配市场，每一项自发行动都要“批准”，政府不同意事情没法做，那不可能公正，人民不可能安居乐业。

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After the discussions in earlier chapters it is hardly necessary to stress that these difficulties cannot be met by conferring on the various international authorities "merely" specific economic powers. The belief that this is a practical solution rests on the fallacy that economic planning is merely a technical task, which can be solved in a strictly objective manner by experts, and that the really vital things would still be left in the hands of the political authorities. Any international economic authority, not subject to a superior political power, even if strictly confined to a particular field, could easily exercise the most tyrannical and irresponsible power imaginable. Exclusive control of an essential commodity or service (as, for example, air transport) is in effect one of the most far-reaching powers which can be conferred on any authority. And as there is scarcely anything which could not be justified by "technical necessities" which no outsider could effectively question—or even by humanitarian and possibly entirely sincere arguments about the needs of some specially ill-favoured group which could not be helped in any other way—there is little possibility of controlling that power. The kind of organisation of the resources of the world under more or less autonomous bodies, which now so often finds favour in the most surprising quarters, a system of comprehensive monopolies recognised by all of the national governments, but subject to none, would inevitably become the worst of all conceivable rackets—even if those entrusted with their administration should prove the most faithful guardians of the particular interests placed in their care.

One need only seriously consider the full implications of such apparently innocuous proposals, widely regarded as the essential basis of the future economic order, such as the conscious control and distribution of the supply of essential raw materials, in order to see what appalling political difficulties and moral dangers they create. The controller of the supply of any such raw material as petrol or timber, rubber or tin, would be the master of the fate of whole industries and countries. In deciding whether to allow the supply to increase and the price or the income of the producers to fall, he would decide whether some country is to be allowed to start some new industry or whether it is to be precluded from doing so. While he "protects" the standards of life of those he regards as specially entrusted to his care, he will deprive many who are in a much worse position of their best and perhaps only chance to improve it. If all essential raw materials were thus controlled there would indeed be no new industry, no new venture on which the people of a country could embark without the permission of the controllers, no plan for development or improvement which could not be frustrated by their veto. The same is true of international arrangement for "sharing" of markets and even more so of the control of investment and the development of natural resources.

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经过前面这些章节的讨论，基本无需强调，“仅仅”把特定的经济权力授予各种国际机构无法应付这些困难。相信这是一个切实可行的解决办法基于一个谬论，那就是经济计划只是技术性任务，能够由专家以严格客观的方式来解决，真正重要的事情仍将掌握在政府手中。任何国际经济机构，不服从一个上级政权，即使严格限制在特定领域，可以想象，很容易会最专横、最不负责任地使用权力。排他控制某项基本物资或者服务（譬如机场）实际上是能授予政府部门影响范围最大的权力之一。并且，外行无法有效质疑“技术上的必要”，进而没有什么事情不可以借之以合法化——或者甚至通过人道主义和可能完全真诚的理由为一些特别不受欢迎的、没有其他办法的团体的需求辩护——因此几乎不可能控制这样的权力。现在发现在一些最让人感到意外的地方大受欢迎的，那种或多或少处于自治下的世界资源组织，为所有国家政府都承认、却没有一个政府负责的全面垄断系统，它将不可避免地成为可以想象的干扰中最糟的——即使是信托机构也应该证明，对所负责具体利益，他们是最忠实的监护人。

那些貌似无害、被广泛认为是未来经济秩序基础的建议，譬如基本原材料供应的自觉管控和分配，要了解它们会造成怎样恶劣的政治困难和道德危机，只要认真考虑一下它们意味着什么。控制象汽油或者木材、橡胶或者锡那些原材料供应的人就是整个行业和国家命运的主宰者。在决定是否允许增加供应或者是否允许生产商降价、减少收入当中，他将决定某些国家是否可以开启某个新兴产业或者是否将事先排除在外。当他“保护”他认为被托付给他以特别照顾的人的生活水准时，他将剥夺很多境况糟得多的人改善其处境的最佳机会也可能是唯一的机会。如果所有基本原材料都这样被控制，真的，没有控制人的许可，不会有一个国家人民可以参与的新行业、新风投，没有发展或者提高的计划不会因他们的否决而无可奈何。对于旨在“分享”市场的国际性安排同样如此，对于自然资源投资与开发的管控更是如此。

It is curious to observe how those who pose as the most hardboiled realists, and who lose no opportunity of casting ridicule on the "utopianism" of those who believe in the possibility of an international political order, yet regard as more practicable the much more intimate and irresponsible interference with the lives of the different peoples which economic planning involves; and believe that, once hitherto undreamed-of power is given to an international government, which has just been represented as not even capable of enforcing a simple Rule of Law, this greater power will be used in so unselfish and so obviously just a manner as to command general consent. If anything is evident it should be that, while nations might abide by formal rules on which they have agreed, they will never submit to the direction which international economic planning involves—that while they may agree on the rules of the game, they will never agree on the order of preference in which the rank of their own needs and the rate at which they are allowed to advance is fixed by majority vote. Even if, at first, the peoples should, under some illusion about the meaning of such proposals, agree to transfer such powers to an international authority, they would soon find out that what they have delegated is not merely a technical task, but the most comprehensive power over their very lives.

What is evidently at the back of the minds of the not altogether unpracticable "realists" who advocate these schemes is that, while the great Powers will be unwilling to submit to any superior authority, they will be able to use those "international" authorities to impose their will on the smaller nations within the area in which they exercise hegemony. There is so much "realism" in this that by thus camouflaging the planning authorities as "international" it might be easier to achieve the condition under which international planning is alone practicable, namely, that it is in effect done by one single predominant power. This disguise would, however, not alter the fact that for all the smaller states it would mean a much more complete subjection to an external power, to which no real resistance would any longer be possible, than would be involved in the renunciation of a clearly defined part of political sovereignty.

It is significant that the most passionate advocates of a centrally directed economic New Order for Europe should display, like their Fabian and German prototypes, the most complete disregard of the individuality and of the rights of small nations. The views of Professor Carr, who in this sphere even more than in that of internal policy is representative of the trend towards totalitarianism in this country, have already made one of his professional colleagues ask the very pertinent question: "If the Nazi way with small sovereign states is indeed to become the common form, what is the war about?"⁵ Those who have observed how much disquiet and alarm some recent utterances on these questions in papers as different as *The Times* and the *New Statesman*⁶ have caused among our smaller Allies will have little doubt how much this attitude is even now resented among our closest friends, and how easy it will be to dissipate the stock of goodwill which has been laid up during the war if these advisers are followed.

很好奇地想看看，那些抓住一切机会对相信国际政治秩序有可能的“乌托邦主义”冷嘲热讽、难以对付的现实主义者，如何还认为经济计划所涉及的对各族人民更加直接、不负责任的干涉更切实可行；如何相信一旦迄今为止从未想象过的权力被授予一个国际性政府，这个政府甚至不能强制实行简单的法治，这个更大的权力能够以无私、显然公正的方式取得普遍的赞同。如果有什么是显然的，那就是这些国家可能会遵守他们同意的形式规则，但他们绝不会服从国际经济计划的指挥——他们可能同意游戏的规则，但绝不会同意优先次序，他们自己需求的缓重、被允许发展的速度由多数投票决定。甚至，最初，人们可能基于对方案意义的某些幻想，同意将权力转交给国际机构，他们很快就会发现，他们所委托出去的不仅仅是技术性任务，而是凌驾于他们每一个人生活之上最全面的权力。

倡导这个方案的那些并非完全不切实际的“现实主义”背后的想法显然是，大国将不愿服从任何上一级政府，但他们能用这些“国际”机构的形式来把他们的意志强加于他们霸权区域内的小国身上。这里有很多“现实主义”的成分，通过将计划部门伪装成“国际的”，更容易创造条件其中国际性计划自己就可以切实可行，换句话说，实际上占统治地位的单一大国说了算。不管怎样，这个伪装并不改变一个事实，对众多小国来说，它更意味着全面服从于不再可能真正抗拒的外部强权，而不是丧失部分清晰界定的政治主权。

集中指挥经济也就是欧洲新秩序最热衷的拥护者，象他们的费边主义和德国鼻祖一样，应会表现出对小国个性和权利的最完全漠视，这很有重要。卡尔教授的观点，在国际关系领域比起在内政方面更能代表英国朝极权主义发展的倾向，已经引起他的同事提出了一个非常中肯地问题：“如果纳粹对待主权小国的方式真的成为了一种普遍的形式，战争为了什么啊？”《泰晤士报》和《新政治家》这样不同的报纸就这些问题最近发表的言论在我们的小国盟友中引起多少的不安和焦急，那些看到这一点的人将不会怀疑，我们最亲密的朋友现在对这种态度有多愤慨，如果听从这些人建议，很容易白白浪费战争期间积累下来的善意。

⁵ Professor C. A. W. Manning, in a review of Professor Carr's *Conditions of Peace* in the *International Affairs Review Supplement*, June 1942.

⁶ It is significant in more than one respect that, as was recently observed in one of the weekly journals, "one had already begun to expect a touch of the Carr flavour in the *New Statesman* pages as well as in those of *The Times*" ("Four Winds" in *Time and Tide*, February 20, 1943).

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Those who are so ready to ride roughshod over the rights of small states are, of course, right in one thing: we cannot hope for order or lasting peace after this war if states, large or small, regain unfettered sovereignty in the economic sphere. But this does not mean that a new super-state must be given powers which we have not learnt to use intelligently even on a national scale, that an international authority ought to be given power to direct individual nations how to use their resources. It means merely that there must be a power which can restrain the different nations from action harmful to their neighbours, a set of rules which defines what a state may do, and an authority capable of enforcing these rules. The powers which such an authority would need are mainly of a negative kind: it must above all be able to say "no" to all sorts of restrictive measures.

Far from its being true that, as is now widely believed, we need an international economic authority while the states can at the same time retain their unrestricted political sovereignty, almost exactly the opposite is true. What we need and can hope to achieve is not more power in the hands of irresponsible international economic authorities, but, on the contrary, a superior political power which can hold the economic interests in check, and in the conflict between them can truly hold the scales, because it is itself not mixed up in the economic game. The need is for an international political authority which, without power to direct the different people what they must do, must be able to restrain them from action which will damage others. The powers which must devolve on an international authority are not the new powers assumed by the states in recent times, but that minimum of powers without which it is impossible to preserve peaceful relationships, i.e. essentially the powers of the ultra liberal "*laissez-faire*" state. And even more than in the national sphere, it is essential that these powers of the international authority should be strictly circumscribed by the Rule of Law. The need for such a super-national authority becomes indeed greater as the individual states more and more become units of economic administration, the actors rather than merely the supervisors of the economic scene, and as therefore any friction is likely to arise not between individuals but between states as such.

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当然，那些准备好践踏小国权利的人，有一件事是对的：如果各国不管大小重新获得了经济领域里无约束的主权，战后我们难以指望有秩序或者持久的和平。但这并不意味着，必须把我们甚至还没有学会如何在国家层面明智使用的权力给予一个新的超级国家；并不意味着应该给予国际机构权力让他们指导各个独立国家如何使用其资源。它仅仅意味着必须有权力能约束各个国家，使其行为不要伤害邻国，必须定义一系列的规则明确一个国家可以做什么，必须有一个机构能够强制实施这些规则。那样的机构需要的权力主要是是否决性的：它首先必须能够对各种限制性措施说“不”。

现在广泛相信的是，在保留各个国家无限制的政治主权的同时，我们需要一个国际性的经济机构，这远远不对，反过来才对。我们所需要和希望能得以实现的不是将更多权力置于不负责任的国际经济机构手中，相反，所需要的是一个上级政治机构，能够约束各经济利益，在经济纷争中能确实把握公平，之所以如此，因为它自身不卷入经济游戏。所需要的是这样一个国际政治机构，无权指挥各民族他们必须做什么，但必须能约束他们不做损害他人的行为。下放给国际机构的权力不是各个国家新近取得的权力，而是没有它就不能维持和平关系的最低限度的权力，基本上就是“自由放任”极度自由主义国家的权力。比在国家范围内更甚的是，根本的一点是国际机构的权力必须严格为法治所限定。当各个独立国家逐渐成为经济管理的单元，成为经济场景中的玩家而不再仅仅是监管，摩擦不是可能出现在不是个人之间而是国家之间而时，就真的更需要这样一个超国家的机构。

The form of international government under which certain strictly defined powers are transferred to an international authority, while in all other respects the individual countries remain responsible for their internal affairs, is, of course, that of federation. We must not allow the numerous ill-considered and often extremely silly claims made on behalf of a federal organisation of the whole world during the height of the propaganda for "Federal Union" to obscure the fact that the principle of federation is the only form of association of different peoples which will create an international order without putting an undue strain on their legitimate desire for independence⁷. Federalism is, of course, nothing but the application to international affairs of democracy, the only method of peaceful change man has yet invented. But it is a democracy with definitely limited powers. Apart from the more impracticable ideal of fusing different countries into a single centralised state (the desirability of which is far from obvious) it is the only way in which the ideal of international law can be made a reality. We must not deceive ourselves that in calling in the past the rules of international behaviour international law we were doing more than expressing a pious wish. When we want to prevent people from killing each other we are not content to issue a declaration that killing is undesirable, but we give an authority power to prevent it. In the same way there can be no international law without a power to enforce it. The obstacle to the creation of such an international power was very largely the idea that it need command all the practically unlimited powers which the modern state possesses. But with the division of power under the federal system this is by no means necessary.

This division of power would inevitably act at the same time also as a limitation of the power of the whole as well as of the individual state. Indeed many of the kinds of planning which are now fashionable would probably become altogether impossible. But it would by no means constitute an obstacle to all planning. It is, in fact, one of the main advantages of federation that it can be so devised as to make most of the harmful planning difficult while leaving the way free for all desirable planning. It prevents, or can be made to prevent, most forms of restrictionism. And it confines international planning to the fields where true agreement can be reached—not only between the "interests" immediately concerned, but among all those affected. The desirable forms of planning which can be effected locally and without the need of restrictive measures, are left free and in the hands of those best qualified to undertake it. It is even to be hoped that within a federation, where there will no longer exist the same reasons for making the individual states as strong as possible, the process of centralisation of the past may in some measure be reversed and some devolution of powers from the state to the local authorities become possible.

把某些严格定义的权力转交给国际组织，在其他所有方面，各个国家对内务自行负责，这种国际政府的形式当然是联邦制。我们不应允许，在高度宣传“邦联”的情况下，以全世界联邦组织的名义提出许许多多欠考虑、常常极为愚蠢的要求，这样会模糊一个事实，即联邦原则是联合各族人民、建立国际秩序、对独立的合理要求不非法压制的唯一形式。当然，联邦主义只不过是民主制度应用于国际事务，是人类迄今发明的和平改变的唯一方法。但是，它是权力明确有限的民主制度。除了将不同国家融合成一个中央集权国家这样不太切实可行的想法（没有明显吸引力），这是实践国际法理想的唯一途径。我们不要自己骗自己，过去把国际行为规则叫做国际法，只不过表达了虔诚的愿望，做得并不多。当我们想要防止人们相互残杀，我们不能只发一个申明，杀戮不可取，我们给与政府权力去阻止它。同样，没有权力去强制执行，就不可能有国际法。建立那样一个国际权力机构最大的障碍很大程度上就是它要拥有现代国家所拥有的实际上无限的权力的观念。但在联邦制度分权的基础上，这完全不必要了。

权力的分割必然会限制整体的权力，同时限制各个成员国的权力。的确，现在流行的很多计划就很可能都变得完全不可能了。但是它绝不可能阻止所有的计划。事实上，正是联邦制的优点之一，能够设计该制度使得大多数有害的计划难以实施，而给所有可取的计划留有方便之门。它防止或者我们能使之防止多数形式的限制主义。并且，它可以将国际性计划限制在能够真正取得一致的领域——不仅仅是直接相关的“利益”方之间，而是所有利害相关方之间达成一致。本地起作用的、无需限制的计划可以在形式上自由、并且任务由最有资格的人承担。甚至可以期望在联邦内部，同样地消除成员国尽可能做大做强的理由，过去集权的过程可以在某种程度上逆转，权力从国家下放到处地方政府成为可能。

⁷ It is a great pity that the flood of federalist publications which in recent years has descended upon us has deprived the few important and thoughtful works among them of the attention they deserved. One which in

particular ought to be carefully consulted when the time comes for the framing of a new political structure of Europe is Dr. W. Ivor Jennings's small book on A Federation for Western Europe (1940).

It is worth recalling that the idea of the world at last finding peace through the absorption of the separate states in large federated groups and ultimately perhaps in one single federation, far from being new, was indeed the ideal of almost all the liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century. From Tennyson, whose much quoted vision of the "battle of the air" is followed by a vision of the federation of the people which will follow their last great fight, right down to the end of the century the final achievement of a federal organisation remained the ever-recurring hope of a next great step in the advance of civilisation. Nineteenth-century liberals may not have been fully aware how essential a complement of their principles a federal organisation of the different states formed⁸; but there were few among them who did not express their belief in it as an ultimate goal⁹. It was only with the approach of our twentieth century that before the triumphant rise of Realpolitik these hopes came to be regarded as unpracticable and utopian.

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We shall not rebuild civilisation on the large scale. It is no accident that on the whole there was more beauty and decency to be found in the life of the small peoples, and that among the large ones there was more happiness and content in proportion as they had avoided the deadly blight of centralisation. Least of all shall we preserve democracy or foster its growth if all the power and most of the important decisions rest with an organisation far too big for the common man to survey or comprehend. Nowhere has democracy ever worked well without a great measure of local self-government, providing a school of political training for the people at large as much as for their future leaders. It is only where responsibility can be learnt and practised in affairs with which most people are familiar, where it is the awareness of one's neighbour rather than some theoretical knowledge of the needs of other people which guides action, that the ordinary man can take a real part in public affairs because they concern the world he knows. Where the scope of the political measures becomes so large that the necessary knowledge is almost exclusively possessed by the bureaucracy, the creative impulses of the private person must flag. I believe that here the experience of the small countries like Holland and Switzerland contains much from which even the most fortunate larger countries like Great Britain can learn. We shall all be the gainers if we can create a world fit for small states to live in.

But the small can preserve their independence in the international as in the national sphere only within a true system of law which guarantees both that certain rules are invariably enforced and that the authority which has the power to enforce these cannot use it for any other purpose. While for its task of enforcing the common law the super-national authority must be very powerful, its constitution must at the same time be so designed that it prevents the international as well as the national authorities from becoming tyrannical. We shall never prevent the abuse of power if we are not prepared to limit power in a way which occasionally may also prevent its use for desirable purposes. The great opportunity we shall have at the end of this war is that the great victorious powers, by themselves first submitting to a system of rules which they have the power to enforce, may at the same time acquire the moral right to impose the same rules upon others.

值得回想一下，通过将各个独立国家吸收进大型的联邦集团、最终也许就是一个单一的联邦，以实现世界最终和平的想法，远不是新想法，实际上是十九世纪几乎所有自由主义思想家的理想。从丁尼生常常被引用的“空战”想法开始，接下来就是人们希望在一战后建立联邦制的想法，直到十九世纪末，但联邦组织最新的成果就是对文明进步中下一大步一再抱有的希望。十九世纪的自由主义者可能没有完全意识到一个由不同国家组成的联邦是对其自由主义原则何等重要的一个补充；但是他们当中几乎没有人没表示过他们相信联邦是终极目标。仅在二十世纪来临，现实政治嚣张之前，这些希望开始被认为是不可行的、乌托邦式的。

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我们不会大规模地重建文明。总的来说，当避免了中央集权的致命破坏，在小国人民身上会看到更多的美好和体面，在大国人民身上看到相应更多的幸福和满足，这绝非偶然。如果所有的权力、重要的决定都由一个大到远非普通人可以量度、理解程度的组织来独揽，就不用说保护和培植民主了。任何没有很大程度上实现地方自治、没有学校为广大群众和他们未来的领袖提供政治培训的地方，没见民主成功过。只有学会对大多数人熟悉的事务负责并付诸实践，只有当邻居的觉察而不是关于其他民族需求的某些理论知识来指导行动时，普通人才能真正参与公共事务，因为人只关心自己了解的世界。当政治措施的范围变大以至于必要的知识几乎只为官僚机构所掌握时，必须注意个人原发性的行为。在这里我相信，一些小国家譬如荷兰、瑞士的经验，有很多内容值得象英国这样最幸运的大国所学习。如果我们能建立一个适合小国生存的世界，对大家都有利。

但是小国要在国际领域保持和内政一样的独立性只有通过真正的法治制度，只有法治才可以保证两点，确定的规则能被不折不扣的执行，有权执行这些的政府不能把权力用于其它目的。为了执行共同的法律，超国家政府的权力必须很大，但是同时其章程的设计必须避免国际、国家政府成为独裁。限制权力偶尔也会影响权力服务于希望的目的，如果我们不愿意采用这样的方式限制权力，将无法避免滥用权力。二战的结束，我们将有一个很好的机会，战胜国通过自己首先服从一个他们有权强制执行的规章制度，可以同时取得道德权利从而把同样的规则加之于其它国家身上。

⁸ See on this Professor Robbins's already quoted book, pp. 240-57.

⁹ As late as the closing years of the nineteenth century Henry Sidgwick thought it "not beyond the limits of a sober forecast to conjecture that some future integration may take place in the West European states: and

if it should take place, it seems probable that the example of America will be followed, and that the new political aggregate will be formed on the basis of a federal polity" (*The Development of European Polity*, published posthumously in 1903, p. 439).

An international authority which effectively limits the powers of the state over the individual will be one of the best safeguards of peace. The international Rule of Law must become a safeguard as much against the tyranny of the state over the individual as against the tyranny of the new super-state over the national communities. Neither an omnipotent super-state, nor a loose association of "free nations", but a community of nations of free men must be our goal. We have long pleaded that it had become impossible to behave in international affairs as we thought it desirable because others would not play the game. The coming settlement will be the opportunity to show that we have been sincere and that we are prepared to accept the same restrictions on our freedom of action which in the common interest we think it necessary to impose upon others.

Wisely used, the federal principle of organisation may indeed prove the best solution of some of the world's most difficult problems. But its application is a task of extreme difficulty and we are not likely to succeed if in an over-ambitious attempt we strain it beyond its capacity. There will probably exist a strong tendency to make any new international organisation all-comprehensive and world-wide; and there will, of course, be an imperative need for some such comprehensive organisation, some new League of Nations. The great danger is that, if in the attempt to rely exclusively on this world organisation it is charged with all the tasks which it seems desirable to place in the hands of an international organisation, they will not in fact be adequately performed. It has always been my conviction that such ambitions were at the root of the weakness of the League of Nations: that in the (unsuccessful) attempt to make it world-wide it had to be made weak, and that a smaller and at the same time more powerful League might have been a better instrument to preserve peace. I believe that these considerations still hold and that a degree of co-operation could be achieved between, say, the British Empire and the nations of Western Europe and probably the United States which would not be possible on a world scale. The comparatively close association which a Federal Union represents will not at first be practicable beyond perhaps even as narrow a region as part of Western Europe, though it may be possible gradually to extend it.

It is true that with the formation of such regional federations the possibility of war between the different blocs still remains, and that to reduce this risk as much as possible we must rely on a larger and looser association. My point is that the need for some such other organisation should not form an obstacle to a closer association of those countries which are more similar in their civilisation, outlook, and standards. While we must aim at preventing future wars as much as possible, we must not believe that we can at one stroke create a permanent organisation which will make all war in any part of the world entirely impossible. We should not only not succeed in such an attempt, but we should thereby probably spoil our chances of achieving success in a more limited sphere. As is true with respect to other great evils, the measures by which war might be made altogether impossible for the future may well be worse than even war itself. If we can reduce the risk of friction likely to lead to war, this is probably all we can reasonably hope to achieve.

一个有效限制国家对个人权力的国际机构将是和平最好的保障之一。国际性的法治必须保护个人免于政府的暴政，同时保护国家免于超国家的暴政。我们的目标不是无所不能的超国家或者“自由国家”的松散联合，而是人民自由的国家组成的国家社区。我们很久以来一直说，在国际事务中，按我们自己想要的方式去做是不可能的，因为其他人不会按游戏规则。战争即将尘埃落定，这为我们提供了一个机会，表明我们是真诚的，我们准备接受对我们自己的行动自由进行约束，为了共同的利益，我们认为有必要将同样的约束施加于他国。

只要善用，联邦组织原则可能真地被证明是解决全世界最困难问题的最佳方法。但其应用是个极度困难的任务，如果我们目标过于远大，超出了能力范围，我们不大可能成功。很可能存在一种强烈的倾向，是把所有新的国际组织都搞成全方位的、世界范围的；当然对那样的综合性组织，某种新的国际联盟，会有迫切需要。但这样做很大的一个危险是，如果试图仅仅依赖于这样一个国际组织，把所有看起来最好由国际性组织处理的任务都交由它负责，实际上任务不能很好完成。我始终认为，那样远大的理想是国际联盟不足的根源：在搞成世界范围的不成功企图中，不可避免地变弱；规模较小时权力更大的联盟也许是维护和平更好的手段。我相信这些考虑仍然站得住脚，譬如大英帝国、西欧诸国也许还有美国之间可以达成某种程度的全球范围不可能的合作。邦联所代表的相对密切的联合，甚至可能在比西欧某一部分那样狭小的地区稍大的地方起初都难以切实可行，尽管有可能逐步扩大。

的确，形成那样的地区性联邦，不同地域之间战争的可能性仍然存在，并且为了尽可能地减少这种风险，我们必须仰仗于规模更大、形式更松散的联合。我的意思是，对那些其他形式组织的需要，不应该妨碍文明、眼界、标准更加相似的国家组成更紧密的联合。我们的目标是尽可能地防止未来的战争，我们不能认为一举就能够建立一个永久性组织，使得全世界任何一个角落所有战争完全不可能。那样的企图，不仅仅不会成功，而且我们很可能因此浪费在更有限范围取得成功的机会。就面对其它巨大邪恶力量时，为了完全避免未来战争而采取的措施很可能甚至比战争本身还要糟。如果我们能够减少摩擦的风险降低战争的可能，合情合理地希望，这很可能就是我们得到的全部。