

4. THE INEVITABILITY OF PLANNING

We are the first to assert that the more complicated the forms of civilisation, the more restricted the freedom of the individuals must become.

B. Mussolini

It is a revealing fact that few planners are content to say that central planning is desirable. Most of them affirm that we can no longer choose but are compelled by circumstances beyond our control to substitute planning for competition. The myth is deliberately cultivated that we are embarking on the new course not out of free will but because competition is spontaneously eliminated by technological changes which we neither can reverse nor should wish to prevent. This argument is rarely developed at any length—it is one of the assertions taken over by one writer from another till, by mere iteration, it has come to be accepted as an established fact. It is, nevertheless, devoid of foundation. The tendency towards monopoly and planning is not the result of any "objective facts" beyond our control, but the product of opinions fostered and propagated for half a century till they have come to dominate all our policy.

Of the various arguments employed to demonstrate the inevitability of planning, the one most frequently heard is that technological changes have made competition impossible in a constantly increasing number of fields, and that the only choice left to us is between control of production by private monopolies and direction by the government. This belief derives mainly from the Marxist doctrine of the "concentration of industry", although, like so many Marxist ideas, it is now found in many circles who have received it at third or fourth hand and do not know whence it derives.

The historical fact of the progressive growth of monopoly during the last fifty years and the increasing restriction of the field in which competition rules is, of course, not disputed although the extent of the phenomenon is often greatly exaggerated. The important question is whether this development is a necessary consequence of the advance of technology, or whether it is simply the result of the policies pursued in most countries. We shall presently see that the actual history of this development strongly suggests the latter. But we must first consider in how far modern technological developments are of such a kind as to make the growth of monopolies in wide fields inevitable.

The alleged technological cause of the growth of monopoly is the superiority of the large firm over the small, due to the greater efficiency of modern methods of mass production. Modern methods, it is asserted, have created conditions in the majority of industries where the production of the large firm can be increased at decreasing costs per unit, with the result that the large firms are everywhere underbidding and driving out the small ones; this process must go on till in each industry only one or at most a few giant firms are left. This argument singles out one effect sometimes accompanying technological progress; it disregards others which work in the opposite direction; and it receives little support from a serious study of the facts. We cannot here investigate this question in detail and must be content to accept the best evidence available. The most comprehensive study of the facts undertaken in recent times is that of the American "Temporary National Economic Committee" on the Concentration of Economic Power.

4. 计划的不可避免

是我们最先断言，越复杂的文明形式，就必须越限制个人的自由。

贝尼托·墨索里尼

一个发人深省的事实是，说中央计划是其意愿，没几个计划者会同意。他们大多数声称的是，计划替代竞争，环境所迫，情非得已。技术的进步自发地导致竞争的消失，我们既不能逆转也无意阻止，这条新路，实非我所愿，这是精心炮制的神话。这个论调并非深思熟虑，而是人云亦云，三人成虎，毫无根据。垄断、计划的趋势并非任何“客观事实”之必然结果，而是半个世纪以来精心培植、宣传的一些观点的产物，久而久之，竟支配我们全部的政策。

在众多用来表明计划是不可避免的论据中，最常听到的一个是，在越来越多的领域，技术的进步使竞争不再可能，摆在面前只有两个选择，私人寡头控制生产或者由政府指挥。这一说法主要衍生于马克思主义理论的“行业集中原则”。现在发现，它象很多其它的马克思主义的说法，七转八转，并不知最初出处。

过去五十年，垄断持续增长，竞争主导的领域里限制不断增加，当然是不争的历史事实，尽管该现象的程度常有夸大。重要的问题是，这是技术进步的必然结果，还根本就是各国奉行之政策所致。我们一会就会看到，历史真相非常支持后者。但我们先来看看，诸如此类现代技术的发展在多大的程度上让广泛领域出现垄断不可避免。

所声称导致垄断发展的技术原因是，现代大规模生产的方法效率更高，因此企业规模大优于小。他们断言，现代方法为大多数行业创造了一个条件，即企业大、产出多、单位产品成本低，因此大企业产品售价低，挤垮小企业；这一过程会持续下去直到一个行业最终只剩下一个或者最多几个大型企业。这一说法，单独挑出技术进步所带来的诸多影响之一，而选择性地忽略其它可能导致相反解释的一些，经不起事实的认真推敲。我们在这里不能对这一问题进行详细研究，列举已有最有力证据应该足够。美国“临时国家经济委员会”近段时间对经济权力集中的研究，是对实际情况探讨做得最全面的。

The final report of this Committee (which certainly cannot be accused of an undue liberal bias) arrives at the conclusion that the view according to which the greater efficiency of large-scale production is the cause of the disappearance of competition "finds scant support in any evidence that is now at hand"¹. And the detailed monograph on the question which was prepared for the Committee sums up the answer in this statement:

The superior efficiency of large establishments has not been demonstrated; the advantages that are supposed to destroy competition have failed to manifest themselves in many fields. Nor do the economies of size, where they exist, invariably necessitate monopoly. . . . The size or the sizes of the optimum efficiency may be reached long before the major part of a supply is subjected to such control. The conclusions that the advantage of large-scale production must lead inevitably to the abolition of competition cannot be accepted. It should be noted, moreover, that monopoly is frequently the product of factors other than the lower costs of greater size. It is attained through collusive agreement and promoted by public policies. When these agreements are invalidated and when these policies are reversed, competitive conditions can be restored.

An investigation of conditions in this country would lead to very similar results. Anyone who has observed how aspiring monopolists regularly seek and frequently obtain the assistance of the power of the state to make their control effective can have little doubt that there is nothing inevitable about this development.

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This conclusion is strongly supported by the historical order in which the decline of competition and the growth of monopoly manifested themselves in different countries. If they were the result of technological developments or a necessary product of the evolution of "capitalism", we should expect them to appear first in the countries with the most advanced economic system. In fact, they appeared first during the last third of the nineteenth century in what were then comparatively young industrial countries, the United States and Germany. In the latter country especially, which came to be regarded as the model country typifying the necessary evolution of capitalism, the growth of cartels and syndicates has since 1878 been systematically fostered by deliberate policy. Not only the instrument of protection, but direct inducements and ultimately compulsion, were used by the governments to further the creation of monopolies for the regulation of prices and sales. It was here that, with the help of the state, the first great experiment in "scientific planning" and "conscious organisation of industry" led to the creation of giant monopolies, which were represented as inevitable growths fifty years before the same was done in Great Britain. It is largely due to the influence of German socialist theoreticians, particularly Sombart, generalising from the experience of their country, that the inevitable development of the competitive system into "monopoly capitalism" became widely accepted. That in the United States a highly protectionist policy made a somewhat similar development possible, seemed to confirm this generalisation. The development of Germany, however, more than that of the United States, came to be regarded as representative of a universal tendency; and it became a commonplace to speak to quote a widely read political essay of recent date of "Germany where all the social and political forces of modern civilisation have reached their most advanced form".

该委员会的最终报告（肯定不能指过于偏向自由主义）得出了以下结论，大规模生产提高生产效率导致竞争消失的观点“缺乏现有手头证据的支持”。对该问题，为委员会准备有专论详细论述，结论陈词如下：

大型企业效率的优势未得以证实；假定破坏竞争的因素在诸多领域并未证实起作用。所属经济的规模总是必然导致垄断也未证实..... 在大部分产品供应被垄断之前，企业往往早已到达效率最优的规模。大规模生产的优势必然导致竞争消失的结论无法成立。应该注意的是，此外，垄断往往是更大规模更低成本之外诸多因素的结果。它是私下合谋，政策鼓励所致。一旦合谋不再，或者政策反转，竞争环境就能得以恢复。

对英国情况的考察会得到极其类似的结论。看到那些渴望垄断的人不断地寻求、频繁地获得举国之力的帮助，以形成有效控制，没人会怀疑，垄断的形成不是不可避免的。

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竞争衰落、垄断形成的现象在不同国家出现的先后次序有力地支持以上结论。如果它们是技术发展或者“资本主义”演化的必然产物，我们可以期望，它们应该最先出现在经济制度最发达的国家。事实上，它们最先出现在十九世纪最后三十年，相对年轻的工业国家，美国和德国。特别是后者，被认为是资本主义必然演变之典型模式国家，从 1878 年以来，其卡特尔、辛迪加的发展被国家政策系统性地精心扶植。政府采取不仅保护，更是直接诱导，最终强迫的手段，促使垄断的形成，以达到调控价格和销售的目的。这就是，在政府的帮助下，“科学地计划”和“行业的自觉组织”的第一次伟大实验导致了超大垄断企业的诞生。这竟然被当作不可避免。五十年后，英国如出一辙。这很大程度得归功于德国社会主义理论家特别是桑巴特一般化德国经验而产生的影响。竞争制度必然发展成“垄断资本主义”的说法就这样被广泛接受。美国实行高度保护主义的政策，可能发展出有几分类似的垄断，似乎佐证了该说法的普遍性。然而，德国垄断的形成，远较美国，被认为代表了普遍的趋势；并且最近一篇广为传阅的政治短文称“在德国，现代文明所有社会、政治力量达到了最先进的形式”，谈话中对其引用屡见不鲜。

¹ Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, 77th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No.35, 1941, p.89

How little there was of inevitability in all this, and how much is the result of deliberate policy, becomes clear when we consider the position in this country till 1931 and the development since that year in which Great Britain also embarked upon a policy of general protection. It is only a dozen years since, except for a few industries which had obtained protection earlier, British industry was on the whole as competitive as, perhaps, at any time in its history. And, although during the 1920s it suffered severely from incompatible policies followed with regard to wages and to money, at least the years till 1929 compare with regard to employment and general activity not unfavourably with the 1930s. It is only since the transition to protection and the general change in British economic policy accompanying it, that the growth of monopolies has proceeded at an amazing rate and has transformed British industry to an extent the public has scarcely yet realised. To argue that this development has anything to do with the technological progress during this period, that technological necessities which in Germany operated in the 1880s and 1890s, made themselves felt here in the 1930s, is not much less absurd than the claim implied in the statement of Mussolini (quoted at the head of this chapter) that Italy had to abolish individual freedom before other European people because its civilisation had marched so far in advance of the rest!

In so far as this country is concerned the thesis that the change in opinion and policy merely follows an inexorable change in the facts can be given a certain appearance of truth just because England has followed at a distance the intellectual developments elsewhere. It could thus be argued that monopolistic organisation of industry grew up in spite of the fact that public opinion still favoured competition but that outside events frustrated their wishes. The true relation between theory and practice becomes, however clear as soon as we look to the prototype of this development Germany. That there the suppression of competition was a matter of deliberate policy that it was undertaken in the service of the ideal which we now call planning there can be no doubt. In the progressive advance towards a completely planned society the Germans and all the people who are imitating their example are merely following the course which nineteenth-century thinkers particularly Germans have mapped out for them. The intellectual history of the last sixty or eighty years is indeed a perfect illustration of the truth that in social evolution nothing is inevitable but thinking makes it so.

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The assertion that modern technological progress makes planning inevitable can also be interpreted in a different manner. It may mean that the complexity of our modern industrial civilisation creates new problems with which we cannot hope to deal effectively except by central planning. In a sense this is true yet not in the wide sense in which it is claimed. It is, for example a commonplace that many of the problems created by a modern town, like many other problems caused by close contiguity in space are not adequately solved by competition. But it is not these problems, like those of the "public utilities", etc., which are uppermost in the minds of those who invoke the complexity of modern civilisation as an argument for central planning. What they generally suggest is that the increasing difficulty of obtaining a coherent picture of the complete economic process makes it indispensable that things should be coordinated by some central agency if social life is not to dissolve in chaos.

把英国 1931 年之前的情况, 和从该年开始实行总保护主义政策以来的发展情况加以对比考察, 其中多么少是不可避免, 多么多是政策精心导致, 明明白白。十多年前, 英国的工业, 除了少数早已获得政策保护的外, 整体上来说可能竞争性历史上最高。并且, 尽管在 1920 年代, 工资、货币方面受到一些和竞争相抵触的政策严重影响, 至少直到 1929 年的那些年就业及总的商业活动仍不比 1930 年代差。自从转向保护主义, 以及随之发生的英国经济政策总变化, 垄断以惊人的速度成长, 英国工业到了改头换面, 大众不难觉察的程度。争辩称该垄断成长跟这个时期技术进步有关, 德国 1880、1890 年代必须的技术条件在英国 1930 年代才得以满足, 非常荒谬。就像(本章开头所引述的)墨索里尼的话, 意大利文明进步迅速, 远远领先欧洲其他国家, 因此意大利人民也得早点放弃个人自由, 一样荒谬。

到目前为止, 就英国的情况, 理论上讲, 实际的变化势不可挡, 催生相关观点与政策发生了变化, 表面上有几分正确性, 这仅仅因为英国远远追随其他国家的思想发展。因此这样说, 尽管舆论仍然赞同竞争, 由于外部环境粉碎了他们的希望, 工业垄断组织得以成型。然而, 我们一看德国这个发展原型, 理论与实践的真正关系就立刻一目了然。毫无疑问, 在德国为了服务于所谓“计划”这个理想的需要, 采取精心炮制的政策压制了竞争。在朝社会全面计划的目标前进的过程中, 德国人民以及模仿他们的其他各国人民, 只不过是照着十九世纪思想家特别是德国思想家所规划的路线前进。过去六十年或者八十年的思想史完美地展示一个真理, 在社会变革中, 没有什么是必然的, 如果必然, 思想使然。

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现代技术发展使计划无可避免的说法还能从另外一个角度解释。它可能意味着, 现代工业文明过于复杂, 新问题丛生, 除了集中计划, 解决别无他法。在某种意义上来看, 这个解释也许不错; 但在其宣称的广泛意义上, 则肯定不对。譬如, 司空见惯, 现代城镇化产生了很多问题, 就象空间拥挤引起的其它问题一样, 通过竞争不足以解决。但在以现代文明的复杂性为借口替集中计划辩护的人的心目中, 最重要的并不是类似“公共设施”这些问题。他们通常所说的是, 了解密不可分的整个经济运行过程越来越难, 为了不让社会陷入混乱, 必不可少地应该有一个中央机构来协调。

This argument is based on a complete misapprehension of the working of competition. Far from being appropriate only to comparatively simple conditions, it is the very complexity of the division of labour under modern conditions which makes competition the only method by which such co-ordination can be adequately brought about. There would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant facts. It is only as the factors which have to be taken into account become so numerous that it is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them, that decentralisation becomes imperative. But once decentralisation is necessary, the problem of co-ordination arises, a co-ordination which leaves the separate agencies free to adjust their activities to the facts which only they can know, and yet brings about a mutual adjustment of their respective plans. As decentralisation has become necessary because nobody can consciously balance all the considerations bearing on the decisions of so many individuals, the co-ordination can clearly not be effected by "conscious control", but only by arrangements which convey to each agent the information he must possess in order effectively to adjust his decisions to those of others. And because all the details of the changes constantly affecting the conditions of demand and supply of the different commodities can never be fully known, or quickly enough be collected and disseminated, by anyone centre, what is required is some apparatus of registration which automatically records all the relevant effects of individual actions, and whose indications are at the same time the resultant of, and the guide for, all the individual decisions.

This is precisely what the price system does under competition, and which no other system even promises to accomplish. It enables entrepreneurs, by watching the movement of comparatively few prices, as an engineer watches the hands of a few dials, to adjust their activities to those of their fellows. The important point here is that the price system will fulfil this function only if competition prevails, that is, if the individual producer has to adapt himself to price changes and cannot control them. The more complicated the whole, the more dependent we become on that division of knowledge between individuals whose separate efforts are co-ordinated by the impersonal mechanism for transmitting the relevant information known by us as the price system.

It is no exaggeration to say that if we had had to rely on conscious central planning for the growth of our industrial system, it would never have reached the degree of differentiation, complexity, and flexibility it has attained. Compared with this method of solving the economic problem by means of decentralisation plus automatic co-ordination, the more obvious method of central direction is incredibly clumsy, primitive, and limited in scope. That the division of labour has reached the extent which makes modern civilisation possible we owe to the fact that it did not have to be consciously created, but that man tumbled on a method by which the division of labour could be extended far beyond the limits within which it could have been planned. Any further growth of its complexity, therefore, far from making central direction more necessary, makes it more important than ever that we should use a technique which does not depend on conscious control.

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There is yet another theory which connects the growth of monopolies with technological progress, and which uses arguments almost opposite to those we have just considered; though not often clearly stated, it has also exercised considerable influence.

这个说法完全误解了竞争如何工作的。竞争绝非仅适用于相对简单的情况，正因现代条件下高度复杂的劳动分工，竞争成为能带来充分协作的唯一方法。如果情况简单，单个人或者一个组就能有效的摸清各相关事实，高效控制与计划没什么困难。正是由于需要予以考虑的因素不计其数，无法总览全局，去中心化才势在必行。但一旦必须去中心化，协调的问题就会出现。有些事实，只有各单位自己知道，单位需要根据它来调整自己的活动。并且，各单位之间需要调整各自相应的计划相互适应。众多个体独立决策，需要考虑各方各面，没有人能够自觉权衡周全如此多的因素，所以需要去中心化。“自觉控制”显然无法有效协调。要能适应其他单位的决策，各个单位必须掌握必要信息，只有通过一种机制传递该信息才能协调。并且变化无时无刻不在改变各种商品的供需情况，没有一个中心能够知晓变化的所有细节，也不能够迅速地收集、消化这些细节。我们需要某种登记表一样的工具，能够自动记录所有单位各自行为导致的相关结果，同时又能反映出所有单位决策合力作用的结果，并能进一步指引所有单位的下一步决策。

竞争条件下的价格系统恰恰就是做这个的，除此以外，没有其他系统甚至有望做到。就象工程师监视几个仪表指针一样，利用这个系统，企业家只需要观察相对少数几个价格的波动，就能调整企业活动，并协调同行。重要的一点是，价格系统只有在竞争普遍的前提下才能落实这一功能。也就是，单个生产商只能适应价格的变化，而不能控制价格的变化。社会整体越复杂，我们越依赖于个体知识上的分工，通过非人为的客观机制传递相关信息来相互配合，据我们所知，这就是价格系统。

毫不夸张地说，如果我们不得不依靠自觉的中央指挥，我们的工业系统绝不可能达到今天这样细致、复杂、灵活的程度。对比去中心化加上自动协调的方法解决经济问题，集中的方法显然极端笨重、更原始、作用范围更有限。劳动的分工到达今天这个文明程度，归功于一个事实，那就是它并非有意创造，而是人类在摸爬滚打中自然形成的，劳动分工已经拓展到远超过计划的限度。因此，复杂性进一步增加，中央指挥更加不必要，而采用不依赖于自觉控制的手段则是前所未有的更加重要。

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还有一个把垄断发展和技术进步联系在一起的理论，它的说法和我们以上刚讨论过的说法则完全相反；尽管这一理论不常被明确提出，它也有一定的影响。

It contends, not that modern technique destroys competition, but that, on the contrary, it will be impossible to make use of many of the new technological possibilities unless protection against competition is granted, i.e., a monopoly is conferred. This type of argument is not necessarily fraudulent, as the critical reader will perhaps suspect: the obvious answer, that if a new technique for satisfying our wants is really better, it ought to be able to stand up against all competition, does not dispose of all instances to which this argument refers. No doubt in many cases it is used merely as a form of special pleading by interested parties. Even more often it is probably based on a confusion between technical excellence from a narrow engineering point of view and desirability from the point of view of society as a whole.

There remains, however, a group of instances where the argument has some force. It is, for example, at least conceivable that the British automobile industry might be able to supply a car cheaper and better than cars used to be in the United States if everyone in this country were made to use the same kind of car; or that the use of electricity for all purposes could be made cheaper than coal or gas if everybody could be made to use only electricity. In instances like these it is at least possible that we might all be better off, and should prefer the new situation if we had the choice but that no individual ever gets the choice, because the alternative is that either we should all use the same cheap car (or all should use only electricity), or that we should have the choice between these things with each of them at a much higher price. I do not know whether this is true in either of the instances given. But it must be admitted that it is possible that by compulsory standardisation or the prohibition of variety beyond a certain degree, abundance might be increased in some fields more than sufficiently to compensate for the restriction of the choice of the consumer. It is even conceivable that a new invention may be made some day whose adoption would seem unquestionably beneficial, but which could be used only if many or all people were made to avail themselves of it at the same time.

Whether such instances are of any great or lasting importance, they are certainly not instances where it could be legitimately claimed that technical progress makes central direction inevitable. They would merely make it necessary to choose between gaining a particular advantage by compulsion and not obtaining it or, in most instances, obtaining it a little later, when further technical advance has overcome the particular difficulties. It is true that in such situations we may have to sacrifice a possible immediate gain as the price of our freedom but we avoid, on the other hand, the necessity of making future developments dependent upon the knowledge which particular people now possess. By sacrificing such possible present advantages, we preserve an important stimulus to further progress. Though in the short run the price we have to pay for variety and freedom of choice may sometimes be high, in the long run even material progress will depend on this very variety, because we can never predict from which of the many forms in which a good or service can be provided something better may develop. It cannot, of course, be asserted that the preservation of freedom at the expense of some addition to our present material comfort will be thus rewarded in all instances. But the argument for freedom is precisely that we ought to leave room for the unforeseeable free growth. It applies, therefore, no less when, on the basis of our present knowledge, compulsion would seem to bring only advantages, and although in a particular instance it may actually do no harm.

这个理论辩称，并非现代技术消灭了竞争，相反，很多新技术，除非实行保护政策使其免于竞争，否则不能得以发展。也就是，赐予其垄断地位。这类说法不一定全站不住脚。批判性的读者可能会说：答案显然，如果满足我们需要的新技术更优，它应该能在所有竞争中脱颖而出。这个答案并不能摒除这个理论采用的所有例证。毫无疑问，很多情况下，这个理论被相关利益团体利用为其特殊诉求说话。更多情况下，很可能是人们混淆了，一项技术从狭隘工程视角看的技术先进性和从社会全局着眼的合意性。

然而，仍有一类情况这个理论有些说服力。譬如，至少可以想象一下，如果让英国人全部用同一种汽车，英国汽车业也许能够供应一种比美国车更好、更便宜的汽车。如果让每个人各种用途只准用电，电一定能比用煤或气更便宜。这样的例子，至少大家都有可能得到好处，如果有选择，我们应该都会选它，但个人并没有选择，所有人若或使用同一种便宜的车（或所有人只用电作为能源），若或在贵很多的车中选择一种。我不确定，这两个例子能不能说明问题。但必须承认，在某些领域，通过强制实行标准化或者一定程度上禁止多种型号，产量的增加足以弥补消费者选择有限带来的损失。我们甚至可以想象，未来有某种发明，毫无疑问的有用，但是只有在很多人甚至所有人同时使用的时候才起作用。

上面这些例子无论有多大或者多久的重要性，肯定不足以合理地断定技术进步不可避免地导致中央指挥。只是使得必须在以下两种情况中选一个，情况一、通过政策强制给予特殊的优势，情况二、或者就像大多数情况那样，没有被给予优势，技术进一步发展克服特定困难，稍后自行发展出优势。的确，在那样的情况下，作为自由的代价我们可能必须得牺牲一些暂时的利益。但另一方面，我们避免了将来发展的基本要素依赖于掌握在少数人手里的知识。牺牲那些当前可能的好处，我们保留了进一步发展所需的激励因素。尽管短时间内，我们为选择多样、选择自由所付出的价格较高，但是长期来看，实质上的进步甚至都取决于这种多样性。因为，我们没法预计，在物品或者服务的多个式样中，哪一个更有前途。当然，也不能肯定，牺牲现有的舒适条件保留自由能够在未来所有情形下都得到相应回报。但，自由的意义正是，我们应该为无法预料的自由发展留有空间。因此，这一观点适用于强制政策，当基于我们现有知识，它看起来只有好处，并且在某些具体情况下实际上也并无坏处的情况；更应推而广之。

In much of the current discussion on the effects of technological progress this progress is presented to us as if it were something outside us which could compel us to use the new knowledge in a particular way. While it is true, of course, that inventions have given us tremendous power, it is absurd to suggest that we must use this power to destroy our most precious inheritance: liberty. It does mean, however, that if we want to preserve it, we must guard it more jealously than ever and that we must be prepared to make sacrifices for it. While there is nothing in modern technological developments which forces us towards comprehensive economic planning, there is a great deal in them which makes infinitely more dangerous the power a planning authority would possess.

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While there can thus be little doubt that the movement towards planning is the result of deliberate action and that there are no external necessities which force us to it, it is worth enquiring why so large a proportion of the technical experts should be found in the front rank of the planners. The explanation of this phenomenon is closely connected with an important fact which the critics of the planners should always keep in mind; that there is little question that almost every one of the technical ideals of our experts could be realised within a comparatively short time if to achieve them were made the sole aim of humanity. There is an infinite number of good things, which we all agree are highly desirable as well as possible, but of which we cannot hope to achieve more than a few within our lifetime, or which we can hope to achieve only very imperfectly. It is the frustration of his ambitions in his own field which makes the specialist revolt against the existing order. We all find it difficult to bear to see things left undone which everybody must admit are both desirable and possible. That these things cannot all be done at the same time, that anyone of them can be achieved only at the sacrifice of others, can be seen only by taking into account factors which fall outside any specialism, which can be appreciated only by a painful intellectual effort—the more painful as it forces us to see against a wider background the objects to which most of our labours are directed, and to balance them against others which lie outside our immediate interest and for which, for that reason, we care less.

Every one of the many things which, considered in isolation, it would be possible to achieve in a planned society, creates enthusiasts for planning who feel confident that they will be able to instil into the directors of such a society their sense of the value of the particular objective; and the hopes of some of them would undoubtedly be fulfilled, since a planned society would certainly further some objectives more than is the case at present. It would be foolish to deny that the instances of planned or semi-planned societies which we know do furnish illustrations in point, good things which the people of these countries owe entirely to planning. The magnificent motor roads in Germany and Italy are an instance often quoted—even though they do not represent a kind of planning not equally possible in a liberal society. But it is equally foolish to quote such instances of technical excellence in particular fields as evidence of the general superiority of planning. It would be more correct to say that such extreme technical excellence out of line with general conditions is evidence of a misdirection of resources. Anyone who has driven along the famous German motor roads and found the amount of traffic on them less than on many a secondary road in England, can have little doubt that, so far as peace purposes are concerned, there was little justification for them. Whether it was not a case where the planners decided in favour of "guns" instead of "butter" is another matter. But by our standards there is little ground for enthusiasm.

在现在很多对技术进步的影响的讨论中，好像进步是我们身外之物，能按某种方式迫使我们接受新知识。没错，发明创造当然给了我们巨大的力量，但必须用这一力量来破坏我们最珍贵的传承：自由，那就荒谬了。然而，它意味着，如果我们想保持自由，我们必须前所未有小心翼翼地保护它，并准备为它做出牺牲。现代技术的发展并不迫使我们走向全面计划经济，但它极有可能使得政府计划部门拥有的权力变得无限危险。

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这样，无疑，没有外在必然因素迫使我们朝计划的方向发展，纯粹是故意为之，值得推敲的是，在计划官僚的最前沿为什么发现有这么一大批的技术专家。对这一现象的解释跟一个重要的事实密切相关，对计划官僚进行批评时要切记；那就是我们专家的几乎每一项技术目标，如果取得其成功是人类活动的唯一目的，无疑能在较短时间内实现。有无限多美好的东西，我们都十分想要，并有可能得到，但我们一生有限，所得若或数量有限，若或质量有限。专家在自己的领域雄心勃勃，不免倍受挫折，而离经叛道。一件事，大家都承认想做到且能做到，就会很难接受没做到。只有把眼光放在专业范围以外，通盘考虑才能可以看出，好事没法同时全部达成，某些的成功不得不建立在牺牲另一些的基础上，在大背景下我们不得不精选少数重点集中力量，且要平衡没有眼前利益的另一些非重点。殚精竭虑才能正确评估，十分艰难，越难越少顾及非重点。

众多事项中任何一件，单独予以考虑，都可以在计划体制内达成，这样产生了很多热衷于计划的人，他们信心满满地向领导人灌输具体目标的价值意义、以及信誓旦旦能成功的希望，因为计划体制肯定比现有体制更能推进某些事项。计划或者半计划体制社会有些项目，其人民把成功完全归功于计划的优点，譬如德国、意大利气势恢弘的高速公路，尽管这并不表示自由社会不可能有类似的计划，我们知道他们添枝加叶粉饰援引，但否认这个并不明智。但是，引用那些具体领域技术优势的例子来说明计划体制具有普遍的优越性，那也同样不明智。那些超出普遍条件的极端技术成就正是资源误配的证据，这样说可能更正确。每一个开过德国著名高速公路，发现其车流量还不如很多英国二级公路的人都很少怀疑，以和平目的而言，它没有多少经济合理性。但如果计划它的目的是为了运“枪炮”而不是送“黄油”，则又另当别论。按我们的标准，对计划的热衷站不住脚。

The illusion of the specialist that in a planned society he would secure more attention to the objectives for which he cares most is a more general phenomenon than the term of specialist at first suggests. In our predilections and interests we are all in some measure specialists. And we all think that our personal order of values is not merely personal, but that in a free discussion among rational people we would convince the others that ours is the right one. The lover of the countryside who wants above all that its traditional appearance should be preserved and that the blots already made by industry on its fair face should be removed, no less than the health enthusiast who wants all the picturesque but insanitary old cottages cleared away, or the motorist who wishes the country cut up by big motor roads, the efficiency fanatic who desires the maximum of specialisation and mechanisation no less than the idealist who for the development of personality wants to preserve as many independent craftsmen as possible, all know that their aim can be fully achieved only by planning and they all want planning for that reason. But, of course, the adoption of the social planning for which they clamour can only bring out the concealed conflict between their aims.

The movement for planning owes its present strength largely to the fact that, while planning is in the main still an ambition, it unites almost all the single-minded idealists, all the men and women who have devoted their lives to a single task. The hopes they place in planning, however, are not the result of a comprehensive view of society, but rather of a very limited view, and often the result of a great exaggeration of the importance of the ends they place foremost. This is not to underrate the great pragmatic value of this type of men in a free society like ours, which makes them the subject of just admiration. But it would make the very men who are most anxious to plan society the most dangerous if they were allowed to do so and the most intolerant of the planning of others. From the saintly and single-minded idealist to the fanatic is often but a step. Though it is the resentment of the frustrated specialist which gives the demand for planning its strongest impetus, there could hardly be a more unbearable and more irrational world than one in which the most eminent specialists in each field were allowed to proceed unchecked with the realisation of their ideals. Nor can "co-ordination", as some planners seem to imagine, become a new specialism. The economist is the last to claim that he has the knowledge which the co-ordinator would need. His plea is for a method which effects such co-ordination without the need for an omniscient dictator. But that means precisely the retention of some such impersonal and often unintelligible checks on individual efforts as those against which all specialists chafe.

比起专家这个名字所意味的专，更普遍的一种现象是，对专家有一种误解，就他们最关心的问题在计划体制内他们能稳获更普遍的关注。在我们的兴趣爱好领域，我们都是某种程度上的专家。我们都认为，自己的个人价值观不仅仅是个人的，如果与理性的人自由辩论，一定能说服其他人使其相信我们的才是正确的。乡村爱好者想把保留传统田园风貌放在首位，工业发展已造成的斑驳瑕疵统统都要清除掉。同样，爱卫生的人则想清理掉那些不卫生的田园旧舍，留下风景如画。汽车司机希望高速公路四通八达。痴迷高效率的人一切都想要最大程度地专业化、机械化。同样，支持个性发展的理想主义者则希望保护尽可能多的个体工匠。所有人都知道，要完全达到他们的目的只有通过计划，因此都支持计划体制。但，当然，采纳他们叫嚷着要的社会计划只能揭示出他们种种目的背后的互相矛盾。

计划的运动之所以有现在的力量，很大程度上归功于一个事实，计划主要作为一种理想抱负，团结了几乎所有思想单纯的理想主义者，这些男男女女为一件事奉献一生。不管怎样，他们寄诸计划体制上的希望，不是基于对社会的全面看法，而是基于一些非常狭隘的观点，常常过于夸大他们自己最优先考虑的目的的重要性。在象英国的自由社会中，有同样的一类人，这样说不是要贬低他们的现实价值，只会让他们更令人钦佩。但如果真让这些急于对整个社会进行计划的人来改造社会的话，他们会变得很危险，最迫切的最危险，最不能容忍别人的计划。从道德高尚、思想单纯的理想主义者到狂热分子常常只有一步之遥。行业专家经受挫折，心生不满，强烈地要求实行计划，但一旦允许这些最杰出的专家在各自擅长的领域朝着他们的理想无拘无束自由奔驰，世界将变得无法忍受、没有理性。也无法“协调”，如计划者可以料想，计划本身也成了专业领域。经济学家可能是最后一个自称有知识、能协调的人。他要发愿祈求一个办法，在无需一个无所不知的发号施令者的前提下，协调各方。但，那恰恰意味着，得维持一些针对专家所作所为的检查，这些检查不讲人情、常常莫名其妙，为所有专家恼火。