

5. PLANNING AND DEMOCRACY

The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted to no council and senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

Adam Smith.

The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organisation of the labours of society for a definite social goal. That our present society lacks such "conscious" direction towards a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main complaints of its socialist critics.

In many ways this puts the basic issue very clearly. And it directs us at once to the point where the conflict arises between individual freedom and collectivism. The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ between themselves in the nature of the goal towards which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organise the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end, and in refusing to recognise autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism.

The "social goal", or "common purpose", for which society is to be organised, is usually vaguely described as the "common good", or the "general welfare", or the "general interest". It does not need much reflection to see that these terms have no sufficiently definite meaning to determine a particular course of action. The welfare and the happiness of millions cannot be measured on a single scale of less and more. The welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is given its place. To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make it possible to decide between all the different courses between which the planner has to choose. It presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their due place.

The conception of a complete ethical code is unfamiliar, and it requires some effort of imagination to see what it involves. We are not in the habit of thinking of moral codes as more or less complete. The fact that we are constantly choosing between different values without a social code prescribing how we ought to choose, does not surprise us, and does not suggest to us that our moral code is incomplete. In our society there is neither occasion nor reason why people should develop common views about what should be done in such situations. But where all the means to be used are the property of society and are to be used in the name of society according to a unitary plan, a "social" view about what ought to be done must guide all decisions. In such a world we should soon find that our moral code is full of gaps.

5. 计划与民主

政治家如果试图指导私人应该怎么花钱，那马上招来骂声一片，不仅如此，他们冒领了国务院、国会之类根本不应被授予的权力，那十分危险，就像把实际任务交给那些胡说八道、纸上谈兵的人手里一样。

亚当·斯密

所有集体主义制度的共同特征可以用所有学校里社会主义者最爱的一句话来概括，精心组织社会力量达到既定社会目标。英国社会缺乏那样朝某一目标发展的“刻意的”方向，社会主义批评家指这样的社会是被一群不负责任的人异想天开、白日做梦地领导着。

在很多方面，这把基本问题摆得很明。它马上把我们指到个人自由和集体主义的冲突所在。集体主义、共产主义、法西斯主义等等各种各样，其区别在于其想指挥社会力量达到的目标的本质不同。但，它们与自由主义、个人主义一概不同，共同的差别在于，他们都想为单一的目标组织整个社会及其全部资源，拒绝承认个人目标至高无上的自主世界。简而言之，他们都是真正意义上的极权主义，极权主义是一个新词，我们采用来描述，理论上叫集体主义的东西出乎意料却又密不可分的表现形式。

对社会进行组织以达到的“社会目标”或者“共同目的”，通常粗略地描述为“共同美好”，“大众福利”或者“普遍利益”。无需深思就可以看到这些术语并没有十分确切的含义，不足以确定具体的行动过程。成百上千万人的福利和幸福不能用一个指标的多或者少来衡量。人民的福利，象个人的幸福一样，取决于极多的事情无尽组合。用一个目标来表示是不够的，它是一系列的目标，一个完备的价值度量，每个人的每个需求在其中都有体现。依据单一计划指导我们所有活动预先假定所有需求按价值能排序，这种排序必须完备无缺，当计划者必须在不同路线之间做选择时，能基于它做比较。简而言之，它预先假定存在一个完备的道德规范，在其中，人所有不同的价值都有相应位置。

完备的道德规范的概念对我们有点陌生，需要一点想象力来了解它的内涵。习惯上我们不把道德规范想成是多少完备的。实际情况是，没有一个道德规范规定我们应该怎么选，我们也在时时刻刻做选择，没什么奇怪，也不说明我们的道德规范是不完备的。在我们的社会中，既没有可能也没有必要，为在何种场合必须做什么达成一致意见。但是，当所有生产生活资料都是社会资产的一部分，在社会的名义下依据计划统一使用时，就需要一个“社会”意见来指引所有决定，什么应该做。在那样一个世界里，我们马上就会发现我们的道德规范漏洞百出。

We are not concerned here with the question whether it would be desirable to have such a complete ethical code. It may merely be pointed out that up to the present the growth of civilisation has been accompanied by a steady diminution of the sphere in which individual actions are bound by fixed rules. The rules of which our common moral code consists have progressively become fewer and more general in character. From the primitive man who was bound by an elaborate ritual in almost everyone of his daily activities, who was limited by innumerable taboos, and who could scarcely conceive of doing things in a way different from his fellows, morals have more and more tended to become merely limits circumscribing the sphere within which the individual could behave as he liked. The adoption of a common ethical code comprehensive enough to determine a unitary economic plan would mean a complete reversal of this tendency.

The essential point for us is that no such complete ethical code exists. The attempt to direct all economic activity according to a single plan would raise innumerable questions to which the answer could be provided only by a moral rule, but to which existing morals have no answer and where there exists no agreed view on what ought to be done. People will have either no definite views or conflicting views on such questions, because in the free society in which we have lived there has been no occasion to think about them and still less to form common opinions about them.

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Not only do we not possess such an all-inclusive scale of values: it would be impossible for any mind to comprehend the infinite variety of different needs of different people which compete for the available resources and to attach a definite weight to each. For our problem it is of minor importance whether the ends for which any person cares comprehend only his own individual needs, or whether they include the needs of his closer or even those of his more distant fellows that is, whether he is egoistic or altruistic in the ordinary senses of these words. The point which is so important is the basic fact that it is impossible for any man to survey more than a limited field, to be aware of the urgency of more than a limited number of needs. Whether his interests centre round his own physical needs, or whether he takes a warm interest in the welfare of every human being he knows, the ends about which he can be concerned will always be only an infinitesimal fraction of the needs of all men.

This is the fundamental fact on which the whole philosophy of individualism is based. It does not assume, as is often asserted, that man is egoistic or selfish, or ought to be. It merely starts from the indisputable fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to include in our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking, scales of value can exist only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of values exist, scales which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with each other. From this the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed, within defined limits, to follow their own values and preferences rather than somebody else's, that within these spheres the individual's system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others. It is this recognition of the individual as the ultimate judge of his ends, the belief that as far as possible his own views ought to govern his actions, that forms the essence of the individualist position.

我们这里并不关心那样一个完备的道德规范是不是可取的。这里仅指出，人类文明发展到现在，个人行为受到固定规则约束的范围越来越小。组成公共道德规范的一些规则数量上逐步减少，性质上逐步更一般化。从原始人，日常生活每天为一堆繁琐的仪式约束，要顾及无数的禁忌，特立独行难以想象，发展到现在，道德越来越多地倾向于仅仅设定一个范围，在其内个人可以为所欲为。采用一个公共道德规范完备得足以支持统一的经济计划，完全是逆势而为。

对我们而言，基本一点是那样一个完备的道德规范根本不存在。试图按统一的计划指挥所有的经济活动会引起无数的问题，对这些问题只有道德规范能提供答案，但是现有的道德规范没有解答，对什么该做没有一致的看法。对那些问题，大家或者没有确定的看法，或者看法相互矛盾，在我们生活的英国这样的自由社会，没什么机会思考它们，更不可能形成共同的意见。

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不仅是我们没有那样一个无所不包的价值标准：不同人需求不同，千差万别，竞争有限的资源，根本不可能有任何头脑很够理解掌握这些需求并予以权衡。对于我们关心的问题，个人在意的只关乎他自己的需求，还是包括他亲密或者疏远的伙伴，也就是一般意义上的利己或者利他，并不重要。重要的一点是一个基本事实，任何人只能了解有限的领域，只能认识到有限几个需求的迫切性。一个人的兴趣是否以他自己的物质需求为中心，或者他是否热心所有熟人的福利，无论怎样，他所有关注的目标只不过是全人类需求微不足道的一小部分。

这一根本事实，是个人主义整个哲学理论的基础。虽然常这么认为，但它并不假定，人是或者应该是利己或者自私的。它仅仅源于一个无可争辩的事实，人类的想象力是有限的，我们的价值标准只可能顾及整个社会需求的一部分，并且，严格的讲，因为价值标准只存在于个人的头脑中，价值标准不可能完备，不可避免地不同的人有不同的标准，并且常常互不相容。从这点出发，个人主义者得出结论，在确定的限度内，个人应该被允许按自己而不是他人的价值观、喜好自由行事，在这样一个世界里，个人目标至高无上，不服从他人号令。承认个人目标最终由个人自己说了算，相信个人行为应尽可能地由个人自己观点来决定，这是个人主义的精华所在。

This view does not, of course, exclude the recognition of social ends, or rather of a coincidence of individual ends which makes it advisable for men to combine for their pursuit. But it limits such common action to the instances where individual views coincide; what are called "social ends" are for it merely identical ends of many individuals or ends to the achievement of which individuals are willing to contribute in return for the assistance they receive in the satisfaction of their own desires. Common action is thus limited to the fields where people agree on common ends. Very frequently these common ends will not be ultimate ends to the individuals, but means which different persons can use for different purposes. In fact, people are most likely to agree on common action where the common end is not an ultimate end to them, but a means capable of serving a great variety of purposes.

When individuals combine in a joint effort to realise ends they have in common, the organisations, like the state, that they form for this purpose, are given their own system of ends and their own means. But any organisation thus formed remains one "person" among others, in the case of the state much more powerful than any of the others, it is true, yet still with its separate and limited sphere in which alone its ends are supreme. The limits of this sphere are determined by the extent to which the individuals agree on particular ends; and the probability that they will agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such action extends. There are certain functions of the state on the exercise of which there will be practical unanimity among its citizens; there will be others on which there will be agreement of a substantial majority; and so on, till we come to fields where, although each individual might wish the state to act in some way, there will be almost as many views about what the government should do as there are different people.

We can rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the state only so long as it is confined to spheres where agreement exists. But not only when the state undertakes direct control in fields where there is no such agreement is it bound to suppress individual freedom. We can unfortunately not indefinitely extend the sphere of common action and still leave the individual free in his own sphere. Once the communal sector, in which the state controls all the means, exceeds a certain proportion of the whole, the effects of its actions dominate the whole system. Although the state controls directly the use of only a large part of the available resources, the effects of its decisions on the remaining part of the economic system become so great that indirectly it controls almost everything. Where, as was, for example, true in Germany as early as 1928, the central and local authorities directly control the use of more than half the national income (according to an official German estimate then, 53 per cent.) they control indirectly almost the whole economic life of the nation. There is, then, scarcely an individual end which is not dependent for its achievement on the action of the state, and the "social scale of values" which guides the state's action must embrace practically all individual ends.

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It is not difficult to see what must be the consequences when democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution requires more agreement than in fact exists. The people may have agreed on adopting a system of directed economy because they have been convinced that it will produce great prosperity. In the discussions leading to the decision, the goal of planning will have been described by some such term as "common welfare" which only conceals the absence of real agreement on the ends of planning.

这个观点当然不排除对社会目标的承认，或者对几个个体巧合的共同目标的承认，目标巧合，正好合力而为。但共同行动仅限于个体观点巧合的情况；我们所称的“社会目标”仅指多个个体相同的目标，或者个体以帮助实现自己愿望作为回报帮助他人共同完成的目标。因此，共同行动局限于认同共同目标的领域。常见情况的是，这个共同目标并非所有个体的最终目标，而是不同人可用它来服务不同目的的手段。事实上，共同目标不是他们的最终目标，而只是能服务多种目的的一种手段时，人们最有可能就共同行动达成一致。

当个体合力实现他们的共同目标，为此目的而形成的组织，就象国家，被赋予了他们的目标体系和相应手段。任何这样形成的组织被赋予“人”格，跟其它组织一起，在其中国家就比其它任何组织强大得多，然而，它作为单个组织仍有其独立的、有限的范围，在这个单独的范围中组织自己的目标至高无上。这个范围的限度取决于其内诸多个体就具体目标达成一致的程 度；并且他们就具体的行动路线达成一致的可能性必然随着行动规模的扩大而降低。国家有某些职能，行使该职能的时候，所有国民会事实上达成一致意见；其它一些职能，国民的相当多数达成协定；如此类推，直到某些领域，尽管每一个人都希望国家有所行动，但对于政府如何做，各持己见。

只有局限在同意的范围内，我们才能依赖于该自愿达成的协议来指引国家的行为。但在没有达成协议的那些领域，不仅是采取直接控制，政府势必压制个人自由。很不幸，我们不能在无限地扩大共同行动范围的同时，仍留给个人以自由。公共部门，其资源完全受政府部门控制，一旦其占比超过一定数值，其行为就会主宰整个系统。尽管政府只直接控制相当大一部分的可用资源，但是其决定对经济系统其余部分的影响如此之大，以至于间接地来说几乎控制一切。例如，之前德国 1928 年的情况就是如此，中央和地方各级政府直接控制超过半数的国家收入（德国官方估计约 53%），他们间接控制了几乎整个国家的经济生活。这样，很少有个人目标不依赖于国家的成就；指导国家行为的“社会价值标准”实际上必然囊括了一切个人目标。

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民主国家开始走计划的路线，执行过程需要得到比实际上已存在的更多的同意，不难看出其必然的后果。群众可能因为相信可以带来大繁荣，被说服而同意采取指令性的经济制度。在导致产生这个决定的讨论中，采用了象“共同福利”这类术语来描述计划的目的，这只不过掩盖了对于计划的目的并未真正达成的一致。

Agreement will in fact exist only on the mechanism to be used. But it is a mechanism which can be used only for a common end; and the question of the precise goal towards which all activity is to be directed will arise as soon as the executive power has to translate the demand for a single plan into a particular plan. Then it will appear that the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends the plan is to serve. The effect of the people agreeing that there must be central planning, without agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to commit themselves to take a journey together without agreeing where they want to go: with the result that they may all have to make a journey which most of them do not want at all. That planning creates a situation in which it is necessary for us to agree on a much larger number of topics than we have been used to, and that in a planned system we cannot confine collective action to the tasks on which we can agree, but are forced to produce agreement on everything in order that any action can be taken at all, is one of the features which contribute more than most to determining the character of a planned system.

It may have been the unanimously expressed will of the people that parliament should prepare a comprehensive economic plan, yet neither the people nor its representatives need therefore be able to agree on any particular plan. The inability of democratic assemblies to carry out what seems to be a clear mandate of the people will inevitably cause dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. Parliaments come to be regarded as ineffective "talking shops", unable or incompetent to carry out the tasks for which they have been chosen. The conviction grows that if efficient planning is to be done, the direction must be "taken out of politics" and placed in the hands of experts, permanent officials or independent autonomous bodies.

The difficulty is well known to socialists. It will soon be half a century since the Webbs¹ began to complain of "the increased incapacity of the House of Commons to cope with its work".

More recently, Professor Laski² has elaborated the argument:

It is common ground that the present parliamentary machine is quite unsuited to pass rapidly a great body of complicated legislation. The National Government, indeed, has admitted this by implementing its economy and tariff measures not by detailed debate in the House of Commons but by a wholesale system of delegated legislation. A Labour Government would, I presume, build upon the amplitude of this precedent. It would confine the House of Commons to the two functions it can properly perform: the ventilation of grievances and the discussion of general principles of its measures. Its Bills would take the form of general formula conferring wide powers on the appropriate government departments; and those powers would be exercised by Order in Council which could, if desired, be attacked in the House by means of a vote of no confidence. The necessity and value of delegated legislation has recently been strongly reaffirmed by the Donoughmore Committee; and its extension is inevitable if the process of socialisation is not to be wrecked by the normal methods of obstruction which existing parliamentary procedure sanctions.

And to make it quite clear that a socialist government must not allow itself to be too much fettered by democratic procedure, Professor Laski at the end of the same article raised the question "whether in a period of transition to Socialism, a Labour Government can risk the overthrow of its measures as a result of the next general election" and left it significantly unanswered.

实际上,仅仅在原理上取得一致。但这是一个只适应于一个共同目标的原理;一旦执行机构必须将统一计划的需求转变成具体的方案,需要一个准确的目标来用以指挥所有行动时,问题就出现了。马上就会看到,大家虽然一致同意需要计划,可在计划所服务的目的上并不能达成一致。人们同意必须有中央计划,但不同意其目的,很像一群人决定一起旅行,但就去哪里没有取得一致,其结果就是大多数人可能不得不一来一场根本不想来的旅行。计划导致了这样一个局面,我们必须就前所未有的议题取得一致;并且在计划体制下,我们不能把集体行动局限在我们能取得一致意见的任务范围内,为了使得行动得以进行而被迫同意一切事项,这是决定计划体制特色最重要的几个特征之一。

可能是人民意愿的一致表示,议会应该准备一份全面的经济计划,这样,人民或人民代表没有必要就任何具体的方案取得一致。民主大会无法贯彻落实看起来明白无误的人民的委托,不可避免地会引起对民主制度的不满。议会被认为是只说不做,没有用,无法或者无能完成他们被选举出来委托承担的任务。大家越来越相信,计划效率要高,指挥权必须从政治里分离出来,交到专家、公务员、独立自治机构的手里。

这个难处很多社会主义者都知道。近半个世纪前,韦伯斯就开始抱怨,"议会越来越无能,无法应付其工作"。

最近,拉斯基教授如下叨唠:

现代议会机器非常不适合快速地批准大量、复杂的法案,这已是共识。的确,国民政府实质上已经承认了这点,因此经济和税务措施的都不在下议院进行细节的辩论,而是整体上授权立法。我料想,有此先例,劳动党政府会大量这样做。下议院剩下只能做两件事了:发牢骚和讨论他们认为大的原则。法案采取普遍的公式式样,把广泛的权力授予政府相关部门;权力在女王政令名义下行使,如果想要反对,可以在议院投个不信用票。最近 Donoughmore 委员会强调了授权立法的必要性和价值所在;社会主义化的进程,如果想不被现在议会正常审批程序所阻碍,扩大授权立法范围不可避免。

并且,为了明确社会主义的政府不应该受民主程序太多的束缚,拉斯基教授在同一篇文章的结尾,提出了一个问题"在向社会主义过渡的时期,劳动党政府能否担风险,下一次大选推翻这个程序",未置可否,耐人寻味。

¹ S. and B. Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, 1897, p.800, footnote

² H. J. Laski. "Labour and the Constitution", *The New Statesman and Nation*, No.81 (New Series), Sept. 10th, 1932, p.277. In a book (*Democracy in Crisis*, 1933, particularly p.87) in which Professor Laski elaborated these ideas, his determination that parliamentary democracy must not be allowed to form an obstacle to the realisation of socialism is even more plainly expressed: not only would a socialist government "take vast

powers and legislated under them by ordinance and decree" and "suspend the classic formula of normal opposition", but the "continuance of parliamentary government would depend on its [i.e. the Labour Government's] possession of guarantees from the Conservative Party that its work of transformation would not be disrupted by repel in the event of its defeat at the polls"! As Professor Laski invokes the authority of the Donoughmore Committee it may be worth recalling that Professor Laski was a member of that committee and presumably one of the authors of its report.

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It is important clearly to see the causes of this admitted ineffectiveness of parliaments when it comes to a detailed administration of the economic affairs of a nation. The fault is neither with the individual representatives nor with parliamentary institutions as such, but with the contradictions inherent in the task with which they are charged. They are not asked to act where they can agree, but to produce agreement on everything—the whole direction of the resources of the nation. For such a task the system of majority decision is, however, not suited. Majorities will be found where it is a choice between limited alternatives; but it is a superstition to believe that there must be a majority view on everything. There is no reason why there should be a majority in favour of anyone of the different possible courses of positive action if their number is legion. Every member of the legislative assembly might prefer some particular plan for the direction of economic activity to no plan, yet no one plan may appear preferable to a majority to no plan at all.

Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular issues. A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan clause by clause, as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic plan, to deserve the name, must have a unitary conception. Even if parliament could, proceeding step by step, agree on some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy nobody. A complex whole where all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other, cannot be achieved through a compromise between conflicting views. To draw up an economic plan in this fashion is even less possible than, for example, successfully to plan a military campaign by democratic procedure. As in strategy it would become inevitable to delegate the task to the experts.

Yet the difference is that, while the general who is put in charge of a campaign is given a single end to which, for the duration of the campaign, all the means under his control have to be exclusively devoted, there can be no such single goal given to the economic planner, and no similar limitation of the means imposed upon him. The general has not got to balance different independent aims against each other; there is for him only one supreme goal. But the ends of an economic plan, or of any part of it, cannot be defined apart from the particular plan. It is the essence of the economic problem that the making of an economic plan involves the choice between conflicting or competing ends—different needs of different people. But which ends do so conflict, which will have to be sacrificed if we want to achieve certain others, in short, which are the alternatives between which we must choose, can only be known to those who know all the facts; and only they, the experts, are in a position to decide which of the different ends are to be given preference. It is inevitable that they should impose their scale of preferences on the community for which they plan.

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当面对国家经济事务琐碎的日常管理时，大家承认议会无法应对，清楚认识到其原因十分重要。问题既不在任何议员，也不在那样的议会制度，相反，问题是在他们所承担任务的内在矛盾上。不是要他们在能够取得一致意见的问题上采取行动，而是要他们全面调配全国资源，也就是对一切问题取得一致意见。然而，对那样一个任务，多数赞同的方式不适合。选项只有有限几个时，我们可以取得多数；但是相信认为就任何事情都会有一个多数赞同的意见，那就是迷信了。采取行动有多条可选的路线，如果人数成千上万，没有理由其中会有一条获得多数的喜欢。之于经济活动的管理，对立法委员会的每个委员来说，某个方案也许比没有方案更好；然而，对多数来说，哪个方案都不如没有方案。

一个连贯的方案也不能分成几部分或就具体事宜逐个投票。民主议会对于一个普通的法案往往推敲斟酌，但对全面的经济计划逐字逐句的投票、修改就有点瞎扯。经济计划，文如其名，必须有一个统一的立意。即使议会能够，一步一步，就某些项目达成一致，最终结果肯定也没人满意。通过矛盾意见之间的妥协没法达成复杂的一揽子计划，因为所有各部分之间必须特别仔细地相互协调。通过这样的方式编制经济计划，甚至比譬如通过民主程序部署军事作战更不可能。从策略上讲，把任务交给专家就不可避免了。

然而，不同之处在于，当单一的作战任务下达给负责的将军，在作战期间，他麾下所有资源必须毫无例外地投入这一任务；而为经济作计划的人并没有那样一个单一的目标，给他的资源也没有类似的规定。将军无需平衡多个独立目标；对他来说只有一个至高无上的目标。但是，对经济计划而言，除了某些具体的计划，全部或者部分目标都没法定义。不同的人有不同的需求，做经济计划涉及在矛盾、相互竞争的目标中做选择，这是经济问题的实质所在。但是，哪些目标有矛盾，如果想达到某些目标就必须放弃其它哪些，简单的来说，我们必须做的选择中哪些是不能两全的选项，只有了解全部情况的人才能知道；决定不同的目标哪个要优先只有他们这些专家才有资格。不可避免地，专家应该会把他们自己的偏好标准强加给他们所服务的社会。

This is not always clearly recognised and delegation is usually justified by the technical character of the task. But this does not mean that only the technical detail is delegated, or even that the inability of parliaments to understand the technical detail is the root of the difficulty³. Alterations in the structure of civil law are no less technical and no more difficult to appreciate in all their implications; yet nobody has yet seriously suggested that legislation there should be delegated to a body of experts. The fact is that in these fields legislation does not go beyond general rules on which true majority agreement can be achieved, while in the direction of economic activity the interests to be reconciled are so divergent that no true agreement is likely to be reached in a democratic assembly.

It should be recognised, however, that it is not the delegation of law-making power as such, which is so objectionable. To oppose delegation as such is to oppose a symptom instead of the cause and, as it may be a necessary result of other causes, to weaken the case. So long as the power that is delegated is merely the power to make general rules, there may be very good reasons why such rules should be laid down by local rather than by the central authority. The objectionable feature is that delegation is so often resorted to because the matter in hand cannot be regulated by general rules but only by the exercise of discretion in the decision of particular cases. In these instances delegation means that some authority is given power to make with the force of law what to all intents and purposes are arbitrary decisions (usually described as "judging the case on its merits").

The delegation of particular technical tasks to separate bodies, while a regular feature, is yet only the first step in the process whereby a democracy which embarks on planning progressively relinquishes its powers. The expedient of delegation cannot really remove the causes which make all the advocates of comprehensive planning so impatient with the impotence of democracy. The delegation of particular powers to separate agencies creates a new obstacle to the achievement of a single coordinated plan. Even if, by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in planning every sector of economic activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating these separate plans into a unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole—in fact, as the planners ought to be the first to admit—they may be worse than no plan. But the democratic legislature will long hesitate to relinquish the decisions on really vital issues, and so long as it does so it makes it impossible for anyone else to provide the comprehensive plan. Yet agreement that planning is necessary, together with the inability of democratic assemblies to produce a plan, will evoke stronger and stronger demands that the government or some single individual should be given powers to act on their own responsibility. The belief is becoming more and more widespread that, if things are to get done, the responsible authorities must be freed from the fetters of democratic procedure.

这一点不总是能清楚地认识到，授权立法是否合通常由任务的技术性特征来决定。但这并不是说，只就技术细节授权立法，或者甚至议会不懂技术细节是问题的根源。民法结构的修改技术性不比这个低、正确评估其潜在影响的难度无有出其右，然而还没有人认真地提议过要将该立法授权给专家组来进行。实际情况是，在这一领域，立法脱不出通用原则的范围，对此能够取得真正的多数一致。而在指挥经济活动方面，要调和的利益南辕北辙，民主议会不大可能取得真正的一致。

无论如何，应该承认，不是立法权的授权如此令人反感。如此反对授权是针对现象而不是原因，因为其它原因也可能必然导致这一现象，这样会模糊问题。只要被代理的权力仅仅是制订通则，可能就有很好的理由来说明，为什么应该是地方政府而不是中央政府制订这些通则。令人反感的是，如此频繁地诉诸于授权，其实是因为手中的事务过于琐碎无法用通则来规范，只能特事特办酌情处理。这些情况下，授权就意味着法律授予了政府无论出于什么目的和意图独断专行的权力（通常被称为酌情判断）。

把具体的技术性任务分开授权给不同的机构，是一个常规现象，但还只是一个开始走计划路线的民主政体逐步放弃其权力的第一步。授权这个权宜之计并不能真地消除让全面计划的拥护者对民主的无能失去耐心的根本原因。将具体的权力分开授权给不同机构，对达成统一协调的计划而言，产生了新的障碍。即使通过这一权宜之计，民主政体在经济生活的各个部分取得了成功，也面临如何将些分离的计划整合成一个整体的问题。多个分离的计划并不就是一个整体的计划，事实上，很多计划者应会率先承认，它们可能还不如没计划。但是，民主立法机关非常不愿意放弃真正重大事件的决策权，只要它不愿意，别的机构不可能提出全面的计划。大家都还同意计划是必要的，加上民主议会又缺乏能力制订这一计划，这会激起越来越强烈的需求，应该授权政府或者个人，依法行事，承担责任。越来越广泛传播的一个观点就是，要把事做成，承担责任的政府就必须不受民主程序的束缚。

³ It is instructive in this connection briefly to refer to the Government document in which in recent years these problems have been discussed. As long as thirteen years ago, that is before this country finally abandoned economic liberalism, the process of delegating legislative powers had already been carried to a point where it was felt necessary to appoint a committee to investigate "what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the sovereignty of Law". In its report the "Donoughmore Committee" (Report of the [Lord Chancellor's] Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, 1932) showed that even at that date Parliament had resorted "to the practice of wholesale and indiscriminate delegation" but regarded this (it was before we had really glanced into the totalitarian abyss!) as an inevitably and relatively innocuous development. And it is probably true that delegation as such need not be a danger to freedom. The interesting point is why delegation had become necessary on such a scale. First place among the causes

enumerated in the report is given to the fact that "Parliament nowadays passes so many laws every year" and that "much of the detail is so technical as to be unsuitable for Parliamentary discussion". But if this were all there would be no reason why the detail should not be worked out before rather than after Parliament passes a law. What is probably in many cases a much more important reason why, "if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which public opinion requires" is innocently revealed in the little sentence that "many of the laws affect people's lives so closely that elasticity is essential"! What does this mean if not conferment of arbitrary power, power limited by no fixed principles and which in the opinion of Parliament cannot be limited by definite and unambiguous rules?

The cry for an economic dictator is a characteristic stage in the movement towards planning, not unfamiliar in this country. It is now several years since one of the most acute of foreign students of England, the late Elie Halevy, suggested that "if you take a composite photograph of Lord Eustace Percy, Sir Oswald Mosley, and Sir Stafford Cripps, I think you would find this common feature — you would find them all agreeing to say: 'We are living in economic chaos and we cannot get out of it except under some kind of dictatorial leadership'". The number of influential public men whose inclusion would not materially alter the features of the "composite photograph" has since grown considerably.

In Germany, even before Hitler came into power, the movement had already progressed much further. It is important to remember that for some time before 1933 Germany had reached a stage in which it had, in effect, had to be governed dictatorially. Nobody could then doubt that for the time being democracy had broken down, and that sincere democrats like Brüning were no more able to govern democratically than Schleicher or von Papen. Hitler did not have to destroy democracy; he merely took advantage of the decay of democracy and at the critical moment obtained the support of many to whom, though they detested Hitler, he yet seemed the only man strong enough to get things done.

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The argument by which the planners usually try to reconcile us with this development is that so long as democracy retains ultimate control, the essentials of democracy are not affected. Thus Karl Mannheim writes:

The only [sic] way in which a planned society differs from that of the nineteenth century is that more and more spheres of social life, and ultimately each and all of them, are subjected to state control. But if a few controls can be held in check by parliamentary sovereignty, so can many.... in a democratic state sovereignty can be boundlessly strengthened by plenary powers without renouncing democratic control⁴.

This belief overlooks a vital distinction. Parliament can, of course, control the execution of tasks where it can give definite directions, where it has first agreed on the aim and merely delegates the working out of the detail. The situation is entirely different when the reason for the delegation is that there is no real agreement on the ends, when the body charged with the planning has to choose between ends of whose conflict parliament is not even aware, and when the most that can be done is to present to it a plan which has to be accepted or rejected as a whole. There may and probably will be criticism; but as no majority can agree on an alternative plan, and the parts objected to can almost always be represented as essential parts of the whole, it will remain quite ineffective. Parliamentary discussion may be retained as a useful safety-valve, and even more as a convenient medium through which the official answers to complaints are disseminated. It may even prevent some flagrant abuses and successfully insist on particular shortcomings being remedied. But it cannot direct. It will at best be reduced to choosing the persons who are to have practically absolute power. The whole system will tend towards that plebiscitarian dictatorship in which the head of the government is from time to time confirmed in his position by popular vote, but where he has all the powers at his command to make certain that the vote will go in the direction he desires.

呼唤一个经济上的独裁者是朝计划发展的运动中一个特色阶段，对英国来说不陌生。几年前，英国几个思想最精辟的外籍研究人员之一，已故的埃利·阿列维说，“如果你把尤斯塔斯·珀西爵士，奥斯瓦尔德·莫斯利爵士和斯塔福德·克里斯普爵士来张合影，我想你会发现一个共同的特征：你会发现他们都会同意说，‘我们活在经济乱象中，除非有某种独裁式的领导，否则难以拔出泥潭’”。从那以后，可以上“合影”的有影响力的公众人物的人数又能增加不少。

在德国，甚至早在希特勒掌权之前，这个运动进展已经远较英国走在前面。重要的是，要记住，在 1933 年之前有段时间德国就已达到一个阶段，它实际上不得不采取独裁的统治。当时没人会怀疑，民主已经土崩瓦解，诚心实意的民主分子象布吕宁管理这个国家的方式已经比专制的施来谢尔、冯帕彭民主不到哪里去了。希特勒已经没有必要破坏民主，他只是利用了民主的衰落的关键时刻获得了很多人的支持罢了。对那些人来说，尽管讨厌希特勒，但他看起来就像唯一一个有魄力、能成事的人。

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对这一发展，计划主义者通常试图打圆场，说，只要民主政体保持最终的控制，民主的基本要素就不会受影响。因此，卡尔·曼海姆写道：

计划的社会和十九世纪的社会唯一【原文如此】的区别是，越来越多的社会生活圈子、直到最终每一个从而所有圈子都为国家所控制。但是如果议会权力能约束少数控制，照样多数也可.....在一个民主国家，无需放弃民主的治理，绝对的权力能无限地强化国家主权。

这个想法忽略了一个重要的区别。当然，当国会能给出一个确定的方针，能就目标首先达成一致，仅仅把细节授权其它机构执行，是可以控制任务的执行。是因为没有达成一致的目标，所以采用授权的形式；议会甚至根本没有意识到目标之间有矛盾，而负责计划的部门不得不在其中做选择；最多就是整理出一个计划交给议会就整体投票要么行要么不行，那情况是截然不同的。也许会有甚至很可能会有反对的声音；但是没有多数支持的替代方案，而被反对的部分几乎总被说成是整体计划的必不可少的内容，反对没什么用。议会的讨论也许可以保留用来把把关，但更可能的是作为一个媒介方便传达官员对民怨的答复。甚至它偶尔也能防止一些明目张胆的权力滥用，执意补救某些具体的错失。但，这样没法治理国家。它最好被简化到负责选人，给被选者实际上绝对的权力。这样整个制度变成民选独裁，政府首脑的地位时不时地通过民众投票肯定一下，但是他握有绝对的权力确保投票产生他想要的结果。

⁴ K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, 1940, p.340

It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to the fields where true agreement exists, and that in some fields things must be left to chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning, this control cannot be made dependent on a majority being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed upon the people, because this minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at issue. Democratic government has worked successfully where, and so long as, the functions of government were, by a widely accepted creed, restricted to fields where agreement among a majority could be achieved by free discussion; and it is the great merit of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which agreement was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free men. It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate "capitalism". If "capitalism" means here a competitive system based on free disposal over private property, it is far more important to realise that only within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself.

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We have no intention, however, of making a fetish of democracy. It may well be true that our generation talks and thinks too much of democracy and too little of the values which it serves. It cannot be said of democracy, as Lord Acton truly said of liberty, that it "is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end. It is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for the security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society, and of private life." Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom. As such it is by no means infallible or certain. Nor must we forget that there has often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some democracies—and it is at least conceivable that under the government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire majority democratic government might be as oppressive as the worst dictatorship. Our point, however, is not that dictatorship must inevitably extirpate freedom, but rather that planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and the enforcement of ideals, and as such essential if central planning on a large scale is to be possible. The clash between planning and democracy arises simply from the fact that the latter is an obstacle to the suppression of freedom which the direction of economic activity requires. But in so far as democracy ceases to be a guarantee of individual freedom, it may well persist in some form under a totalitarian regime. A true "dictatorship of the proletariat", even if democratic in form, if it undertook centrally to direct the economic system, would probably destroy personal freedom as completely as any autocracy has ever done.

The fashionable concentration on democracy as the main value threatened is not without danger. It is largely responsible for the misleading and unfounded belief that so long as the ultimate source of power is the will of the majority, the power cannot be arbitrary. The false assurance which many people derive from this belief is an important cause of the general unawareness of the dangers which we face. There is no justification for the belief that so long as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; the contrast suggested by this statement is altogether false: it is not the source but the limitation of power which prevents it from being arbitrary. Democratic control may prevent power from becoming arbitrary, but it does not do so by its mere existence. If democracy resolves on a task which necessarily involves the use of power which cannot be guided by fixed rules, it must become arbitrary power.

民主的代价就是，自觉控制只能被约束在意见真正统一的领域；某些领域事情必须放任发展。但在一个依赖于中央计划来运作的社会，管理不可能基于取得多数同意；常常必然是少数人的意愿强加于人民的头上，因为这少数人已经是就有争议的问题能达成一致意见的人数最多的一群了。如果政府的职能，按广泛接受的信条，能被限制于某些领域，在这些领域能够通过自由讨论达成多数一致，那么民主政府就会很成功。自由主义信条最大的优点就是，它尽可能地减少了必须达成意见一致的范围，直到一个在自由社会里意见可能存在一致的程度为止。通常有人说民主不会容忍“资本主义”。如果“资本主义”在这里意味着基于私产自由处置的自由竞争，那么更重要是认识到其实只有在这样的制度下民主才可能。当集体主义信条占了主导，民主不可避免地自行毁灭。

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无论如何，我们无意神化民主。很可能我们这一代对于民主谈得多，想的多，而对于其所服务的价值问题讨论甚少。阿克顿爵士说自由，“它不是达到更高政治目的的一种手段。自由本身就是最高的政治目的。我们需要自由，不是为了更好的公共行政管理，而是为国民社会、个人生活最高层次的追求提供保障。”民主不是这样。民主基本上是一个手段，一个保护内部和平和个人自由的实用工具。因此，民主不可能不犯错，十拿九稳。我们也不能忘记，在某些专制统治下往往有比某些民主政治下更多的文化和精神自由。至少可以想象这种情形，同一类教条主义者构成多数的民主政府，可能会跟最糟糕的独裁统治一样充满压迫。然而，我们的重点不是独裁必定不可避免地消灭自由，而是计划导致独裁，因为独裁是胁迫、强迫推行理想最有效的工具；因此要使大规模地实行中央计划成为可能，那独裁是最基本的。计划和民主的冲突根本就是来自这样一个事实，民主是对压制自由的阻碍，而压制自由是指挥经济活动所必须的。但是，只要民主不再保证个人自由的话，它就可以在独裁政体中以某种形式得以存在。一个真正的“民选独裁”，即使披着民主的外衣，如果它集中指挥经济系统，极可能跟其它专制政体所作所为一样，完全地摧毁个人自由。

把民主视作被威胁的主要价值，而把注意力放在这个上，并非没有危险。这很大程度上导致了一个有误导性、无根据的说法，即，如果权力最终来源于多数的意愿，它就不可能是强权。基于这个说法，很多人得出了错误的判断，这是导致没有普遍意识到我们所面临的危险的一个重要原因。只要权力是通过民主程序赋予的就不是强权的说法，没有道理。这一说法的比照完全错误，不是权力的来源而是权力的约束，能避免权力成为强权。民主监督能够防止权力成为强权，但是光有民主是不行的。民主政治完成一项任务，不可避免地涉及权力的使用，如果该权力没有确切的原则规范，它必然成为强权。