

8. WHO, WHOM?

The finest opportunity ever given to the world was thrown away because the passion for equality made vain the hope for freedom.

Lord Acton

It is significant that one of the commonest objections to competition is that it is "blind". It is not irrelevant to recall that to the ancients blindness was an attribute of their deity of justice. Although competition and justice may have little else in common, it is as much a commendation of competition as of justice that it is no respecter of persons. That it is impossible to foretell who will be the lucky ones or whom disaster will strike, that rewards and penalties are not shared out according to somebody's views about the merits or demerits of different people, but depend on their capacity and their luck, is as important as that in framing legal rules we should not be able to predict which particular person will gain and which will lose by their application. And this is none the less true because in competition chance and good luck are often as important as skill and foresight in determining the fate of different people.

The choice open to us is not between a system in which everybody will get what he deserves according to some absolute and universal standard of right, and one where the individual shares are determined partly by accident or good or ill chance, but between a system where it is the will of a few persons that decides who is to get what, and one where it depends at least partly on the ability and enterprise of the people concerned and partly on unforeseeable circumstances. This is no less relevant because in a system of free enterprise chances are not equal, since such a system is necessarily based on private property and (though perhaps not with the same necessity) on inheritance, with the differences in opportunity which these create. There is indeed a strong case for reducing this inequality of opportunity as far as congenital differences permit and as it is possible to do so without destroying the impersonal character of the process by which everybody has to take his chance and no person's view about what is right and desirable overrules that of others.

The fact that the opportunities open to the poor in a competitive society are much more restricted than those open to the rich does not make it less true that in such a society the poor are much more free than a person commanding much greater material comfort in a different type of society. Although under competition the probability that a man who starts poor will reach great wealth is much smaller than is true of the man who has inherited property, it is not only possible for the former, but the competitive system is the only one where it depends solely on him and not on the favours of the mighty, and where nobody can prevent a man from attempting to achieve this result. It is only because we have forgotten what unfreedom means that we often overlook the patent fact that in every real sense a badly paid unskilled worker in this country has more freedom to shape his life than many a small entrepreneur in Germany or a much better paid engineer or manager in Russia. Whether it is a question of changing his job or the place where he lives, of professing certain views or of spending his leisure in a particular manner, although sometimes the price he may have to pay for following his inclinations may be high, and to many appear too high, there are no absolute impediments, no dangers to bodily security and freedom that confine him by brute force to the task and the environment to which a superior has assigned him.

8. 谁主，谁宾？

对平等的热衷，使自由的希望成空，浪费了这个世界上最好的机会。

阿克顿爵士

对竞争最普遍的反对意见是，它是“盲目”的，这很有意思。回想一下，在古代，盲目是正义的神性之一，这并非毫不相关。虽然竞争和正义在其它方面没什么共同之处，但二者都推崇对人一视同仁。无法预言谁走运、谁遭灾；是赏是罚不取决于某人对别人优点缺点的看法，而取决于能力与运气，这跟构建法律规则时不能事先预测对具体适用人群是利是弊，一样地重要。并且，无论如何这也是正确的，因为在竞争中对于决定个人命运机会和运气通常与能力和眼光同样重要。

我们面对的选择，不是在以下两种制度二选一：按照绝对、普遍的权利标准每一个人得其应得的制度，与个人所得份额部分随机决定，运好运歹的制度；而是这两种制度二选一：少数人的意志决定谁得到什么的制度，与所得至少部分取决于才能与进取心、部分取决于无法预料的环境的制度。同样有关的内容还有，在一个自由创业的制度下，机会是不均等的，因为这样的制度必然基于私有产权和继承权（尽管二者可能不是同等必要），这就导致了机会上的差别。的确，我们很有理由，在先天差别允许，但不致于破坏某人必然赌一把、观点不受他人左右等竞争客观因素的范围内，尽可能减少机会的不均等。

在竞争社会中，穷人比富人机会有限得多，但这不能否认，在同样社会里的穷人比在其它类型社会里拥有得多物质享受的人有多得多的自由。尽管在竞争条件下，出身贫寒的人比继承有父辈遗产的人取得巨大财富的可能性低很多，但前者不但可能致富，而且竞争制度是唯一一种他仅靠自己努力、不靠权贵施舍、无人可以阻止他为成功而努力的制度。仅仅因为我们已经忘了不自由意味着什么，我们常常忽略了一个明显的事实，在英国一个无论从哪个方面讲都待遇很差的无技能工人比德国很多中小业主、俄国收入高很多的工程师、经理有更多的自由来经营自己的生活。无论是想换个工作还是搬个地方住，无论是公开发表某些观点还是具体如何消磨闲暇时光，尽管有时候他为自己偏好不得不付出很高的代价，甚至对很多人来说过高的代价，但不会有绝对的障碍，不会有因逃避上级分配的任务和环境而失去人身安全和自由的危险。

That the ideal of justice of most socialists would be satisfied if merely private income from property were abolished and the differences between the earned incomes of different people remained what they are now is true¹. What these people forget is that in transferring all property in the means of production to the state they put the state in a position whereby its action must in effect decide all other incomes. The power thus given to the state and the demand that the state should use it to "plan" means nothing else than that it should use it in full awareness of all these effects.

To believe that the power which is thus conferred on the state is merely transferred to it from others is erroneous. It is a power which is newly created and which in a competitive society nobody possesses. So long as property is divided among many owners, none of them acting independently has exclusive power to determine the income and position of particular people—nobody is tied to him except by the fact that he may offer better terms than anybody else.

What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves. If all the means of production were vested in a single hand, whether it be nominally that of "society" as a whole, or that of a dictator, whoever exercises this control has complete power over us. Who can seriously doubt that a member of a small racial or religious minority will be freer with no property so long as fellow members of his community have property and are therefore able to employ him, than he would be if private property were abolished and he became owner of a nominal share in the communal property. Or that the power which a multiple millionaire, who may be my neighbour and perhaps my employer, has over me is very much less than that which the smallest fonctionnaire possesses who wields the coercive power of the state and on whose discretion it depends whether and how I am to be allowed to live or to work? And who will deny that a world in which the wealthy are powerful is still a better world than one in which only the already powerful can acquire wealth?

It is pathetic, yet at the same time encouraging, to find as prominent an old communist as Mr. Max Eastman rediscovering this truth²:

It seems obvious to me now [he writes in a recent article] - though I have been slow, I must say, in coming to the conclusion - that the institution of private property is one of the main things that have given man that limited amount of free and equalness that Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this institution. Strangely enough Marx was the first to see this. He is the one who informed us, looking backwards, that the evolution of private capitalism with its free market had been a precondition for the evolution of all our democratic freedoms. It never occurred to him, looking forward, that if this was so, these other freedoms might disappear with the abolition of the free market.

大多数社会主义者正义的理想满足于，仅仅废除来自私人财产收入，而不同人收入的差别维持现状，这是事实。这些人忘了的是，当把所有财产以生产资料方式转交给国家的时候，他们就赋予了国家必然实际上决定其他一切收入的地位。这样赋予国家的权力和要求国家用它来作“计划”仅仅意味着国家应当在完全了解其全部效果的前提下使用该权力。

相信因此赋予国家的这些权力仅仅是从其他人手里转移给国家的，这是错误的。这是一个新创造出来的权力，是竞争社会的任何人都未曾拥有的权力。只要财产分散于多个所有者手中，他们中任何一个单独行动都无权独家决定其他人的收入和地位——除非他给出比其他人更优越条件外，没有人会跟他绑在一起。

我们这一代忘了的是，私人财产制度是对自由最重要的保障，对有产的人如此，对无产的人也同样如此。这仅仅是因为，生产资料的控制分散在独立行为的多个人手里，没有人单独拥有控制我们的完整权力，我们作为个体能决定自己要做什么。如果所有的生产资料授予一手，不管名义上是全“社会”，还是一个独裁者，无论谁行使控制权，都对我们有完全的控制。谁能真地怀疑，一个少数民族、或信小众宗教的人，无产，只要他的族人或教友有产，因此能雇佣他，比废除私产、成为公共财产名义上股东的他，更自由？或者，我那百万富翁邻居或者百万富翁老板对我的控制权比一个挥舞政府强权，能任意决定我生活工作机会与方式的官帽最小的官僚还要少？谁会否认一个富人得势的世界仍比一个有权才能致富的世界要好呢？

有点可悲，同时又有点鼓舞人心，我们发现马克斯·伊斯特曼这个老牌共产主义者重新发现了真相：

尽管我脑子转得慢，我不得不说，现在这个结论对我而言显而易见【他最近写道】，私人财产制度是给予人有限的自由和平等的主要因素之一，而马克思却想通过废除该制度给予无限的自由和平等。够奇怪地是，马克思是第一个看到这点的。正是他告诉我们，回头来看，私人资本主义随自由市场的发展是我们全部民主自由发展的先决条件。但他从没看到，展望未来，如果他自己的说是对的，自由市场被废止后，其它那些自由都可能消失。

¹ It is probable that we habitually overestimate the extent to which inequality of incomes is mainly caused by income derived from property, and therefore the extent to which the major inequalities would be abolished by abolishing income from property. What little information we have about the distribution of incomes in Soviet Russia does not suggest that the inequalities are there substantially smaller than in a capitalist society. Max Eastman (*The End of Socialism in Russia*, 1937, pp. 30-4) gives some information from official Russian sources which suggest that the difference between the highest and the lowest salaries paid in Russia is of the

same order of magnitude (about 50 to 1) as in the United States; and Leon Trotsky, according to an article quoted by James Burnham (*The Managerial Revolution*, 1941, p. 43), estimated as late as 1939 that "the upper 11 or 12 per cent. of the Soviet population now receives approximately 50 per cent. of the national income. This differentiation is sharper than in the United States, where the upper 10 per cent. of the population receives approximately 35 per cent. of the national income."

² Max Eastman in *The Reader's Digest*, July 1941, p. 39.

It is sometimes said, in answer to such apprehensions, that there is no reason why the planner should determine the incomes of individuals. The social and political difficulties involved in deciding the shares of different people in the national income are so obvious that even the most inveterate planner may well hesitate before he charges any authority with this task. Probably everybody who realises what it involves would prefer to confine planning to production, to use it only to secure a "rational organisation of industry", leaving the distribution of incomes as far as possible to impersonal forces. Although it is impossible to direct industry without exercising some influence on distribution, and although no planner will wish to leave distribution entirely to the forces of the market, they would probably all prefer to confine themselves to seeing that this distribution conforms to certain general rules of equity and fairness, that extreme inequalities are avoided, and that the relation between the remuneration of the major classes is just, without undertaking the responsibility for the position of particular people within their class, or for the gradations and differentiations between smaller groups and individuals.

We have already seen that the close interdependence of all economic phenomena makes it difficult to stop planning just where we wish, and that, once the free working of the market is impeded beyond a certain degree, the planner will be forced to extend his controls till they become all-comprehensive. These economic considerations, which explain why it is impossible to stop deliberate control just where we should wish, are strongly reinforced by certain social or political tendencies whose strength makes itself increasingly felt as planning extends.

Once it becomes increasingly true, and is generally recognised, that the position of the individual is determined not by impersonal forces, not as a result of the competitive effort of many, but by the deliberate decision of authority, the attitude of the people towards their position in the social order necessarily changes. There will always exist inequalities which will appear unjust to those who suffer from them, disappointments which will appear unmerited, and strokes of misfortune which those hit have not deserved. But when these things occur in a society which is consciously directed, the way in which people will react will be very different from what it is when they are nobody's conscious choice. Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is determined by impersonal forces, than when it is due to design. In a competitive society it is no slight to a person, no offence to his dignity, to be told by any particular firm that it has no need for his services, or that it cannot offer him a better job. It is true that in periods of prolonged mass-unemployment the effect on many may be very similar. But there are other and better methods to prevent that scourge than central direction. But the unemployment or the loss of income which will always affect some in any society is certainly less degrading if it is the result of misfortune and not deliberately imposed by authority. However bitter the experience, it would be very much worse in a planned society. There individuals will have to decide not whether a person is needed for a particular job, but whether he is of use for anything, and how useful he is. His position in life must be assigned to him by somebody else.

回应这些担忧, 有时会说, 没理由为什么应该由计划者来决定个人收入。确定国家收入中不同人的份额在社会上与政治上的困难显而易见, 即使最铁杆的计划者在让任何政府部门负责该事之前也会犹豫再三。很可能每一个意识到它会涉及哪些内容的人都宁愿把计划局限在生产上, 仅以确保“产业的合理组织”, 而把收入的分配尽可能地留给非人为的客观因素。尽管在分配上不施加影响无法管控产业, 尽管计划者也不愿意把分配完全留给市场力量, 但他们很可能都宁愿坐视不管阶层内具体人群地位、小团体或者个人等级的厘定与区分, 而让分配服从某种公平合理的一般性原则, 避免极端的的不平等, 保持主要社会阶层之间薪酬关系合理。

我们已经看到所有经济现象紧密依存, 这使得计划难以恰到好处, 一旦市场的自由运行被干扰到一定程度, 计划者就会被迫扩大管控范围, 直到最后一切全面纳入计划。经济上的考虑解释了为什么控制不能恰到好处, 某些社会或政治的势头更加强了这一观点, 随着计划范围扩大, 这些势头的影响逐渐明显。

个人的地位不再由客观力量决定、不再是多方竞争的结果了, 而由政府有意决定, 这种情况一旦逐步成真, 并为大众普遍认识到的时候, 人们对社会秩序中自身地位的态度也必然发生变化。社会总是存在对受害者显得不公平的不平等, 不应该有的失望, 以及那些遭受不应该遭受的不幸。但是, 当这些发生在自觉控制的社会中, 人们反应的方式, 与它们并非出于任何人的有意选择, 会大相径庭。客观因素导致的不平等, 比有意为之的不平等, 毫无疑问更易容忍, 更少影响个人尊严。在竞争社会中, 某人被公司告知他们不需要他的服务、或者不能给他一个更好的工作, 不是小看他, 对他的尊严没有冒犯。在长期、大面积失业的多个历史时期, 的确很多人受到的影响非常类似。但是避免这样的灾难, 有别的方法来得比中央指挥更好。在任何社会中, 总会影响到部分人的失业或者收入减少, 如果是运气不佳, 并非政府有意强加, 肯定没那么掉份儿。无论情况多么痛苦, 在计划社会中, 只能更痛苦。在那里, 有人不是确定某一项具体的工作是否需要你, 而是你是不是有用、多有用。他生活中的地位必须由他人指派。

While people will submit to suffering which may hit anyone, they will not so easily submit to suffering which is the result of the decision of authority. It may be bad to be just a cog in an impersonal machine; but it is infinitely worse if we can no longer leave it, if we are tied to our place and to the superiors who have been chosen for us. Dissatisfaction of everybody with his lot will inevitably grow with the consciousness that it is the result of deliberate human decision.

Once government has embarked upon planning for the sake of justice, it cannot refuse responsibility for anybody's fate or position. In a planned society, we shall all know that we are better or worse off than others, not because of circumstances which nobody controls, and which it is impossible to foresee with certainty, but because some authority wills it. And all our efforts directed towards improving our position will have to aim, not at foreseeing and preparing as well as we can for the circumstances over which we have no control, but at influencing in our favour the authority which has all the power. The nightmare of English nineteenth-century political thinkers: the state in which "no avenue to wealth and honour would exist save through the government"³ would be realised in a completeness which they never imagined—though familiar enough in some countries which have since passed to totalitarianism.

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As soon as the state takes upon itself the task of planning the whole economic life, the problem of the due station of the different individuals and groups must indeed inevitably become the central political problem. As the coercive power of the state will alone decide who is to have what, the only power worth having will be a share in the exercise of this directing power. There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political questions in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who wields the coercive power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all occasions.

I believe it was Lenin himself who introduced to Russia the famous phrase "who, whom?"—during the early years of Soviet rule the byword in which the people summed up the universal problem of a socialist society⁴. Who plans whom, who directs and dominates whom, who assigns to other people their station in life, and who is to have his due allotted by others? These become necessarily the central issues to be decided solely by the supreme power.

More recently an American student of politics has enlarged upon Lenin's phrase and asserted that the problem of all government is "who gets what, when, and how?" In a way this is not untrue. That all government affects the relative position of different people and that there is under any system scarcely an aspect of our lives which may not be affected by government action, is certainly true. In so far as government does anything at all, its action will always have some effect on "who gets what, when, and how".

There are, however, two fundamental distinctions to be made. Firstly, particular measures may be taken without the knowledge of how they will affect particular individuals, and without aiming at such particular effects. This point we have already discussed. Secondly, it is the extent of the activities of the government which decides whether everything that any person gets at any time depends on the government, or whether its influence is confined to whether some people will get somethings in some way at some time. Here lies the whole difference between a free and a totalitarian system.

可能落在任何人头上的痛苦正好落在你头上，你会接受它，但如果痛苦是政府决策的结果时，就不那么容易接受了。我们如果仅仅被当作机器上的一个零件，可能比较糟；但是如果我们一辈子被绑在一个地方、接受同一个上级的领导，而这个上级是别人选的，我们又不能离开，情况要糟得不知道哪里去。当每一个人逐步意识到一切的不满都是人为的结果，不可避免地，他会越来越不满。

为了公平起见，一旦开始计划，政府就不能推卸对每一个人命运和地位所负有的责任。在计划社会里，我们都应该知道，我们比别人好比别人差，不是因为无法预见、无法控制的情况，而是因为某些政府部门意志使然。为了提高地位，我们的一切努力，不再是预料我们无法控制的情况并尽可能地做准备，转而不得不瞄准大权在握的政府部门，影响它做出有利于我们的决定。十九世纪英国思想家的噩梦，“除了通过政府，发财、成名别无他处”，将以他们无法想象的彻底的方式成为现实——尽管在几个已成为极权主义的国家相当熟悉。

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一旦国家承担起计划整个经济生活的任务，不同个人、团体应有的地位问题就真地不可避免地成了最中心的政治问题。当政府的强制权力单独来决定谁将得到什么，唯一值得拥有的权力就是参与行使这种指挥权。一切经济、社会问题都将成为政治问题，因为问题的解决方案毫无例外地取决于谁掌握强制权力、谁说了算。

我相信是列宁自己在俄国引入了这句著名的话“谁主，谁宾？”——在苏维埃统治早期，人们用来概括社会主义社会普遍问题的口头禅。谁计划谁，谁指挥和支配谁，谁指派他人社会地位，还有谁会得到别人给他的一杯羹？这必然成了由最高权力单独决定的最中心的问题。

最近一个美国政治学学者，扩展了列宁的话，声称所有政府的问题都是“谁在什么时候以什么方式得到什么”。某种意义上这并非不对。所有政府都影响不同人的相对地位，在任何制度下，我们生活很少有什么方面不被政府行为所影响，这毫无疑问是真的。只要政府无论做什么，它的行为总会影响“谁在什么时候以什么方式得到什么”。

然而有两个根本的不同。首先，可能采取的具体措施，是在对具体人群的效果未知，不针对特定效果的前提下。这点我们已经讨论过了。其次，是政府行为的范围。是否任何人在任何时候得到任何东西都取决于政府，或者是否政府影响仅局限于某些人以某种方式在某些时候得到某些东西。自由制度与极权制度全部区别就在于此。

³The actual words are those of the young Disraeli.

⁴ Cf. M. Mugggeridge, *Winter in Moscow*, 1934; A. Feiler, *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, 1930.

The contrast between a liberal and a totally planned system is characteristically illustrated by the common complaints of Nazis and socialists of the "artificial separations of economics and politics", and their equally common demand for the dominance of politics over economics. These phrases presumably mean not only that economic forces are now allowed to work for ends which are not part of the policy of the government, but also that economic power can be used independently of government direction and for ends of which the government may not approve. But the alternative is not merely that there would be only one power, but that this single power, the ruling group, should have control over all human ends, and particularly that it should have complete power over the position of each individual in society.

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That a government which undertakes to direct economic activity will have to use its power to realise somebody's ideal of distributive justice is certain. But how can and how will it use that power? By what principles will it or ought it to be guided? Is there a definite answer to the innumerable questions of relative merits that will arise and which will have to be solved deliberately? Is there a scale of values on which reasonable people can be expected to agree, which would justify a new hierarchical order of society, and is likely to satisfy the demands for justice?

There is only one general principle, one simple rule which would indeed provide a definite answer to all these questions: equality, complete and absolute equality of all individuals in all those points which are subject to human control. If this were generally regarded as desirable (quite apart from the question whether it would be practicable, i.e., whether it would provide adequate incentives), it would give the vague idea of distributive justice a clear meaning and would give the planner definite guidance. But nothing is further from the truth than that people in general regard mechanical equality of this kind as desirable. No socialist movement which aimed at complete equality has ever gained substantial support. What socialism promised was not an absolutely equal, but a more just and more equal distribution. Not equality in the absolute sense, but "greater equality", is the only goal which is seriously aimed at.

Though these two ideals sound very similar, they are as different as possible as far as our problem is concerned. While absolute equality would clearly determine the planner's task, the desire for greater equality is merely negative, no more than an expression of dislike of the present state of affairs; and so long as we are not prepared to say that every move in the direction towards complete equality is desirable, it answers scarcely any of the questions the planner will have to decide.

This is not a quibble about words. We face here a crucial issue which the similarity of the terms used is apt to conceal. While agreement on complete equality would answer all the problems of merit the planner must answer, the formula of the approach to greater equality answers practically none. Its content is hardly more definite than the phrases "common good" or "social welfare". It does not free us from the necessity of deciding in every particular instance between the merits of particular individuals or groups and gives us no help in that decision. All it tells us in effect is to take from the rich as much as we can. But when it comes to the distribution of the spoils, the problem is the same as if the formula of "greater equality" had never been conceived.

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纳粹分子和社会主义者共同抱怨“经济与政治人为的分开”，同样地要求政治支配经济，典型地说明了自由主义和完全计划的制度的对照区别。“经济与政治人为的分开”的说法想必意味着，不仅经济力量现在可以为不是政府政策内容的目标服务，而且经济力量可以不受政府指挥，为政府未必许可的目标服务。但，与之相反的另一制度，不仅是只有一种权力，而且这唯一的权力，即统治集团的权力，应该控制一切人类目标，特别是，对每个人的社会地位有绝对的权力。

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可以肯定，承担指挥经济活动任务的政府必然使用权力来实现某些人分配公道的理想。但，政府怎么样才能够、并且将怎样使用这个权力？基于什么样的原则，或者应该基于什么样的原则去规范它？由此产生的、不得不特意解决的无数多的孰轻孰重的问题，是否有一定的答案？是否有一个理性的人可望赞同的价值标准，能够判断新的社会等级制度的合理性，因而可能满足对公道的需求？

只有一个普遍原则，一个真的可以为所有这些问题提供确切答案的简单规则：平等，所有人在所有服从人为管控的问题上完全并且绝对的平等。如果普遍认为这是可取的（这得与实际上是否可行的问题，也就是能否提供足够激励的问题区分开），它将给分配公道这个模糊的想法一个清晰的意义，并且为计划者明确遵循。但，倘使人们普遍认为这种机械式的平等是可取，那没有比这更离谱的了。没有一个旨在完全平等的社会主义运动曾获得过有力的支持。社会主义承诺的不是绝对的平等，而是一个更加公道、更加平等的分配。不是绝对意义上的平等，而是“更大的平等”，才是唯一认真针对的目标。

尽管这两个理想听起来很相似，只要针对我们讨论的问题来看，它们大相径庭。绝对的平等清楚地确定了计划者的任务，追求更大的平等则不然，它仅仅表达了对现有的不满；只要我们不能说每一步都在走向完全平等，计划者必须回答的问题就基本上一个都没回答。

这不是文字上的诡辩。我们在这里面对一个容易被字面上的相似掩盖的重要问题。赞同完全平等回答了计划者必须回答的所有价值的衡量问题，追求更大平等的方案在实际上一无所用。其内容比“共同好处”或者“社会福利”的说法确切不了多少。它不能让我们摆脱必须在每一个具体实例中确定具体个人、具体群体孰轻孰重的问题，对我们做决定毫无帮助。它的全部内容实际上就是，尽可能地索取富人。但当面对分赃时，同样的问题还在，就好像从来不曾有过“更大的平等”这个方案。

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Most people find it difficult to admit that we do not possess moral standards which would enable us to settle these questions—if not perfectly, at least to greater general satisfaction than is done by the competitive system. Have we not all some idea of what is a "just price", or a "fair wage"? Can we not rely on the strong sense of fairness of the people? And even if we do not now agree fully on what is just or fair in a particular case, would popular ideas not soon consolidate into more definite standards if people were given an opportunity to see their ideals realised?

Unfortunately, there is little ground for such hopes. What standards we have are derived from the competitive regime we have known, and would necessarily disappear soon after the disappearance of competition. What we mean by a just price, or a fair wage, is either the customary price or wage, the return which past experience has made people expect, or the price or wage that would exist if there were no monopolistic exploitation. The only important exception to this used to be the claim of the workers to the "full produce of their labour", to which so much of socialist doctrine traces back. But there are few socialists today who believe that in a socialist society the output of each industry would be entirely shared by the workers of that industry; for this would mean that workers in industries using a great deal of capital would have a much larger income than those in industries using little capital, which most socialists would regard as very unjust. And it is now fairly generally agreed that this particular claim was based on an erroneous interpretation of the facts. But once the claim of the individual worker to the whole of "his" product is disallowed, and the whole of the return from capital is to be divided among all workers, the problem of how to divide it raises the same basic issue.

What the "just price" of a particular commodity or the "fair" remuneration for a particular service is, might conceivably be determined objectively if the quantities needed were independently fixed. If these were given irrespective of cost, the planner might try to find what price or wage is necessary to bring forth this supply. But the planner must also decide how much is to be produced of each kind of goods, and in so doing he determines what will be the just price or fair wage to pay. If the planner decides that fewer architects or watch-makers are wanted and that the need can be met by those who are willing to stay in the trade at a lower remuneration, the "fair" wage will be lower. In deciding the relative importance of the different ends, the planner also decides the relative importance of the different groups and persons. As he is not supposed to treat the people merely as a means, he must take account of these effects and consciously balance the importance of the different ends against the effects of his decision. This means, however, that he will necessarily exercise direct control over the conditions of the different people.

我们没有能解决这些问题的道德准则，很多人发现这点很难接受——如果不完美，至少应该有比采用竞争制度来解决总的来说要更满意一些的吧。我们不是有过象“公道价”或者“公平工资”一类的想法吗？我们难道不能依靠大家强烈的公平感吗？并且，即使对某个具体例子就什么是公道、公平我们现在不能完全取得一致意见，如果人们有机会看到理想实现，公众的想法难道不能很快被提炼成更加确定的标准？

很不幸，这样的希望毫无根据。我们已有的准则都来自于我们已知的竞争性制度，竞争一旦消失，这些准则很快也必然消失。我们所说的公道价、公平工资是我们习惯的价格、工资或者根据历史经验所预期的回报，或者是没有垄断剥削情况下可能存在的价格或工资。唯一重要的例外就是，过去有个说法，工人拥有“他们自己全部劳动所获”，很多社会主义学说都可以追溯到这个说法。但是今天很少还有社会主义者相信，在社会主义社会，每个行业的产出应该完全被这个行业的工人分享；因为资本密集行业的工人收入会因此比资本较少行业的工人高，而大多数社会主义者认为这非常不公道。现在相当普遍地认为这个说法是基于对事实的错误解释。但是一旦不允许工人个人拥有“他的”全部产品，来自资本的回报就得由所有工人瓜分，怎么分就带来了同样的基本问题。

如果固定所需商品数量，某种商品“公道价”是多少，某项服务“公平”报酬是多少，可以想象也许能够客观地决定。如果不计成本，计划者可能可以设法找出什么样的价格或者工资可以保证供应。但，计划者还必须确定每类商品应该生产多少，这样他才可以确定要付的公道价和公平薪资。如果计划者决定要减少建筑师或者钟表匠，如果有人愿意收取较低费用以维持生意的话，“公平”工资就得低点。决定不同目标相对重要性的同时，计划者还得决定不同团体和个人的相对重要性。因为他不应该把人民当作工具来看待，他还必须考虑决定造成的影响，有意地平衡不同目标的重要性和决定所起各种的影响。不管怎样，这意味着他必须对不同人的各种情况施以直接控制。

This applies to the relative position of individuals no less than to that of the different occupational groups. We are in general far too apt to think of incomes within a given trade or profession as more or less uniform. But the differences between the incomes, not only of the most and the least successful doctor or architect, writer or cinema actor, boxer or jockey, but also of the more and the less successful plumber or market gardener, grocer or tailor, are as great as those between the propertied and the propertyless classes. And although, no doubt, there would be some attempt at standardisation by creating categories, the necessity of discrimination between individuals would remain the same, whether it were exercised by fixing their individual incomes or by allocating them to particular categories.

We need say no more about the likelihood of men in a free society submitting to such control or about their remaining free if they submitted. On the whole question what John Stuart Mill wrote nearly a hundred years ago remains equally true today:

A fixed rule, like that of equality, might be acquiesced in, and so might chance, or an external necessity; but that a handful of human beings should weigh everybody in the balance, and give more to one and less to another at their sole pleasure and judgement, would not be borne unless from persons believed to be more than men, and backed by supernatural terrors.

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These difficulties need not lead to open clashes so long as socialism is merely the aspiration of a limited and fairly homogeneous group. They come to the surface only when a socialist policy is actually attempted with the support of the many different groups which together compose the majority of a people. Then it soon becomes the one burning question which of the different sets of ideals shall be imposed upon all by making the whole resources of the country serve it. It is because successful planning requires the creation of a common view on the essential values that the restriction of our freedom with regard to material things touches so directly on our spiritual freedom.

Socialists, the cultivated parents of the barbarous offspring they have produced, traditionally hope to solve this problem by education. But what does education mean in this respect? Surely we have learnt that knowledge cannot create new ethical values, that no amount of learning will lead people to hold the same views on the moral issues which a conscious ordering of all social relations raises. It is not rational conviction but the acceptance of a creed which is required to justify a particular plan. And, indeed, socialists everywhere were the first to recognise that the task they had set themselves required the general acceptance of a common Weltanschauung, of a definite set of values. It was in these efforts to produce a mass movement supported by such a single world view, that the socialists first created most of the instruments of indoctrination of which Nazis and Fascists have made such effective use.

In Germany and Italy the Nazis and Fascists did indeed not have much to invent. The usages of the new political movements which pervaded all aspects of life had in both countries already been introduced by the socialists. The idea of a political party which embraces all activities of the individual from the cradle to the grave, which claims to guide his views on everything, and which delights in making all problems questions of party Weltanschauung, was first put into practice by the socialists. An Austrian socialist writer, speaking of the socialist movement of his country, reports with pride that it was its "characteristic feature that it created special organisations for every field of activities of workers and employees".⁵

这种对不同的个人相对地位的说法对不同的职业团体同样适应。通常我们过分倾向于认为同一个行业内或者同一职业大家的收入或多或少是一致的。但收入的差别，不仅仅是最成功和最不成功的医生、建筑师、作家或者演员、拳击手、马师之间的差别，即使是较好和较差的水管工、园丁、杂货铺老板或者裁缝之间的差别也跟有产和无产阶级之间的差别一样大。并且毫无疑问，尽管有人会试图分门别类把收入标准化，但无论是固定他们的个人收入还是分门别类，个人歧视必然同样存在。

自由社会里人们愿意服从这种控制，或者如果服从这种控制仍能保留自由的可能性，我们无需多说。就整个问题而言，差不多一百多年前约翰·斯图亚特·密尔所说今天仍然正确：

也许可以默许一些固定的规则譬如平等、也譬如机会或者外部必需品；但是少数几个人仅凭其喜恶判断，权衡他人、给多给少，是不能忍受的，除非他们是超人、有超自然的恐怖能力为后盾。

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只要社会主义还只是一个人数量有限志趣相同的团体的共同向往，这些困难不至于引起公开的冲突。只有社会主义者得到多个不同集团组成的多数的支持，开始实际上试图推行政策的时候，问题才浮出水面。这样，究竟向全国人民推行哪套思想并举全国之力服务它很快成为一个迫切的问题。计划要成功需要建立共同的基本价值观，所以限制物质相关的自由会直接触及我们精神的自由。

社会主义者，其野蛮后代的文明父辈，传统上希望通过教育来解决这个问题。但从这个角度教育意味着什么？肯定，我们已经知道，知识不能产生新的伦理价值，知识的积累不能使人用以自觉调整一切社会关系的道德问题达成一致见解。判断某项具体的计划是否合理不是需要理性的说服而是接受信条。的确，是各地社会主义者首先认识到，他们为自己安排的任务需要普遍接受一个共同的世界观，一套明确的价值标准。正是在发动单一世界观支持的大规模群众运动中，社会主义者首先创造了思想灌输的工具，这些工具后来被纳粹分子、法西斯分子有效地利用了。

在德国和意大利，纳粹和法西斯分子真的不要发明什么。渗透生活方方面面的新的政治运动早被社会主义者引入这两个国家。组建一个政党，囊括个人从生到死一切活动，声称指导对一切问题的看法，喜欢将所有问题归结为党的世界观的问题，就是社会主义者首先将想法付诸实践的。一位奥地利的社会主义作家，谈及本国社会主义运动时，自豪地说“为工人和职工的每一个活动领域建立专门组织是其特色。”

⁵ G. Wieser, *Ein Staat stirbt, Oesterreich 1934-1938*, Paris, 1938, p. 41.

But though the Austrian socialists may have gone further in this respect than others, the situation was not very different elsewhere. It was not the Fascists but the socialists who began to collect children from the tenderest age into political organisations to make sure that they grew up as good proletarians. It was not the Fascists but the socialists who first thought of organising sports and games, football and hiking, in party clubs where the members would not be infected by other views. It was the socialists who first insisted that the party member should distinguish himself from others by the modes of greeting and the forms of address. It was they who by their organisation of "cells" and devices for the permanent supervision of private life created the prototype of the totalitarian party. Balilla and Hitlerjugend, Dopolavoro and Kraft durch Freude, political uniforms and military party formations, are all little more than imitations of older socialist institutions⁶.

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So long as the socialist movement in a country is closely bound up with the interests of a particular group, usually the more highly skilled industrial workers, the problem of creating a common view on the desirable status of the different members of society is comparatively simple. The movement is immediately concerned with the status of one particular group and its aim is to raise that status relatively to other groups. The character of the problem changes, however, as in the course of the progressive advance towards socialism it becomes more and more evident to everybody that his income and general position is determined by the coercive apparatus of the state, that he can maintain or improve his position only as a member of an organised group capable of influencing or controlling the state machine in his interest. In the tug-of-war between the various pressure groups which arises at this stage, it is by no means necessary that the interests of the poorest and most numerous groups should prevail. Nor is it necessarily an advantage for the older socialist parties, who avowedly represented the interests of a particular group, to have been the first in the field, and to have designed their whole ideology to appeal to the manual workers in industry. Their very success, and their insistence on the acceptance of the whole creed, is bound to create a powerful countermovement—not by the capitalists, but by the very large and equally propertyless classes who find their relative status threatened by the advance of the elite of the industrial workers.

Socialist theory and socialist tactics, even where they have not been dominated by Marxist dogma, have been based everywhere on the idea of a division of society into two classes with common but mutually conflicting interests: capitalists and industrial workers. Socialism counted on a rapid disappearance of the old middle class and completely disregarded the rise of a new middle class, the countless army of clerks and typists, administrative workers and school teachers, tradesmen and small officials, and the lower ranks of the professions. For a time these classes often provided many of the leaders of the labour movement. But as it became increasingly clear that the position of those classes was deteriorating relatively to that of the industrial workers, the ideals which guided the latter lost much of their appeal to the others. While they were all socialists in the sense that they disliked the capitalist system and wanted a deliberate sharing out of wealth according to their ideas of justice, these ideas proved to be very different from those embodied in the practice of the older socialist parties.

但，尽管在这方面奥地利社会主义者可能比其他社会主义者超前了一步，其他方面情况并没有太大差别。不是法西斯而是社会主义者率先把幼童编入政治组织来教育，确保长成优秀的无产者。不是法西斯而是社会主义者首先想到，在成员不受其它观点影响的党内俱乐部组织体育和竞技，足球和徒步等活动。是社会主义者首先坚持党员必须通过敬礼方式和称呼形式区别于群众。是他们，通过“细胞”一样的组织和对私人生活进行永久监督的措施建立起极权政党的原型。意大利少年先锋队，希特勒青年团，意大利康乐俱乐部，以及德国欢乐力量，政治性的制服，军事化党的编制，不过都是模仿之前的社会主义机构。

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只要一个国家的社会主义群众运动和某集团通常是掌握较高技能的工厂工人的利益紧密绑定在一起，社会各阶层就理想的社会地位达成共识的问题就相对简单。群众运动随即关注集团的社会地位，其目标就是相对其他集团提高自身地位。问题的性质改变了，然而，在朝社会主义继续前进的过程中，每个人都会越来越明白，他的收入和总的地位都由国家强制性的官僚机构来决定，他只有通过作为组织的一员，该组织有能力为了他的利益影响和控制国家机器，才能维持和提高自身地位。在这个阶段崛起的各势力集团的拉锯战中，最贫穷最广大群众的利益绝不一定占优势。老牌社会主义政党，宣称代表某些集团的利益，最早出现，为了吸引行业体力劳动者设计了整套意识形态，也未必有优势。他们的每一步成功，和他们坚持要求接受整个教条注定产生强有力的抗拒——不过不是来自资本家的抵抗，而是为数众多的、同样无产的阶级的对抗，因为他们发现他们的相对地位受到了产业工人中崛起精英的威胁。

社会主义的理论和社会主义策略，甚至在马克思主义学说未占主导地位的地方，早已普遍形成一个思想基础，即将社会分为两个有共同利益、却又利益冲突的阶级：资本家和产业工人。社会主义者指望老的中产阶级的迅速消亡，完全无视了新的中产阶级的兴起，无数的文员、打字员、行政人员、学校教师、商人和小官吏，以及低级别的专业人员。有段时间，这些阶级常出现很多劳工运动领袖。但是当这些阶级的地位相对于产业工人逐渐明显变差时，后者遵循的理想就对前者失去了吸引力。在厌恶资本主义制度，想要依据他们自己的正义观酌量分享财富这个意义上，他们都是社会主义者，但他们的观点被证明和老牌社会主义政党实践中体现出来的很不一样。

⁶The political "book clubs" in this country provide a not unimportant parallel.

The means which the old socialist parties had successfully employed to secure the support of one occupational group—the raising of their relative economic position—cannot be used to secure the support of all. There are bound to arise rival socialist movements that appeal to the support of those whose relative position is worsened. There is a great deal of truth in the often heard statement that Fascism and National Socialism are a sort of middle-class socialism—only that in Italy and Germany the supporters of these new movements were economically hardly a middle class any longer. It was to a large extent a revolt of a new under-privileged class against the labour aristocracy which the industrial labour movement had created. There can be little doubt that no single economic factor has contributed more to help these movements than the envy of the unsuccessful professional man, the university trained engineer or lawyer, and of the "white collared proletariat" in general, of the engine driver or compositor and other members of the strongest trade unions whose income was many times theirs. Nor can there be much doubt that in terms of money income the average member of the rank and file of the Nazi movement in its early years was poorer than the average trade unionist or member of the older socialist party—a circumstance which only gained poignancy from the fact that the former had often seen better days and were frequently still living in surroundings which were the result of this past. The expression "class struggled a rebours", current in Italy at the time of the rise of Fascism, did point to a very important aspect of the movement. The conflict between the Fascist or National-Socialist and the older socialist parties must indeed very largely be regarded as the kind of conflict which is bound to arise between rival socialist factions. There was no difference between them about the question of it being the will of the state which should assign to each person his proper place in society. But there were, as there always will be, most profound differences about what are the proper places of the different classes and groups.

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The old socialist leaders, who had always regarded their parties as the natural spearhead of the future general movement towards socialism, found it difficult to understand that with every extension in the use of socialist methods the resentment of large poor classes should turn against them. But while the old socialist parties, or the organised labour in particular industries, had usually not found it unduly difficult to come to an understanding for joint action with the employers in their particular industries, very large classes were left out in the cold. To them, and not without some justification, the more prosperous sections of the labour movement seemed to belong to the exploiting rather than to the exploited class⁷.

The resentment of the lower middle class, from which Fascism and National Socialism recruited so large a proportion of their supporters, was intensified by the fact that their education and training had in many instances made them aspire to directing positions, and that they regarded themselves as entitled to be members of the directing class. While the younger generation, out of that contempt for profit-making fostered by socialist teaching, spurned independent positions which involved risk, and flocked in ever-increasing numbers into salaried positions which promised security, they demanded a place yielding them the income and power to which in their opinion their training entitled them. While they believed in an organised society, they expected a place in that society very different from that which society ruled by labour seemed to offer. They were quite ready to take over the methods of the older socialism but intended to employ them in the service of a different class.

老牌社会主义政党成功用来锁定某职业团体支持的方法，即提高他们相对经济地位，不能用来锁定所有人的支持。他们注定激起与之敌对的社会主义群众运动，那些敌对的群众运动吸引了地位相对恶化了的群众的支持。常常听说，法西斯和纳粹是某种中产阶级的社会主义，很有几分真相，只是现在意大利和德国，这些新群众运动的支持者经济上来说几乎不再是中产阶级了。新群众运动很大程度上是底层社会阶级对产业工人运动所产生的劳工贵族的反抗。无疑，对这些群众运动的推波助澜，没有哪个经济因素比得上人的嫉妒心，那些失意的职场人士、受过大学训练的工程师或者律师、一般所说的“白领无产阶级”对收入数倍于他们的火车司机、排字工人以及其它最强有力工会的会员的嫉妒。同样无疑的是，就金钱收入而言，早期纳粹运动下属从众平均水平低于工会会员或者老牌社会主义政党成员。前者曾经见过好日子，并且仍常生活在过去条件造成的环境中，这只会更加辛酸。法西斯出现初期意大利流行的说法“阶级斗争逆转”确实指出了该运动很重要的一方面。法西斯或者纳粹和老牌社会主义政党之间的冲突真的必须很大程度上视作一种社会主义各竞争派系之间必然发生的那种冲突。根据国家意志为社会每一个人指配一个合适位置的问题对二者而言没有不同。但是在不同的阶级、集团在什么样的位置的问题上有且将一直有最深的分歧。

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老牌社会主义领袖一直将他们的政党视作未来朝社会主义总攻自然而然的先锋，他们发现难以理解，随着社会主义方法每一次推广应用，广大贫困阶级竟会厌恶他们。当老牌社会主义政党或者某些行业有组织的劳工力量通常发现与他们行业的雇主就联合行动达成谅解并不是过分困难的时候，最广大的阶级群众被晾在了了一边。对他们来说，并非不无道理，劳工运动中那些发达了的部分人属于剥削阶级而不是被剥削阶级。

从下层中产阶级中，法西斯和纳粹招募了一大批支持者，他们中的很多人受到的教育培训使他们渴望获得管理岗位，并且他们认为自己有资格成为管理层的一员，这一事实使他们对现状更加不满。更年轻的一代，受社会主义教育培养，蔑视逐利行为，看不上有风险的独立职位，不断地涌入薪资稳定的职位，他们要一个，照他们意见，收入和权力与所受训练相称的岗位。他们对一个有组织的社会深信不疑，但他们期望在其中的地位，完全不同于工人统治的社会看起来会给他们。他们早准备好接过老牌社会主义的那些手段，不过为不同的阶级服务。

⁷ It is now twelve years since one of the leading European socialist intellectuals, Hendrick de Man (who has since consistently developed further and made his peace with the Nazis), observed that "for the first time

since the beginning of socialism, anti-capitalist resentments are turning against the socialist movement" (*Sozialismus und National-Faschismus, Potsdam, 1931, p.6*)

The movement was able to attract all those who, while they agreed on the desirability of the state controlling all economic activity, disagreed with the ends for which the aristocracy of the industrial workers used their political strength.

The new socialist movement started with several tactical advantages. Labour socialism had grown in a democratic and liberal world, adapting its tactics to it and taking over many of the ideals of liberalism. Its protagonists still believed that the creation of socialism as such would solve all problems. Fascism and National-Socialism, on the other hand, grew out of the experience of an increasingly regulated society awakening to the fact that democratic and international socialism was aiming at incompatible ideals. Their tactics were developed in a world already dominated by socialist policy and the problems it creates. They had no illusions about the possibility of a democratic solution of problems which require more agreement among people than can reasonably be expected. They had no illusions about the capacity of reason to decide all the questions of the relative importance of the wants of different men or groups which planning inevitably raises, or about the formula of equality providing an answer. They knew that the strongest group which rallied enough supporters in favour of a new hierarchical order of society, and which frankly promised privileges to the classes to which it appealed, was likely to obtain the support of all those who were disappointed because they had been promised equality but found that they had merely furthered the interest of a particular class. Above all they were successful because they offered a theory, or *Weltanschauung*, which seemed to justify the privileges they promised to their supporters.

新群众运动能够吸引所有那些赞同国家管控所有经济活动，但不赞同产业工人贵族用其政治力量所追求的目标的人。

新的社会主义运动开始有几个技术上的优势。劳工社会主义从民主与自由世界中成长起来，策略迁就了自由世界，继承了很多自由主义的思想。其主要成员仍然相信这样建立社会主义能够解决所有问题。而另一方面，法西斯和纳粹是在一个逐步监管的社会里成长起来的，已经意识到事实上民主和国际社会主义是朝着不兼容的理想方向。他们的策略是在一个充满社会主义政策和所导致的各种问题的世界中发展起来的。采用民主方法解决问题，需要比他们合理预期多得多的赞同，他们对这种可能没有幻想。要计划就不可避免地要权衡不同个人或者团体需求的相对重要性，有能力理解该问题以及提出一个平等性计算公式以回答该问题，对此他们也没有幻想。但他们知道，团结了足够多的赞成新的社会等级制度的拥护者，对被号召的阶级公开许以特权的最强大的集团，最可能获得所有那些因起初被承诺平等、结果发现做了嫁衣裳而失望的人的支持。最重要的是，他们之所以成功是因为他们提出了一个理论或者世界观，使他们对支持者承诺的那些特权看起来合情合理。