## 9. SECURITY AND FREEDOM

The whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory with equality of work and equality of pay.

## V. I. Lenin, 1917

In a country where the sole employer is the State, opposition means death by slow starvation. The old principle: who does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not eat.

## L. Trotsky, 1937

Like the spurious "economic freedom", and with more justice, economic security is often represented as an indispensable condition of real liberty. In a sense this is both true and important. Independence of mind or strength of character are rarely found among those who cannot be confident that they will make their way by their own effort. Yet the idea of economic security is no less vague and ambiguous than most other terms in this field; and because of this the general approval given to the demand for security may become a danger to liberty. Indeed, when security is understood in too absolute a sense, the general striving for it, far from increasing the chances of freedom, becomes the gravest threat to it.

It will be well to contrast at the outset the two kinds of security: the limited one, which can be achieved for all, and which is therefore no privilege but a legitimate object of desire; and the absolute security which in a free society cannot be achieved for all and which ought not to be given as a privilege-except in a few special instances such as that of the judges, where complete independence is of paramount importance. These two kinds of security are, first, security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all; and, secondly, the security of a given standard of life, or of the relative position which one person or group enjoys compared with others; or, as we may put it briefly, the security of a minimum income and the security of the particular income a person is thought to deserve. We shall presently see that this distinction largely coincides with the distinction between the security which can be provided for all outside of and supplementary to the market system, and the security which can be provided only for some and only by controlling or abolishing the market.

There is no reason why in a society that has reached the general level of wealth which ours has attained, the first kind of security should not be guaranteed to all without endangering general freedom. There are difficult questions about the precise standard which should thus be assured; there is particularly the important question whether those who thus rely on the community should indefinitely enjoy all the same liberties as the rest<sup>1</sup>. An incautious handling of these questions might well cause serious and perhaps even dangerous political problems; but there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity to work, can be assured to everybody. Indeed, for a considerable part of the population of this country this sort of security has long been achieved.

## 9.保障与自由

整个社会将成为工作平等、报酬平等的单个办公室或者单个工厂。 列宁,1917

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<u>在一个政府是唯一雇主的国家</u>,对抗意味着慢慢饿死。旧的原则:谁不工作 不给饭吃就会变成:<u>谁不听话不给饭吃</u>。

托洛茨基, 1937

象杜撰的"经济自由"一样,但更加合理些,经济保障常被说成 真正的自由不可或缺的条件。某种意义上,这正确又重要。独 立的思想、顽强的个性,在那些没有自信凭自己的努力将创造 未来的人身上往往难以见到。然而经济保障这个概念跟这个领 域其他大多数术语一样含糊、歧义;因此对保障需求的普遍赞 同可能危及自由。的确,对保障的理解过于绝对的话,为之全 面奋斗,远不能增加自由的机会,反而成为其最严重的威胁。 一开始不妨对比下两种保障:有限的保障,能为所有人提供, 故非特权而是合理向往的目标;绝对的保障,在自由社会不是 所有人能获得,不应该授予的特权——除非在极少特殊情况下, 譬如法官的保障,因为其完全独立至关重要。这两种保障,第 一种是避免物质严重匮乏的保障,确保所有人最低生活物资; 第二种是给予一定生活标准的保障,一个人或团体对比他人享 受的相对地位;或者,简而言之,最低收入保障和一个人想来 应得的特定收入保障。我们现在应该可以看到二者区别很大程 度上与以下二者区别一致:市场制度之外、作为市场制度的补 充、为所有人提供的保障;与只能部分人享有、只有通过控制 或者废除市场才能提供的保障。

在一个像英国这样已经达到普遍富裕水平的社会,没有理由不 应该在不危及总的自由的前提下,为所有人确保第一种保障。 要精确定义能确保的水平则有些难题:特别是,有个重要的问 题,靠社会福利的人是不是应该无限享有和其他人同样的自由 呢。对这些问题不小心处理很可能引起严重甚至是危险的政治 问题;但毫无疑问,足以维持健康和工作能力的最基本的食物、 住宿以及衣着保障应该是对所有人可以保证的。的确,英国人 口相当部分已经享有这个保障很长时间了。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> There are also serious problems of international relations which arise if mere citizenship of a country confers the right to a standard of living higher than elsewhere, and which ought not to be dismissed too lightly.

Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate provision. Where, as in the case of sickness and accident, neither the desire to avoid such calamities nor the efforts to overcome their consequences are as a rule weakened by the provision of assistance, where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks, the case for the state helping to organise a comprehensive system of social insurance is very strong. There are many points of detail where those wishing to preserve the competitive system and those wishing to supersede it by something different will disagree on the details of such schemes; and it is possible under the name of social insurance to introduce measures which tend to make competition more or less ineffective. But there is no incompatibility in principle between the state providing greater security in this way and the preservation of individual freedom. To the same category belongs also the increase of security through the state rendering assistance to the victims of such "acts of God" as earthquakes and floods. Wherever communal action can mitigate disasters against which the individual can neither attempt to guard himself, nor make provision for the consequences, such communal action should undoubtedly be taken.

There is, finally, the supremely important problem of combating general fluctuations of economic activity and the recurrent waves of large-scale unemployment which accompany them. This is, of course, one of the gravest and most pressing problems of our time. But, though its solution will require much planning in the good sense, it does not—or at least need not—require that special kind of planning which according to its advocates is to replace the market. Many economists hope indeed that the ultimate remedy may be found in the field of monetary policy, which would involve nothing incompatible even with nineteenth-century liberalism. Others, it is true, believe that real success can be expected only from the skilful timing of public works undertaken on a very large scale. This might lead to much more serious restrictions of the competitive sphere, and in experimenting in this direction we shall have carefully to watch our step if we are to avoid making all economic activity progressively more dependent on the direction and volume of government expenditure. But this is neither the only, nor, in my opinion, the most promising way of meeting the gravest threat to economic security. In any case, the very necessary efforts to secure protection against these fluctuations do not lead to the kind of planning which constitutes such a threat to our freedom.

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The planning for security which has such an insidious effect on liberty is that for security of a different kind. It is planning designed to protect individuals or groups against diminutions of their income which although in no way deserved yet in a competitive society occur daily, against losses imposing severe hardships having no moral justification yet inseparable from the competitive system. This demand for security is thus another form of the demand for a just remuneration, a remuneration commensurate with the subjective merits and not with the objective results of a man's efforts. This kind of security or justice seems irreconcilable with freedom to choose one's employment. 面对那些生活中的共同危险,因为其不确定性,很少个人能有 充分的准备,没有理由国家不应该协助个人做好准备。就像疾 病和意外事故,人们避免灾难的愿望和为了克服其后果所做的 努力原则上不会因为帮助而有所削弱,简而言之,当我们面对 真正可保的风险时,由国家帮助建立一个全面的社保系统理由 充分。在细节方面,那些希望保留竞争制度和那些希望用别的 方法取而代之的人在具体方案的细节上会有不同意见;并且, 在社保名义下采用一些使竞争或多或少失效的方法是可能的。 但是,国家按这个方式提供较大的保障和维护个人自由没有原 则上的抵触。类似地,还有政府通过对地震、洪水等"天灾" 受害者提供普遍援助来提高保障。但凡公共行动能够减轻个人 无法抵抗、无法防范的灾情,那样的公共行动毫无疑问应该被 采取。

最后,还有一个超级重要的问题,跟经济活动的一般性波动以 及伴随反复发生的大规模失业潮作斗争。这当然是我们这个时 代最严重、最迫切的问题之一。但是,尽管问题的解决将需要 不少计划,好的意义上的计划,但不需要至少不必需要那种主 张取代市场的特别计划。许多经济学家的确希望通过货币政策 找到最终的解决办法,那甚至跟十九世纪的自由主义也毫无挑 触。确实,其他经济学家则相信只有适时实施超大规模公共建 设才有希望取得真正的成功。这有可能会导致对竞争性领域严 重得多的限制;并且如果我们要避免所有经济活动逐渐依赖于 政府开支的方向与规模,在这个方面试验时必须小心谨慎。但 是在我看来,经济保障面临的严重威胁,这既非唯一也非最有 希望的解决途径。无论哪种情况,确保不受这些波动影响的必 要努力都不会导致那种对自由构成威胁的计划。

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有威胁自由的隐患、为保障而进行的计划,为的是另一种保障。 竞争性社会,个人或者团体收入减少,尽管无论如何不应当发 生,但每天都在发生;竞争性制度,个人或团体常有损失, 导致道义上不合理的严重困难;这种保障是设计来对付这样情 况的一种计划。对这种保障的要求就是要求公正报酬的另一种 形式,要与主观价值而不是个人努力客观结果相称的报酬。这 种保障或者公平看起来和自主择业的自由并不兼容。 In any system which for the distribution of men between the different trades and occupations relies on their own choice it is necessary that the remuneration in these trades should correspond to their usefulness to the other members of society, even if this should stand in no relation to subjective merit. Although the results achieved will often be commensurate with efforts and intentions, this cannot always be true in any form of society. It will particularly not be true in the many instances where the usefulness of some trade or special skill is changed by circumstances which could not be foreseen. We all know the tragic plight of the highly trained man whose hard-learned skill has suddenly lost its value because of some invention which greatly benefits the rest of society. The history of the last hundred years is full of instances of this kind, some of them affecting hundreds of thousands of people at a time.

That anybody should suffer a great diminution of his income and bitter disappointment of all his hopes through no fault of his own, and despite hard work and exceptional skill, undoubtedly offends our sense of justice. The demands of those who suffer in this way, for state interference on their behalf to safeguard their legitimate expectations, are certain to receive popular sympathy and support. The general approval of these demands has had the effect that governments everywhere have taken action, not merely to protect the people so threatened from severe hardship and privation, but to secure to them the continued receipt of their former income and to shelter them from the vicissitudes of the market.<sup>2</sup>

Certainty of a given income can, however, not be given to all if any freedom in the choice of one's occupation is to be allowed. And if it is provided for some it becomes a privilege at the expense of others whose security is thereby necessarily diminished. That security of an invariable income can be provided for all only by the abolition of all freedom in the choice of one's employment is easily shown. Yet, although such a general guarantee of legitimate expectation is often regarded as the ideal to be aimed at, it is not a thing which is seriously attempted. What is constantly being done is to grant this kind of security piecemeal, to this group and to that, with the result that for those who are left out in the cold the insecurity constantly increases. No wonder that in consequence the value attached to the privilege of security constantly increases, the demand for it becomes more and more urgent, till in the end no price, not even that of liberty, appears too high.

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If those whose usefulness is reduced by circumstances which they could neither foresee nor control were to be protected against undeserved loss, and those whose usefulness has been increased in the same way were prevented from making an unmerited gain, remuneration would soon cease to have any relation to actual usefulness. It would depend on the views held by some authority about what a person ought to have done, what he ought to have foreseen, and how good or bad his intentions were. Such decisions could not but be to a large extent arbitrary. The application of this principle would necessarily bring it about that people doing the same work would receive different remuneration. The differences in remuneration would then no longer present an adequate inducement to people to make the changes which are socially desirable, and it would not even be possible for the individuals affected to judge whether a particular change is worth the trouble it causes.

在任何基于劳动者自由择业以达到不同行业、职业之间人力资源分配目的的社会制度下,行业报酬必须与对社会其他成员的 有用程度相匹配,即便应与他人主观评价无关。尽管最终结果 常常与个人努力及动机相称,但并非在所有形式社会都如此。 特别是,在很多情况下,由于无法预料的环境变化,某些行业 或者某项特殊技能的有用程度发生了变化,所以无法相称。我 们都知道这种悲惨不幸,因为某些发明对社会极其有用,使得 一些受过高级训练的人辛辛苦苦学得的技能一夜之间一无所值。 过去一百年很多这样的例子,有些情况下同时波及上百万的人。 任何人技艺超群、辛苦努力,并无过错,突然遭受收入锐减、 希望破灭,毫无疑问有伤我们的公正感。遭受这样不幸的人要 求国家干预来维护其合理预期肯定会受到群众的同情和支持。 对于这种要求普遍批准的结果就是,各地政府采取行动,不仅 仅要保护群众免受严重困难和贫穷的威胁,而且还要保证他们 免受市场变化影响继续获得与以前同样的收入。

然而,如果允许自由择业,不可能确保所有人收入。如果给某 些人以保障,那它就是一种以牺牲他人利益为代价的特权,他 人的权利保障必然因此减少。这容易看出,确保所有人收入不 变只能以牺牲所有人自由择业为代价。然而,尽管那样一种对 合理预期的普遍保障常常被视作理想目标,但并未认真尝试。 不断在做的是将零星的保障给这个集团那个集团,导致的结果 是排除在外的那些无保障程度不断增加。难怪,结果就是保障 特权的价值不断增加,对它的需求越来越迫切,直到最后高至 无价、不惜牺牲自由,这似乎太高了。

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有人因为无法预料或者控制的环境变化引起有用程度下降,如 果其不当损失得到保护,同样缘故有用程度增加获取的过分收 益也被免除,那么报酬很快就和实际有用程度脱钩了。一个人 应该做什么,应该预料什么,其用意是好是坏,就将依赖于某 些政府部门的看法。这样的决定很大程度上只可能是独断的。 运用这个原则必然出现同工不同酬。报酬差异因此不能足以激 励大家来作出社会所需的变化,甚至受影响的人也不能判断某 些改变是否得不偿失。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Very interesting suggestions of how these hardships might be mitigated within a liberal society, have recently been put forward by Professor W H. Hutt in a book, which will repay careful study (Plan for Reconstruction, 1943).

But if the changes in the distribution of men between different employments, which are constantly necessary in any society, can no longer be brought about by pecuniary "rewards" and "penalties" (which have no necessary connection with subjective merit), they must be brought about by direct orders. When a person's income is guaranteed he can neither be allowed to stay in his job merely because he likes it, nor to choose what other work he would like to do. As it is not he who makes the gain or suffers loss dependent on his moving or not moving, the choice must be made for him by those who control the distribution of the available income.

The problem of the adequate incentives which arises here is commonly discussed as if it were a problem mainly of the willingness of people to do their best. But this, although important, is not the whole, nor even the most important, aspect of the problem. It is not merely that if we want people to give their best we must make it worthwhile for them. What is more important is that if we want to leave them the choice, if they are to be able to judge what they ought to do, they must be given some readily intelligible yardstick by which to measure the social importance of the different occupations. Even with the best will in the world it would be impossible for anyone intelligently to choose between various alternatives if the advantages they offered him stood in no relation to their usefulness to society. To know whether as the result of a change a man ought to leave a trade and an environment which he has come to like, and exchange it for another, it is necessary that the changed relative value of these occupations to society should find expression in the remunerations they offer.

The problem is, of course, even more important because the world as it is men are, in fact, not likely to give their best for long periods unless their own interests are directly involved. At least for great numbers some external pressure is needed if they are to give their best. The problem of incentives in this sense is a very real one, both in the sphere of ordinary labour and in those of the managerial activities. The application of the engineering technique to a whole nation——and this is what planning means——"raises problems of discipline which are hard to solve", as has been well described by an American engineer with great experience in government planning, who has clearly seen the problem.

In order to do an engineering job, [he explains], there ought to be surrounding the work a comparatively large area of unplanned economic action. There should be a place from which workers can be drawn, and when a worker is fired he should vanish from the job and from the pay-roll. In the absence of such a free reservoir discipline cannot be maintained without corporal punishment, as with slave labour<sup>3</sup>.

In the sphere of executive work the problem of sanctions for negligence arises in a different but no less serious form. It has been well said that while the last resort of a competitive economy is the bailiff, the ultimate sanction of a planned economy is the hangman<sup>4</sup>. The powers the manager of any plant will have to be given will still be considerable. But no more than in the case of the worker can the manager's position and income in a planned system be made to depend merely on the success or failure of the work under his direction. As neither the risk nor the gain is his, it cannot be his personal judgment, but whether he does what he ought to have done according to some established rule, which must decide. A mistake he "ought" to have avoided is not his own affair, it is a crime against the community and must be treated as such. While so long as he keeps to the safe path of objectively ascertainable duty he may be surer of his income than the capitalist entrepreneur, the danger which threatens him in case of real failure is worse than bankruptcy. He may be economically secure so long as he satisfies his superiors, but this security is bought at the price of the safety of freedom and life.

不同工作之间人力分配的变化,在任何社会时刻都是必须的, 如果不再能通过金钱的"赏""罚"(赏罚与主观评价没有必 然联系)带来这种变化,那么只能通过直接命令来实现。当一 个人的收入有保障时,他不再仅仅因为喜欢而能留在他现有的 岗位,也不再能选他想做的其它工作。因为他工作变动或者不 变动带来的利益或损失不再是他自己承担,所以必然是那些控 制收入分配的人为他做选择。

这里论及的激励充分的问题,通常被当作主要是人们是否愿意 尽力工作的问题来讨论。但这尽管重要,不是问题的全部,甚 至不是问题最重要的方面。如果我们要想人们尽力工作,我们 必须要让这件事对他们来说值得如此。不仅如此,更重要的是, 如果我们要把选择留给他们自己,如果他们要能够判断他们应 做什么,必须给他们一些易于理解的尺度用以衡量不同职业的 社会重要性。如果给一个人的利益跟他们的社会有用性没有关 系,即使有着这世上最良好的愿望,任何人都无法作出明智选 择。要知道,因为环境变化,一个人是否应该离开他们所喜欢 的行业或者环境另换一处,这些职位相对社会价值的不同就必 须体现在对发给他们报酬上。

当然,这个问题甚至会更重要,是因为事实上,如果不与他们 利益直接挂钩,人都不大可能长时间地尽最大努力,这个世界 就是如此。至少对绝大多数来说,要他们尽最大努力,必须要 一些外部压力。在这个意义上,激励的问题非常现实,在普通 劳力、在管理活动的范畴都如此。对整个国家使用工程的方法 进行管理——这就是计划的意思——"产生了难以解决的纪律 问题",一个有丰富政府计划经验、清楚地看到这个问题的美 国工程师如此说。

为了实施工程项目【他解释道】,围绕工作应该有一个相当大的非计划经济 活动区。应该有一个招工的地方,并且工人一被开除,他应该马上消失,不 再付薪。没有这样一个自由的人力库存,除非象对待奴隶那样体罚,否则没 法维持纪律。

在行政工作的领域,疏忽导致的惩罚问题,形式各不相同,性 质同样严重。有句话讲得好,<u>竞争型经济最后一招就是上法庭,</u> <u>计划经济最后一招就是上绞架</u>。任何工厂,经理必须有的权力 相当大。但在计划体制下,经理和工人一样,职位和收入都不 仅仅取决于他负责的工作的成败。因为风险和收益都不是他的, 不可能取决于他的个人判断,而必须看他是否按照规定做了他 应该做的事。他"应该"可以避免的一个错误不是他个人的事, 而是对整个社会的犯罪,并且必须按犯罪处理。只要他坚持走 责任可客观界定的安全道路,他收入应该比资本主义社会的企 业家更有保障,但是真有失败的情况下,他的危险比破产严重 得多。只要能使上级满意,他经济上可能有保障,但是这个保 障是以自由和生命的安全为代价的。

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> D. C. Coyle, "The Twilight of National Planning," Harpers' Magazine, October 1935, p. 558.
<sup>4</sup> W Roepke, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Zurich, 1942, p. 172.

The conflict with which we have to deal is indeed a quite fundamental one between two irreconcilable types of social organisation, which, from the most characteristic forms in which they appear, have often been described as the commercial and the military type of society. The terms were, perhaps, unfortunate, because they direct attention to unessentials and make it difficult to see that we face here a real alternative and that there is no third possibility. Either both the choice and the risk rest with the individual or he is relieved of both. The army does indeed in many ways represent the closest approach familiar to us to the second type of organisation, where work and worker alike are allotted by authority and where, if the available means are scanty, everybody is alike put on short commons. This is the only system in which the individual can be conceded full economic security and through the extension of which to the whole of society it can be achieved for all its members. This security is, however, inseparable from the restrictions on liberty and the hierarchical order of military life--it is the security of the barracks.

It is possible, of course, to organise sections of an otherwise free society on this principle and there is no reason why this form of life, with its necessary restrictions on individual liberty, should not be open to those who prefer it. Indeed, some voluntary labour service on military lines might well be the best form for the state to provide the certainty of an opportunity for work and a minimum income for all. That proposals of this sort have in the past proved so little acceptable is due to the fact that those who are willing to surrender their freedom for security have always demanded that if they give up their full freedom it should also be taken from those not prepared to do so. For this claim it is difficult to find a justification.

The military type of organisation as we know it gives us, however, only a very inadequate picture of what it would be like if it were extended to the whole of society. So long as only a part of society is organised on military lines, the unfreedom of the members of the military organisation is mitigated by the fact that there is still a free sphere to which they can move if the restrictions become too irksome. If we want to form a picture of what society would be like if, according to the ideal which has seduced so many socialists, it was organised as a single great factory, we have to look to ancient Sparta, or to contemporary Germany, which after moving for two or three generations in this direction, has now so nearly reached it.

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In a society used to freedom it is unlikely that many people would be ready deliberately to purchase security at this price. But the policies which are now followed everywhere, which hand out the privilege of security, now to this group and now to that, are nevertheless rapidly creating conditions in which the striving for security tends to become stronger than the love of freedom. The reason for this is that with every grant of complete security to one group the insecurity of the rest necessarily increases. If you guarantee to some a fixed part of a variable cake, the share left to the rest is bound to fluctuate proportionally more than the size of the whole. And the essential element of security which the competitive system offers, the great variety of opportunities, is more and more reduced. 我们必须面对的矛盾真的是两种互不兼容的社会制度十分基本 的矛盾。从其表现的最特征形式上来看,一个被称为商业型社 会,一个被称为军管型社会。这样的说法也许有点不贴切,因 为它撇开了问题本质,使我们难以看到我们面对的其实是一个 二选一的问题,没有第三种可能。要么选择和风险系于一身, 要么与二者都无干系。就我们所知,很多方面,军队做事方法 真的跟第二种社会制度最为相近,工作和人力此类都由组织调 配,如果缺少生产生活资料,每个人就都同样地缺。这是唯一 一种制度,个人能给予完全的经济保障,推而广之,扩展到整 个社会,所有人都能有保障。然而这种保障与对自由的限制、 那种军队生活的等级制度密不可分——这是军营里的保障。

当然可以基于这一原则来组织原本就是自由的部分社会,这种 对个人自由进行必要约束的生活方式,没有理由不应该对那些 喜欢它的人开放。其实,某些军队系统的劳工志愿服务很可能 是一个国家为所有人提供就业和最低收入保障的最佳形式。这 样的方案在过去被证明难以接受归因于这样一个情况,那些愿 意牺牲自由换取保障的人总是要求,如果他们放弃全部自由, 那也要剥夺那些不愿这么做的人的自由。这样要求,实难合情 合理。

然而,军事化的组织形式,如果推广到整个社会,它会是什么 样子,我们所知非常片面。只要按照军队形式组织的仅仅是社 会的一部分,事实上,如果组织成员讨厌所受约束的话,仍然 可以换到自由的那部分去,不自由大大缓解。如果按照吸引众 多社会主义者的那个理想,把整个社会组织成一个超大工厂, 我们想知道这样的社会是什么样子,我们必须看看古代斯巴达, 或者现代德意志,德意志在这个方向上通过两三代人的努力, 现在差不多就到了那个地步。

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在一个习惯于自由的社会,很多人有意准备以如此代价换取保 障不大可能。但是现在各处奉行的政策,为这个那个集团提供 保障特权,还是很快形成了一种渴望保障趋于超过追求自由的 局面。这样的原因是,每一次给予一群人全面保障,其他人的 保障就更少了。一块尺寸变化的蛋糕,如果你分给某些人固定 一块,剩下部分给其他人,变化对剩下部分的影响按比例来说 就超过了对整块蛋糕的影响。并且,竞争社会提供保障的基本 要素,也就是机会超多,也就越来越少了。 Within the market system, security can be granted to particular groups only by the kind of planning known as restrictionism (which includes, however, almost all the planning which is actually practised!). "Control", i.e. limitation of output so that prices will secure an "adequate" return, is the only way in which in a market economy producers can be guaranteed a certain income. But this necessarily involves a reduction of opportunities open to others. If the producer, be he entrepreneur or worker, is to be protected against underbidding by outsiders, it means that others who are worse off are precluded from sharing in the relatively greater prosperity of the controlled industries. Every restriction on the freedom of entry into a trade reduces the security of all those outside it. And as the number of those whose income is secured in this manner increases, the field of alternative opportunities is restricted which are open to anyone who suffers a loss of income; and for those unfavourably affected by any change the chance of avoiding a fatal diminution of their income is correspondingly diminished. And if, as has become increasingly true, in each trade in which conditions improve, the members are allowed to exclude others in order to secure to themselves the full gain in the form of higher wages or profits, those in the trades where demand has fallen have nowhere to go and every change becomes the cause of large unemployment. There can be little doubt that it is largely a consequence of the striving for security by these means in the last decades that unemployment and thus insecurity for large sections of the population has so much increased.

In this country such restrictions, especially those affecting the intermediate strata of society, have assumed important dimensions only in comparatively recent times, and we have scarcely yet realised their full consequences. The utter hopelessness of the position of those who, in a society which has thus grown rigid, are left outside the range of sheltered occupation, and the magnitude of the gulf which separates them from the fortunate possessor of jobs for whom protection against competition has made it unnecessary to budge ever so little to make room for those without can only be appreciated by those who have experienced it. It is not a question of the fortunate ones giving up their places, but merely that they should share in the common misfortune by some reduction of their incomes, or frequently even merely by some sacrifice of their prospects of improvement. The protection of their "standard of life", of the "fair price", or the "professional income" to which they regard themselves as entitled, and in the protection of which they receive the support of the state, precludes this. In consequence, instead of prices, wages, and individual incomes, it is now employment and production which have become subject to violent fluctuations. There has never been a worse and more cruel exploitation of one class by another than that of the weaker or less fortunate members of a group of producers by the well-established which has been made possible by the "regulation" of competition. Few catchwords have done so much harm as the ideal of a "stabilisation" of particular prices (or wages) which, while securing the income of some, makes the position of the rest more and more precarious.

在市场制度下,保障只有通过一种所谓的限制主义的计划手段 才能给予特定的人群(但限制主义几乎包括了实际上实行过的 所有计划手段)。"控制",也就是限产保价确保"充足"利 润,是市场经济下能确保生产者一定收入的唯一途径。但这必 然涉及他人机会的减少。如果一个生产者,业主或者工人,得 以保护免受外部杀价,它就意味着其他弱势群体被排除在受保 护的行业之外,不能分享该行业的相对景气。每一项行业限入 减少了行业外其他所有人的保障。并且,随着以这种方式收入 有保障的人数增加,其他收入减少的人的选择范围就更受限制; 那些受变化不利影响的人避免收入致命性减少的机会也相应减 少。并且,如果每一个行业境况改善,其成员被允许排斥外人 以确保高工资高利润等充分收益,那些需求减少的行业的人就 无处可去,一有变化就会导致大规模失业,这已逐步成为现实。 大量人口失业增加、生活无保障,无疑很大程度上是过去几十 年通过这些手段追求保障的后果。

在英国,那些限制,特别影响社会中间阶层的那些限制,只在 相对较近期才开始起重要作用,我们还少有认识到其全部后果。 在因此形成的僵硬社会里,幸运儿拥有工作,不受竞争威胁, 无需稍作让步以给没有工作的人留一席之地,那些被排除在被 庇护行业之外的人处境完全绝望、与幸运儿鸿沟巨大,只有设 身处地才能真正体会。这不是一个幸运儿应该放弃他们位置的 问题,而是他们应该通过减少些收入,或者更常见地仅仅牺牲 一些进一步改善的机会来分担不幸。得到政府支持,对他们自 认为有资格享有的"生活标准"、"公道价格"或者"职业收 入"的保护,排除了这个可能。后果就是,不是价格、工资或 者个人收入,而是整个就业、产出产生急剧起伏。竞争的"调 控"可能产生行业内得势的一群,他们对同行里弱势、运气不 好的一群的剥削,比一个阶级对另一个阶级的剥削更厉害、更 残忍。没什么流行口号比"稳定"具体价格(或者工资)这样 的理想更有害, 它保障某些人的收入, 使其余人处境越来越不 安。

Thus, the more we try to provide full security by interfering with the market system, the greater the insecurity becomes; and, what is worse, the greater becomes the contrast between the security of those to whom it is granted as a privilege and the ever-increasing insecurity of the under-privileged. And the more security becomes a privilege, and the greater the danger to those excluded from it, the higher will security be prized. As the number of the privileged increases and the difference between their security and the insecurity of the others increases, a completely new set of social values gradually arises. It is no longer independence but security which gives rank and status, the certain right to a pension more than confidence in his making good which makes a young man eligible for marriage, while insecurity becomes the dreaded state of the pariah in which those who in their youth have been refused admission to the haven of a salaried position remain for life.

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The general endeavour to achieve security by restrictive measures, tolerated or supported by the state, has in the course of time produced a progressive transformation of society--a transformation in which, as in so many other ways, Germany has led and the other countries have followed. This development has been hastened by another effect of socialist teaching, the deliberate disparagement of all activities involving economic risk and the moral opprobrium cast on the gains which make risks worth taking but which only few can win. We cannot blame our young men when they prefer the safe, salaried position to the risk of enterprise after they have heard from their earliest youth the former described as the superior, more unselfish and disinterested occupation. The younger generation of today has grown up in a world in which in school and press the spirit of commercial enterprise has been represented as disreputable and the making of profit as immoral, where to employ a hundred people is represented as exploitation but to command the same number as honourable. Older people may regard this as an exaggeration of the present state of affairs, but the daily experience of the University teacher leaves little doubt that as a result of anti-capitalist propaganda values have already altered far in advance of the change in institutions which has yet taken place in this country. The question is whether by changing our institutions to satisfy the new demands, we shall not unwittingly destroy values which we still rate higher.

The change in the structure of society involved in the victory of the ideal of security over that of independence cannot be better illustrated than by a comparison of what ten or twenty years ago could still be regarded as the English and the German type of society. However great the influence of the army may have been in the latter country, it is a grave mistake to ascribe what the Englishman regarded as the "military" character of German society mainly to that influence. The difference went much deeper than could be explained on that ground, and the peculiar attributes of German society existed no less in circles in which the properly military influence was negligible than in those in which it was strong. It was not so much that at almost all times a larger part of the German people was organised for war than was true in other countries, but that the same type of organisation was employed for so many other purposes, which gave German society its peculiar character. It was that a larger part of the civil life of Germany than of any other country was deliberately organised from the top, that so large a proportion of her people did not regard themselves as independent but as appointed functionaries, which gave her social structure its peculiar character. Germany had, as the Germans themselves boasted, for long been a Beamtenstaat in which not only in the Civil Service proper but in almost all spheres of life income and status were assigned and guaranteed by some authority.

这样,我们越是试图通过干预市场提供充分保障,就越缺乏保 障;并且,更糟的是,作为一种特权授予某些人的保障和弱势 群体不断增加的无保障差距越来越大。并且,保障越成为一种 特权,对排除在外的那些人来说,危险越大,保障也越珍贵。 随着特权人数的不断增加,<u>有保障和无保障差距不断增大,一</u> 种全新的社会价值体系逐步形成。不再是独立而是保障给人以 身份和地位,不再是建功立业的自信而是有权享受退休金使年 轻人更有结婚的资格,平民百姓处于无保障的恐惧境地,那些 年轻时期被拒绝在领薪天堂之外的人要在其中终其一生。

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在国家容许或者支持的情况下,通过限制措施获取保障的普遍 努力,随着时间的推移,已经导致了社会的逐步改变——这一 转变,象其它很多方面一样,其中德国领先,他国仿效。该发 展变化又被社会主义教育的另一效果所促进,即故意贬低所有 经济投机活动,在道德上进行讨伐那些值得担风险但很少人能 赢的利益。当年轻人宁愿选择安稳、拿月薪的工作而不愿冒险 创业时,我们不能责备他们,他们从小就听到的就是前者是高 创业时,我们不能责备他们,他们从小就听到的就是前者是高 尚、更大公无私的职业。今天较年轻的一代他们是在这一个世 界中成长起来的,学校、媒体把商业精神描绘成不名誉的,把 赚取利润视为不道德的,雇佣一百个人代表剥削,而指挥同样 数量的人则代表光荣。年纪较大的人也许觉得这言过其实,但 我大学教师日常经验毫无疑问表明,作为反资本主义宣传的结 果,在英国,价值观的改变在社会制度改变之前早已发生。问 题是,改变我们的制度适应这新的需求时,我们会不会不知不 觉地破坏掉我们仍然更看重的价值标准呢。

向往保障对向往独立的胜利所包含的社会结构的变化,没有什 么比十年、二十年前现在仍可称为英国式社会和德国式社会的 对比更说明问题了。无论军队对于德国的影响有多大,把英国 人所谓的德国社会的"军队"特色主要归功于军队对国家的影 响是大错特错。两种社会的差别远比用这个来解释更加深刻, 德国社会的特色在军方影响可忽略的圈子不会比军方影响较大 的圈子更少。与其说大多数时候,对比其它国家,更多德国人 为战争而组织了起来,不如说德国人为其它很多目的也是同样 组织的,这才导致了德国社会的特色。德国跟其他国家相比, 更多的民众生活特意地从上到下进行组织,很大一部分人不把 自己视作独立个体而是被任命的工作人员,这样社会结构就有 了特色。德国,就像德国人自己吹嘘的那样,早就是更治国家, 其中不仅仅是公务员,几乎一切民生领域,收入和待遇都由政 府分配、保证。 While it is doubtful whether the spirit of freedom can anywhere be extirpated by force, it is not certain that any people would successfully withstand the process by which it was slowly smothered in Germany. Where distinction and rank is achieved almost exclusively by becoming a salaried servant of the state, where to do one's assigned duty is regarded as more laudable than to choose one's own field of usefulness, where all pursuits that do not give a recognised place in the official hierarchy or a claim to a fixed income are regarded as inferior and even somewhat disreputable, it is too much to expect that many will long prefer freedom to security. And where the alternative to security in a dependent position is a most precarious position, in which one is despised alike for success and for failure, only few will resist the temptation of safety at the price of freedom. Once things have gone so far, liberty indeed becomes almost a mockery, since it can be purchased only by the sacrifice of most of the good things of this earth. In this state it is little surprising that more and more people should come to feel that without economic security liberty is "not worth having" and that they are willing to sacrifice their liberty for security. But it is disquieting to find Professor Harold Laski in this country employing the very same argument which has perhaps done more than any other to induce the German people to sacrifice their liberty.<sup>5</sup>

There can be no question that adequate security against severe privation, and the reduction of the avoidable causes of misdirected effort and consequent disappointment, will have to be one of the main goals of policy. But if these endeavours are to be successful and not to destroy individual freedom, security must be provided outside the market and competition be left to function unobstructed. Some security is essential if freedom is to be preserved, because most men are willing to bear the risk which freedom inevitably involves only so long as that risk is not too great. But while this is a truth of which we must never lose sight, nothing is more fatal than the present fashion among intellectual leaders of extolling security at the expense of freedom. It is essential that we should re-learn frankly to face the fact that freedom can only be had at a price and that as individuals we must be prepared to make severe material sacrifices to preserve our liberty. If we want to retain this we must regain the conviction on which the rule of liberty in the Anglo-Saxon countries has been based and which Benjamin Franklin expressed in a phrase applicable to us in our lives as individuals no less than as nations: "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."

自由的精神能否被暴力完全消灭值得怀疑,但在德国,不确定 是不是有人能对抗得了自由被缓慢地扼杀。在那里几乎只有通 过成为领国家薪水的公务员才能出类拔萃,在那里接受指派工 作比自择擅长的领域更受称赞,在那里职业的追求如最终不能 在官僚体系中谋得位置或者有固定收入则被认为低人一等或者 多少不光荣,在那里想期望很多人长远地放弃保障选择自由实 属奢望。并且,如果不是依附别人获有保障,就处境危险,无 论成功或者失败都被人蔑视,没什么人可以抵抗得了以自由换 取安全的诱惑。事情一旦到这个地步,的确,自由几乎有点滑 帮,因为只有牺牲这个世界上大多数美好的东西才能换来自由 了。在这种状态下,不奇怪越来越多的人开始感觉到没有经济 保障的自由"不值得",他们愿意牺牲自由换取保障。但令人 不安的是,英国的拉斯基教授采用同样的论调,这种论调诱使 德国人牺牲自由,无人能及。

毫无疑问,建立足够保障避免严重贫困,减少诱因避免误导工 作引起失望,必须是制定政策的主要目标之一。但,如果这些 努力要成功,并且不破坏个人自由,保障必须在市场机制以外 提供,不阻碍竞争正常进行。如果自由要维持,有些保障是基 本的,因为大多数人只有风险不大的时候才愿意承担不可避免 会涉及到自由的风险。虽然这是一个我们绝对不能忽视的事实, 但最危险的还是知识分子领袖以吹捧自由换取保障为时髦。很 基本,我们应该重新学习坦白地面对一个事实,自由是有代价 的,作为个体我们必须准备作出重大的物质上的牺牲以维护我 们的自由。如果我们想保有自由,我们必须重建作为盎格鲁撒 克逊国家自由原则之基础的那种信念,那就是富兰克林罗斯福 这一样句话所表达的"那些放弃基本自由来换取少许临时保障 的人既不配拥有自由也不配拥有保障",对个人对国家都是如 此。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> H. J. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (Pelican edition 1937, p. 51): "Those who know the normal life of the poor, its haunting sense of impending disaster, its fiful search for beauty which perpetually eludes, will realise well enough that, without economic security, liberty is not worth having."