

INTRODUCTION

Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas.

Lord Acton

Contemporary events differ from history in that we do not know the results they will produce. Looking back, we can assess the significance of past occurrences and trace the consequences they have brought in their train. But while history runs its course, it is not history to us. It leads us into an unknown land and but rarely can we get a glimpse of what lies ahead. It would be different if it were given to us to live a second time through the same events with all the knowledge of what we have seen before. How different would things appear to us, how important and often alarming would changes seem that we now scarcely notice! It is probably fortunate that man can never have this experience and knows of no laws which history must obey.

Yet, although history never quite repeats itself, and just because no development is inevitable, we can in a measure learn from the past to avoid a repetition of the same process. One need not be a prophet to be aware of impending dangers. An accidental combination of experience and interest will often reveal events to one man under aspects which few yet see.

The following pages are the product of an experience as near as possible to twice living through the same period or at least twice watching a very similar evolution of ideas. While this is an experience one is not likely to gain in one country, it may in certain circumstances be acquired by living in turn for long periods in different countries. Though the influences to which the trend of thought is subject in most civilised nations are to a large extent similar, they do not necessarily operate at the same time or at the same speed. Thus, by moving from one country to another, one may sometimes twice watch similar phases of intellectual development. The senses have then become peculiarly acute. When one hears for a second time opinions expressed or measures advocated which one has first met twenty or twenty-five years ago, they assume a new meaning as symptoms of a definite trend. They suggest, if not the necessity, at least the probability, that developments will take a similar course.

It is necessary now to state the unpalatable truth that it is Germany whose fate we are in some danger of repeating. The danger is not immediate, it is true, and conditions in this country are still so remote from those witnessed in recent years in Germany as to make it difficult to believe that we are moving in the same direction. Yet, though the road be long, it is one on which it becomes more difficult to turn back as one advances. If in the long run we are the makers of our own fate, in the short run we are the captives of the ideas we have created. Only if we recognise the danger in time can we hope to avert it.

It is not to the Germany of Hitler, the Germany of the present war, that this country bears yet any resemblance. But students of the currents of ideas can hardly fail to see that there is more than a superficial similarity between the trend of thought in Germany during and after the last war and the present current of ideas in this country. There exists now in this country certainly the same determination that the organisation of the nation we have achieved for purposes of defence shall be retained for the purposes of creation. There is the same contempt for nineteenth century liberalism, the same spurious "realism" and even cynicism, the same fatalistic acceptance of "inevitable trends". And at least nine out of every ten of the lessons which our most vociferous reformers are so anxious we should learn from this war are precisely the lessons which the Germans did learn from the last war and which have done much to produce the Nazi system.

引言

揭露思想观念的来龙去脉，令人恼羞成怒，鲜有出其右。

阿克顿爵士

当代事件与历史不同，我们不知道它们会产生什么样的结果。回头来看，我们能估量过去所发生一切的重要性，追索其所导致相继发生的后果。历史车轮滚滚向前，今天对我们来说却不是历史。它带我们来到未知的境地，我们对前途难窥一貌。带着所见所闻，让我们再活过一次，必然大不相同。事情看起来会多么不一样，变化看起来会多么明显，多么重要，让人警觉，而我们现在对这些变化却几无觉察。人们对此毫无经验，对历史必然规律一无所知，这也许是一件幸事。

然而，尽管历史从来不会一成不变，仅仅因为事物发展的必然性，在一定程度上我们能够从过去吸取教训，避免重蹈覆辙。意识到即将到来的危险，不一定非得是先知。经验和兴趣的偶然结合常常能够揭示事件鲜为人知的一面。

我差不多两次经历某个历史时期，或者至少是两次看到非常类似的思想发展过程。下面几页源于我这些经验。这是只在一个国家生活过的人难以获得的经验；特定的环境下在几个国家相继生活过很长时间的人也许有可能有类似经验。尽管在文明程度最高的几个国家，思想潮流所遭受的影响很大程度上相似，但它们未必在相同的时间发生、以相同的速度发展。所以，从一个国家迁到另一个国家，有时候可以再次看到思想发展的相似阶段。我们也因此能特别敏锐地觉察。二十、二十五年前提到过的某些观点或者提倡过的某些方法被再次听到，它们就呈现了新的意义，是确切趋势的征兆。它们意味着，如果不是必然的话，至少有可能，会经历类似的发展过程。

现在有必要指出一个难以接受的真相，我们有会重复德国命运的危险。危险不是迫在眉睫，的确，英国的情况和这几年德国所见到的情况还有些距离，以至于很难相信我们在朝着相同的方向前进。然而，尽管路还很长，但它是条越走越难回头的路。如果长期来看我们是自己命运的创造者，短期来看我们则为自己所创造的思想所束缚。只有及时认识到危险，我们才有希望避免危险。

英国还不像希特勒的德国、二战中的德国。但是，研究思想潮流的人很难不看到一战中、一战后德国思潮与现在英国思潮的相似性不仅仅只是表面上的。英国现在肯定存在同样的决心，想保留为了国防目的建立的一些政府部门，用于建设。这里对十九世纪自由主义的同样蔑视，同样的伪“现实主义”甚至犬儒主义，对“必然趋势”同样的宿命论式的接受。叫嚣最厉害的那些改革家急于让我们从二战中吸取的教训，十有八九正是德国从一战中吸取的教训，这些教训很大程度上导致了纳粹制度的产生。

We shall have opportunity in the course of this book to show that there are a large number of other points where, at an interval of fifteen to twenty-five years, we seem to follow the example of Germany. Although one does not like to be reminded, it is not so many years since the socialist policy of that country was generally held up by progressives as an example to be imitated, just as in more recent years Sweden has been the model country to which progressive eyes were directed. All those whose memory goes further back know how deeply, for at least a generation before the last war, German thought and German practice influenced ideals and policy in this country.

The author has spent about half of his adult life in his native Austria, in close touch with German intellectual life, and the other half in the United States and England. In the dozen years in which this country has now become his home he has become increasingly convinced that at least some of the forces which have destroyed freedom in Germany are also at work here, and that the character and the source of this danger are, if possible, even less understood than they were in Germany. The supreme tragedy is still not seen that in Germany it was largely people of goodwill, men who were admired and held up as models in this country, who prepared the way, if they did not actually create, the forces which now stand for everything they detest. Yet our chance of averting a similar fate depends on our facing the danger and on our being prepared to revise even our most cherished hopes and ambitions if they should prove to be the source of the danger. There are few signs yet that we have the intellectual courage to admit to ourselves that we may have been wrong. Few are ready to recognise that the rise of Fascism and Nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period, but a necessary outcome of those tendencies. This is a truth which most people were unwilling to see even when the similarities of many of the repellent features of the internal regimes in communist Russia and national-socialist Germany were widely recognised. As a result, many who think themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of Nazism and sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for ideals whose realisation would lead straight to the abhorred tyranny.

All parallels between developments in different countries are, of course, deceptive; but I am not basing my argument mainly on such parallels. Nor am I arguing that these developments are inevitable. If they were, there would be no point in writing this. They can be prevented if people realise in time where their efforts may lead. But till recently there was little hope that any attempt to make them see the danger would be successful. It seems, however, as if the time were now ripe for a fuller discussion of the whole issue. Not only is the problem now more widely recognised, there are also special reasons which at this juncture make it imperative that we should face the issues squarely.

It will, perhaps, be said that this is not the time to raise an issue on which opinions clash sharply. But the socialism of which we speak is not a party matter, and the questions which we are discussing have little to do with the questions at dispute between political parties. It does not affect our problem that some groups may want less socialism than others, that some want socialism mainly in the interest of one group and others in that of another. The important point is that, if we take the people whose views influence developments, they are now in this country in some measure all socialists. If it is no longer fashionable to emphasise that "we are all socialists now", this is so merely because the fact is too obvious. Scarcely anybody doubts that we must continue to move towards socialism, and most people are merely trying to deflect this movement in the interest of a particular class or group.

贯穿本书，有机会展示，在其它很多方面，我们看起来在重复德国的例子，时间间隔十五到二十五年而已。尽管大家不愿回忆，没几年前德国的社会主义政策普遍地被进步人士奉为典范加以仿效，正如近年来瑞典成为进步人士青睐的模范国家一样。所有那些记忆更久远点的人都知道，至少对一战前那一代来说，德国思想、德国实践对英国的理念与政策产生了多么深刻的影响。

作者成年后半生在祖国奥地利度过，与德国知识分子有过密切接触，另外半生则在美国和英国度过。十几年过去，现在英国已经成了作者的家乡，他日益相信，曾经破坏了德国自由的各种势力，至少有些已在英国起作用，但对这一危险的特征、根源的认识，如有可能，恐怕比德国当年还要少。人们仍未看到，最大的悲剧是，在德国，很大程度上是那些带着良好愿望的人，那些被英国人仰慕、奉为楷模的人，为这些势力铺平了道路，如果不是他们事实上造成的话。这些势力现在代表了他们自己所憎恨的一切。然而，避免类似命运的机会取决于我们如何面对危险，取决于，如果我们珍视的愿望、远大的抱负被证明是危险的根源，改正要做的准备。还没迹象看到，我们思想上有勇气承认我们或已错了。很少有人准备好承认，法西斯、纳粹的兴起不是对抗之前的社会主义趋势，而是这些趋势的必然结果。这是大多数人不愿意看到的真相，甚至当人们已经广泛地认识到共产主义的俄国与国家社会主义的德国在内政上有很多令人反感的特征十分相似时。结果，同时，很多自认优于法西斯的反常，诚心反对法西斯政见的人，却在为一经实现就是恶政的理想而工作。

类比不同国家发展过程当然不足为证，但我的论点并不是主要基于这些类比。我也并不认为这些发展过程不可避免，否则，写这本书也就毫无意义了。如果人们及时认识到他们的努力可能导致什么样的后果，问题就能被预防。但是直到最近，使他们看到危险的尝试并没有多少成功的希望。无论如何，对这个事情进行全面讨论的时机现在似乎已经成熟。不仅因为该问题现在已经被更广泛认识到，更因为在这个节骨眼上还有些特殊的原因使我们直面这些问题势在必行。

可能有人会说，现在不是提出各方意见会尖锐冲突的问题的时候。但是我们所说的社会主义不是党派的问题，我们所讨论的问题与党争没多少关系。某些集团主张社会主义比其他集团少，为了这个或者那个集团的利益而主张社会主义，这对我们来说都没什么关系。重要的一点是，如果我们在英国挑出那些话语有影响力的人，他们在某种程度上都是社会主义者。如果强调“现在我们都是社会主义者”已经不再时髦的话，这仅仅是因为事实已经太明显。几乎没有人怀疑我们必须继续朝社会主义方向前进，大多数人仅仅是为了某特定阶级或者团体的利益试图调整其步伐而已。

It is because nearly everybody wants it that we are moving in this direction. There are no objective facts which make it inevitable. We shall have to say something about the alleged inevitability of "planning" later. The main question is where this movement will lead us. Is it not possible that if the people whose convictions now give it an irresistible momentum began to see what only a few yet apprehend, they would recoil in horror and abandon the quest which for half a century has engaged so many people of goodwill? Where these common beliefs of our generation will lead us is a problem not for one party but for every one of us, a problem of the most momentous significance. Is there a greater tragedy imaginable than that in our endeavour consciously to shape our future in accordance with high ideals, we should in fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving for?

There is an even more pressing reason why at this time we should seriously endeavour to understand the forces which have created National Socialism: that this will enable us to understand our enemy and the issue at stake between us. It cannot be denied that there is yet little recognition of the positive ideals for which we are fighting. We know that we are fighting for freedom to shape our life according to our own ideas. That is a great deal, but not enough. It is not enough to give us the firm beliefs which we need to resist an enemy who uses propaganda as one of his main weapons not only in the most blatant but also in the most subtle forms. It is still more insufficient when we have to counter this propaganda among the people in the countries under his control and elsewhere, where the effect of this propaganda will not disappear with the defeat of the Axis powers. It is not enough if we are to show to others that what we are fighting for is worth their support, and it is not enough to guide us in the building of a new Europe safe against the dangers to which the old one has succumbed.

It is a lamentable fact that the English in their dealings with the dictators before the war, not less than in their attempts at propaganda and in the discussion of their war aims, have shown an inner insecurity and uncertainty of aim which can be explained only by confusion about their own ideals and the nature of the differences which separated them from the enemy. We have been misled as much because we have refused to believe that the enemy was sincere in the profession of some beliefs which we shared as because we believed in the sincerity of some of his other claims. Have not the parties of the Left as well as those of the Right been deceived by believing that the National-Socialist Party was in the service of the capitalists and opposed to all forms of socialism? How many features of Hitler's system have not been recommended to us for imitation from the most unexpected quarters, unaware that they are an integral part of that system and incompatible with the free society we hope to preserve? The number of dangerous mistakes we have made before and since the outbreak of war because we do not understand the opponent with whom we are faced is appalling. It seems almost as if we did not want to understand the development which has produced totalitarianism because such an understanding might destroy some of the dearest illusions to which we are determined to cling.

We shall never be successful in our dealings with the Germans till we understand the character and the growth of the ideas which now govern them. The theory which is once again put forth, that the Germans as such are inherently vicious, is hardly tenable and not very creditable to those who hold it. It dishonours the long series of Englishmen who during the past hundred years have gladly taken over what was best, and not only what was best, in German thought.

我们朝着这个方向前进，仅仅是因为大家主观使然，并无客观必然。我们以后会讨论所谓的“计划”的必然性。主要问题是这一运动会把我们带向何处。有人对它笃信不疑，使其势不可挡，一旦这些人开始看到还只有少数人意识到的问题，难道不可能他们会恐惧退缩，放弃这个半个世纪来卷入了无数善意人的追求吗？我们这代人共同的信仰将把我们带往何方，不是一个政党的问题，而是我们每一个人的问题，一个关乎未来的最重要问题。我们竭尽全力，追求理想，塑造未来，事实上却不知不觉地创造出与奋斗的理想截然相反的结果，还能想象得出更悲哀的吗？

为什么在这个时候应该认真努力地去了解造就纳粹的各种因素还有更迫切的原因：这样我们才能了解我们的敌人以及敌我之间利害攸关的问题。不可否认，我们对为之奋斗的积极的理想还缺少清晰认识。我们知道，我们在为按自己想法塑造自己生活的自由而奋斗。这很好，但还不够。不足以坚定我们的信念以抵挡敌人喧嚣大胆又精细入微的宣传攻势。在敌人控制的国家和其它地方要与这些宣传做斗争就更加不够了，轴心势力失败，其宣传效果并不会随之消失。如果要告诉别人我们所奋斗的目标值得他们的支持，这是不够的；要用以指导我们重建新的安全的欧洲，避免重蹈覆辙，这也是不够的。

一个可悲的事实是，战前，英国人跟独裁者打交道，跟宣传造势、战争目标讨论中一样，内心都表现出只能用理想模糊、敌我本质不分来解释的目的不明确、不坚定。我们不相信敌人说的某些信仰真的跟我们一样，我们被误导；我们相信他们说的其它一些，我们又被误导。左右两党不是都相信纳粹政党是为资本主义服务、反对一切形式的社会主义，而都被欺骗了吗？还有多少希特勒制度的特色还没有被从最意想不到的地方推荐出来建议仿效，我们意识不到它们是该制度不可或缺的组成部分，与我们希望维护的自由社会格格不入吗？战前以及战争爆发以来，因我们不了解我们面对的对手而犯下的危险的错误多得吓人。就好像是，我们不愿了解极权主义的产生过程，因为了解它会破坏我们那个下定决心抱着不放的最美幻想。

只有我们了解了现在统治着德国人的那些观念的特征和成长过程，我们才能在和他们的交道中取得成功。那个一再被提出的理论，即德国人本质邪恶，很难成立；持有这个观点的人不可信。它侮辱了一系列众多的英国思想家，他们在过去百年间心悦诚服地接受了德国思想中最优秀的、和不仅仅是最优秀的这些内容。

It overlooks the fact that when eighty years ago John Stuart Mill was writing his great essay *On Liberty* he drew his inspiration, more than from any other men, from two Germans, Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt¹, and forgets the fact that two of the most influential intellectual forebears of National Socialism, Thomas Carlyle and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, were a Scot and an Englishman. In its cruder forms this view is a disgrace to those who by maintaining it adopt the worst features of German racial theories. The problem is not why the Germans as such are vicious, which congenitally they are probably no more than other peoples, but to determine the circumstances which during the last seventy years have made possible the progressive growth and the ultimate victory of a particular set of ideas, and why in the end this victory has brought the most vicious elements among them to the top. Mere hatred of everything German, instead of the particular ideas which now dominate the Germans is, moreover, very dangerous, because it blinds those who indulge in it against a real threat. It is to be feared that this attitude is frequently merely a kind of escapism, caused by an unwillingness to recognise tendencies which are not confined to Germany, and by reluctance to re-examine, and if necessary, to discard, beliefs which we have taken over from the Germans and by which we are still as much deluded as the Germans were. It is doubly dangerous because the contention that only the peculiar wickedness of the Germans has produced the Nazi system is likely to become the excuse for forcing on us the very institutions which have produced that wickedness.

The interpretation of the developments in Germany and Italy about to be proffered in this book is very different from that given by most foreign observers and by the majority of exiles from those countries. But if this interpretation is correct, it will also explain why it is almost impossible for a person who, like most of the exiles and the foreign correspondents of English and American newspapers, holds the now prevalent socialist views, to see those events in the proper perspective. The superficial and misleading view, which sees in National-Socialism merely a reaction fomented by those whose privileges or interests were threatened by the advance of socialism, was naturally supported by all those who, although they were at one time active in the movement of ideas that has led to National-Socialism, have stopped at some point of that development and, by the conflict into which this brought them with the Nazis, were forced to leave their country. But the fact that they were numerically the only significant opposition to the Nazis means no more than that in the wider sense practically all Germans had become socialists, and that liberalism in the old sense had been driven out by socialism. As we hope to show, the conflict in existence between the National-Socialist "Right" and the "Left" in Germany is the kind of conflict that will always arise between rival socialist factions. If this interpretation is correct it means, however, that many of those socialist refugees, in clinging to their beliefs, are now, though with the best will in the world, helping to lead their adopted country the way which Germany has gone.

它忽略了一个事实，八十年前约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒在写他伟大的著作《论自由》，从两个德国人歌德和威廉·冯·洪堡那里获得的灵感多过其他任何人；它忘了另一个事实，国家社会主义最有影响的两个思想先驱，托马斯·卡莱尔和休斯顿·斯图加特·张伯伦，一个苏格兰人一个英格兰人。认为德国人邪恶的观点粗制滥造，对那些借用德国种族主义最坏的一点来维护该观点的人来说，是个耻辱。问题不是德国人为什么自身邪恶，他们不可能天生比其他民族更邪恶；问题是确定什么样的环境在过去七十年使得某些特定思想逐步成长并最终取胜成为可能，以及最终为什么这个胜利让他们最邪恶的一面登峰造极。此外，仅仅仇恨德国人的一切，而不是现在支配德国人的某些思想，非常危险，它蒙蔽了醉心如此的人，认识不到真正的威胁。应让人担心的是，这种态度常常只是一种逃避主义，不愿意承认思潮已不限于德国的趋势，不愿意重新审视、必要时放弃那些从德国照搬过来、蛊惑当年的德国人一样蛊惑我们的信仰。相信德国人特有的邪恶导致纳粹产生的论点，很可能成为把正是导致邪恶产生的制度强加于我们头上的借口，这不啻双倍的危险。

本书将提出的对纳粹在德国、意大利发展的阐释和大多数国外观察家以及这两个国家的流亡人士所持看法很不同。但如果本书阐释正确，它也将解释为什么象大多数流亡人士、英美报刊海外通讯员等这些持有现在流行的社会主义观点的人难以从正确角度认识这些事件。一个肤浅且误导的观点是，认为纳粹的产生仅仅是缘于某些人因特权、私利受到社会主义壮大的威胁而做出的反应；这个观点自然得到了所有曾经在孕育纳粹的思想运动中活跃，后来发展过程中因与纳粹冲突而终止，被迫流亡国外人士的支持。人数上来说，他们是仅有的重要的反纳粹力量，但这个情况仅仅意味着，在更广泛的意义上，实际上所有德国人都成了社会主义者，过去意义上的自由主义已经被社会主义赶跑了。我们希望展示，德国纳粹“右翼”和“左翼”之间存在的冲突也总会在社会主义阵营内部的对立派别之间出现。如果阐释正确，它意味着，那些社会主义流亡人士，抱着他们的信念，带着全世界最良好的愿望，然而，现在正在帮助他们所寄居的国家走上德国曾经的道路。

¹As some people may think this statement exaggerated, the testimony of Lord Morley may be worth quoting, who in his *Recollections* speaks of the "acknowledged point" that the main argument of the essay *On Liberty* "was not original but came from Germany".

I know that many of my English friends have sometimes been shocked by the semi-Fascist views they would occasionally hear expressed by German refugees, whose genuinely socialist convictions could not be doubted. But while these English observers put this down to their being Germans, the true explanation is that they were socialists whose experience had carried them several stages beyond that yet reached by socialists in this country. It is true, of course, that German socialists have found much support in their country from certain features of the Prussian tradition; and this kinship between Prussianism and socialism, in which in Germany both sides gloried, gives additional support to our main contention².

But it would be a mistake to believe that the specific German rather than the socialist element produced totalitarianism. It was the prevalence of socialist views and not Prussianism that Germany had in common with Italy and Russia and it was from the masses and not from the classes steeped in the Prussian tradition, and favoured by it, that National-Socialism arose.

我知道我的很多英国朋友有时候偶尔听到德国流亡人士所表达的半法西斯观点震惊不已。这些流亡人士，真正信仰社会主义，不容置疑。这些英国观察家把这归因于他们是德国人，而真正的解释是，德国社会主义者的亲身经历使他们远远超出了英国社会主义者几条街。当然，的确，德国社会主义者在本国因某些普鲁士民族传统大获支持；在德国，普鲁士主义和社会主义都被引以为豪，两者之间的渊源，为我们的主要论点提供了额外的支持。

但相信是特殊的德国因素而不是社会主义的因素导致了极权主义的产生，那是错的。德国与意大利、俄罗斯共同有的是社会主义观点的大流行，而不是普鲁士主义。纳粹是从大众中兴起的，不是从沉浸于、受惠于普鲁士传统的那些德国阶级中兴起的。

² That there did exist a certain kinship between socialism and the organisation of the Prussian State, consciously organised from the top as in no other country, is undeniable and was freely recognised already by the early French socialists. Long before the ideal of running the whole state on the same principles as a

single factory was to inspire nineteenth-century socialism, the Prussian poet Novalis had already deplored that "no other state has ever been administered so much like a factory as Prussia since the death of Frederick William." (Cf. Novalis [Friedrich von Hardenberg], *Glauben und Liebe, oder der König und die Königin*, 1798.)